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In 2016, when real-estate heir and reality-television figure Donald Trump 
was  unexpectedly elected president of the United States, media were to blame. 
 Mainstream media (the news) had missed a silent majority of working-class  voters 
in their focus on the opinions and preferences of coastal elites. Marginal media 
(fake news) had manufactured lies and manipulated low-information voters. 
Quantitative media (data) had used faulty models and outdated polling techniques 
to predict the outcome. Social media (Twitter) had been weaponized to  manipulate 
the news cycle and bully and intimidate critics. Deleted, hacked, and ultimately 
leaked media (e-mails) had cast doubt on an otherwise trustworthy candidate. 
Even the electoral college—a sort of political medium designed to transmit and 
translate the will of the voters into the constitutional form of elected office—had 
failed to accurately reflect and communicate the choice of a majority of voters.
While the full impact of Trump’s election will take many years to play out, the 
initial surprise—some might say shock—it generated reveals a great deal about the 
relationship between politics and media (or politics as media) in  contemporary 
American culture. The first revelation is the vast quantity and heterogeneity of 
information sources. Data, images, private messages, public proclamations, 
 professional insiders, and renegade outsiders were all deemed credible in some 
context for some audience. Media have perhaps never before been so numerous 
or so diverse. The second point is that in spite of this variety, all of these forms are 
still considered nonfiction media. For the audiences they attract, they engender a 
degree of faith in their ability to accurately reflect reality. Simply put, they can tell 
the truth. They are, in other words, documentary media. And finally, of course, 
they were all wrong.
xvi    Preface
The text that follows will explain how the media landscape that produced this 
particular cultural and political event came to be over the prior fifteen to twenty 
years. My focus is not on Trump or the 2016 election specifically, but rather on the 
climate of political polarization that emerged in wake of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001; the culture of innovation that emerged with widespread access 
to digital technology in the late 1990s; and the persistence of a faith in nonfiction 
media to mobilize citizens that dates back to the earliest photographs and takes off 
in the early twentieth century. I will demonstrate that our current period of rapid 
evolution in documentary or nonfiction media has several historical precedents 
(chapter 1), and that its impact can be seen in a variety of contemporary forms 
including film (chapter 2), social media (chapter 3), video games (chapter 4), and 
data visualization (chapter 5). The final chapter will place these same forces— 
technology, politics, and nonfiction media—into the context of the 2016 election 
by looking at the role of conspiracy theories and midstream news outlets in the 
rise of Donald Trump. Moments of political rupture like the one we are living 
through produce a need for new forms of media capable of expressing and reflecting 
competing sets of values about what is or ought to be in our shared cultural life. 
This search to discover new forms of media capable of expressing these shared 
values—to determine, in other words, where truth lies—is what this book is about.
1
1
Seeing in the Dark
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to 
spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. . . . It is a mean, nasty, 
dangerous dirty business out there, and we have to operate in that arena.
—Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 16, 2001
Here in the pre-dawn darkness of Afghanistan, we can see the light of a 
new day on the horizon. . . . [T]hrough dark days we have drawn strength 
from .  .  . the ideals that have guided our nation and lit the world: a belief 
that all people are created equal, and deserve the freedom to determine their 
destiny. That is the light that guides us still.
—Barack Obama, press conference, May 1, 2012
It’s all working out. Just remember, everything that you’re seeing, everything 
that you’re reading, it’s not what’s happening.
—Donald Trump, speaking to veterans, July 24, 2018
The statements in this chapter’s epigraph punctuate a dramatic period in the 
 history of the United States. In the early days of a postmillennium presidency, 
just two weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Vice President 
Dick Cheney presaged that the country would be forced to “work  .  .  . the dark 
side” and “spend time in the shadows” to wage a battle for which there would be 
“no end date.” Signaling an end to the (relative) peace and prosperity of the prior 
decade, this new world was “mean, nasty, dirty dangerous,” and survival in this 
landscape would require “any means at our disposal.” Though he was referring to 
the  government’s planned approach to dealing with terrorist threats, in hindsight 
his remarks foretell the long period of deep political turmoil and conflict over 
events yet to come, events that included revelations of secret prisons, torture, 
 human rights abuses, over a hundred thousand civilian causalities, two wars 
abroad, and an unprecedented erosion of civil liberties for average citizens at 
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home. In the midst of this political conflict, the country was further shaken by the 
worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Just over a decade later, on the anniversary of the death of Osama bin Laden, 
however, President Barack Obama reassured the public that this period of  darkness 
was over. The country had emerged from the “dark cloud of war” and was basking 
in “the light of a new day.” Finally, we could rekindle the ideals that “have guided 
our nation and lit the world.” The optimism of Obama’s rhetoric notwithstanding, 
the end of the war that his comments foreshadowed has yet to arrive. Although 
it had moved off of the front page with the targeted killing of bin Laden in 2011, 
Obama maintained a sizable ground force in Afghanistan and dramatically ex-
panded covert drone operations in multiple countries over the course of his two 
terms in office. Rather than ending, the war had, it appeared to his critics, simply 
slipped even further into the shadows.
Indeed, Donald Trump’s comments at a ceremony honoring military veterans 
sought to reassure them that the negative war coverage they saw in the news wasn’t 
an accurate reflection of reality, and that “it’s all working out.” The unpopular war 
he was referring to, however, wasn’t the war on terror that many in his audience 
had fought in over the prior sixteen years in Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather the 
trade war that he had launched with China and other countries by introducing 
tariffs on various imported goods. The other war, the one in Afghanistan (which 
fifteen thousand US troops were still actively fighting at the time that he spoke), 
had receded so far from the mainstream conversation that Trump mentioned it 
only once, almost in passing.
While these remarks reflect widely varying politics and illuminate different 
points in the ongoing tide of the longest-running war in US history, they all rely 
on metaphors of vision and light—optics and occlusion—to signify this period of 
political instability and national uncertainty. The war they implicitly or explicitly 
reference is the ongoing war in Afghanistan, which began shortly after Cheney’s 
remarks—part of the amorphous and ongoing war on terror. Where Cheney wants 
to prepare the public for the darkness and secrecy to come and Obama wants 
to signal a return to transparency and openness, Trump wants to shift public 
 attention elsewhere entirely. All three men evoke images of conflict and darkness, 
but differ on whether it is beginning, ending, or simply not what it seems. What 
was this period of darkness?
The question elicits a range of possibilities, from the horrific nature of vari-
ous historical events, to the disastrous, at times unethical, reactions of the leaders 
tasked with responding to them, to the acute polarization and political conflict that 
surrounded them. But it also emerges in part from the struggle to find sufficient 
images to represent and therefore comprehend historic events that were for many 
unbelievable. I do not mean that there were no images of these events—quite the 
opposite. The 9/11 attacks were widely viewed live on television, and the ensuing 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan were extensively covered on television through 
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the military’s embedded reporting program. Even events and policies hidden from 
the public and official media channels (the execution of Saddam Hussein, the 
torture program at Abu Ghraib, the drone program) produced a gusher of “leaked” 
images to fill the void. Nor am I referring specifically to places like the “Salt Pit” 
near Bagram Air Base or policies like “extraordinary rendition,” which remained 
largely hidden from public view.1
Instead, our lack of sufficient images was a reflection of the political instability 
that the country faced at the dawn of a new historical period, one whose contours 
and dynamics were still occluded from view. Just as optical “seeing” often serves 
as a metaphor for cognitive understanding (“I see what you mean”), representing 
something in an image implies the ability to encapsulate and convey this under-
standing to another person. The period of darkness that emerged in the shadow 
of 9/11 was cast by our inability to understand or respond in a collective way to the 
events that unfolded as the war on terror began. In literal and metaphorical terms, 
we were  unable to “picture” what was happening, incapable of “visualizing” a proper 
response. Instead of the “just” image we needed to shed light on our situation, we 
just had images—to reference Jean-Luc Godard’s well-known turn of phrase.2
The optics of this dark period were, paradoxically, partially pushed forward into 
new territory by the same force that had driven their technological  development 
for much of the previous two centuries: warfare. As scholars such as Paul Virilio, 
Friedrich Kittler, Lisa Parks, and Roger Stahl demonstrate, the connections be-
tween warfare and optical technology run deep, extending down into the classified 
realm of military research—where weapons development spins off into consumer 
technology and out into the popular culture, where in turn war and entertainment 
easily pass for one and the same spectacle.3 Where the old model of two nation-
states squaring off on the battlefield gave way to newer forms of urban guerilla 
combat and invisible insurgencies, modern military weaponry turned to the use of 
information and digital technology—cellular and satellite networks—to track and 
attack a disparate and disconnected enemy on a global battlefield. The complicity 
between the state, the military, and the entertainment industry that Tim Lenoir 
and Luke Caldwell powerfully outline demonstrates how all three collude in 
producing and profiting from the spectacle of war in society.4 The blurring of 
 legal and political lines between previously distinct entities and activities—like 
that between civilians and insurgents, or between military engagement and 
 nation- building—produced a state of generalized confusion.5 For Trump and his 
supporters, even the press and its coverage of these events became an “enemy of 
the American people”.6 These conflicts contributed to the larger impression that 
the United States was in the dark about who and where its enemies were—an 
 impression mirrored in the increasingly “optic-less” and invisible form of warfare 
that the nation was waging.
But even as military strategy and government policy evolved and  expanded to 
face these invisible threats, activists and protest groups took up similar  technologies 
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to expose and oppose these actions, a resistance that also drove the evolution of 
new forms of visual representation.7 The opposition to these uses outlined above 
shaped their evolution as well. For as long as there have been optical recording 
technologies, there have been representations that sought to counter or contest 
their official, state-sanctioned use. Many of the filmmakers who pioneered these 
oppositional modes focused on altering the camera technology—effectively, 
 hacking—as a way of altering or hacking the larger political and commercial 
framework in which it was developed.8 This most recent period was no  exception. 
As historical events forced the United States (in Cheney’s eyes at least) to take 
unprecedented steps, these actions provoked reactions on the part of activists, 
 artists, and everyday citizens. Like Cheney, these dissenting voices were forced 
to “work .  .  . the dark side,” using “any means at our disposal” to articulate and 
 disseminate their opposing viewpoints.
The result was an explosion of experimentation in nonfiction visual represen-
tation, one that combined older technologies like photography, film, and video 
with newer technologies like digital networks, social media, video games, and data 
visualization. These new, hybridized forms combined documentary aesthetics, po-
litical rhetoric, and digital technology. The same political instability that produced 
the war on terror brought each of the above fields into concert with one another—
a development that produced a radical evolution in the technology we use to re-
cord and represent the world and ushered in the emergence of a new “worldview.”9 
What brought us through the darkness was not a new technology, but rather a new 
way of seeing the world itself. This new way of seeing wasn’t a product solely of 
the technology, the state, and the commercial institutions that developed it or the 
individuals who adopted and adapted it, but rather of the political conflicts and 
commitments that drove all three.
The birth of this new worldview is the focus of the text that follows. This book’s 
title, Where Truth Lies, describes the space of transition from one worldview to 
another, a space where the disruption of what once seemed solid and trustworthy 
(or “true”) forced the search for a new “truth” to replace what was lost. Rather than 
an absolute definition of “truth,” it explores how the failure of existing represen-
tational paradigms to account for and describe a world that had suddenly been 
plunged into “darkness” compelled the creation of new paradigms on different 
representational ground. The space of experimentation between destruction and 
rebuilding—its own “ground zero” of sorts—is the space that this book explores. 
It emerges in the overlapping border of the three territories described above: poli-
tics, aesthetics, and technology. The competing worldviews it outlines are as much 
products of the dominant geopolitical regime (referred to in various contexts as 
“neoliberalism,” “multinational capitalism,” “vectoral capitalism,” or “empire”) 
as they are given forms of technological media or the aesthetic representations 
that they produce.10 In this sense, the disruptions that occurred in the last decade 
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 reshuffled what Jacques Rancière refers to as the “distribution of the sensible.” As 
Rancière puts it, “[T]he distribution of the sensible is the system of self-evident 
facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something 
in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions 
within it.”11 The redefinition of where truth lies can be understood as a reorganiz-
ing of the “self-evident facts” and social relations that make up Rancière’s distribu-
tion of the sensible. It is, in other words, a redistribution of the sensible.
Positioned at the cusp of film and digital media, this redistribution sits between 
what was clearly the dominant medium of the twentieth century (the moving im-
age) and what is arguably becoming the dominant medium of the twenty-first 
century (digital technology and the Internet).12 But the emergence of any new me-
dium does not dictate the disappearance of its predecessors. Just as film did not 
eliminate its forerunners (still photography and print) and went on to survive the 
emergence of broadcast technologies like radio and television, moving images in 
general will survive and migrate over into new digital formats and distribution 
technologies.13 And yet, this migration will inevitably change the nature of mov-
ing images, even as moving images equally impact the nature of these new media. 
Film, for example, may have survived and influenced the emergence of its moving-
image counterpart, television, but it became nonetheless significantly different as a 
result. Similarly, film, television, and any number of other existing media continue 
to shape and be shaped by their integration with evolving digital technologies. The 
broad intersection of moving images and digital media thus represents the major 
media transition point occurring today.14
What follows focuses specifically on the interactions between one  particular 
type of moving image—the political documentary—and the different ways it 
shapes and is shaped by digital media. Working at a transitional point in an 
ongoing historical process that is neither uniform nor monolithic, I explore a 
range of documentary and digital materials that bear the marks of their  mutual 
influences to varying extents. Some of these texts are clearly recognizable as 
traditional, feature-length documentary films, and yet they nonetheless bear 
the imprint of digital technology in both form and content. Other works are 
“born” digital and lack any photographic, cinematic, or indexical trace, and yet 
they nonetheless fit within a broad documentary framework by virtue of their 
rhetorical contexts and political agendas. These hybrid media can be explained 
to a limited extent as either documentaries or new media, but they are best 
understood as some mixture of both.15
Political documentary and its long-standing connections to grassroots  activism 
and independent media provide the ideal context for understanding much of the 
political activity taking place online and offline throughout this historical period.16 
At its root, documentary film collects information about the world,  organizes this 
data into a socially meaningful form, and then presents this  information to the 
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public. In the context of political documentary, where abstract values like “ justice” 
and “freedom” are called upon to address specific historical circumstances or  social 
conditions, these aesthetic practices take on the role of rhetorical strategies in-
tended to inform and persuade the public.17 As an aesthetic practice,  documentary 
instantiates or manifests this meaning through a variety of  expressive codes, in-
cluding framing, editing, exposure, sound, and so forth. When social conceptions 
of truth and meaning change over time, documentary aesthetics shape and are 
shaped by these wider ideological shifts.
This mode of aesthetic expression—organizing information into a  socially 
meaningful form—also describes a great deal of the activity taking place in 
 online environments. Indeed, a corporation like Google expresses this boldly 
in its  mission statement, which proclaims that it wants to “organize the world’s 
 information.” Although a digital form like a website or a database is not simply 
another form of documentary film, the same impulse to inform, educate, and 
 persuade that gave rise to documentary film in previous periods shapes a great 
deal of the work being done through digital means. Moreover, documentary’s long 
traditions of participant/independent media production, archival exploration, and 
social discourse/action all find correlates in interactive environments that seek to 
enable user-generated content, tagging, and social networking. Both expressions 
draw on the same social and political impulses, seek the same outcomes, and in-
form one another’s execution even as they differ in the forms of meaning-making 
they undertake.
If part of the ideological disruption and redistribution that I describe lies in 
the interactions between these two forms of media, the rest of it lies in the  specific 
political climate that emerged during the presidency of George W. Bush.18 The 
 extreme controversy generated first by his election in 2000 (the first of many close 
elections that reminded the electorate that “participation matters”) and continuing 
through his handling of the 9/11 terrorist attacks ignited heated political debates 
throughout his term in office. These debates increasingly found expression through 
documentary means in online environments. Moreover, his administration’s 
 general antipathy toward the media and any type of transparency regarding its 
decisions and their consequences unsurprisingly fed a drive toward independent 
investigation and expression by both ends of the political spectrum. Indeed, Dick 
Cheney’s assertion about the need to “work . . . the dark side” and “spend time in 
the shadows” also inadvertently came to characterize the administration’s gener-
ally secretive approach. Consequently, the Bush administration became a natural 
target for a genre like documentary, steeped as it is in the Enlightenment ideal of 
transparency. This genre itself was in the midst of migrating to an environment 
that found its own mantra in Stewart Brand’s well-known claim that “information 
wants to be free.”
As the discrepancy between Cheney’s policy of secrecy and Brand’s mantra of 
transparency indicates, there is a discursive conflict between state politics and 
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digital culture in the years after 9/11. These political debates and broader discus-
sions about the Internet find themselves enmeshed in questions of information, 
democracy, human rights, truth, and the competing interests of the individual and 
society. From its inception, the war on terror was conceptualized both implicitly 
and explicitly as a war of information. Intelligence failures like the inability to 
predict the 9/11 attacks and the mistaken belief in weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq were characterized as resulting from either a lack of information or the 
fabrication of information to lead the country into war. The controversial use of 
torture, on the other hand, is approached as a punishment of the body to access 
information in the mind.19 Similarly, the spread of the Internet and networked cul-
ture are repeatedly evangelized as an information revolution ushering in an era of 
collective intelligence and universal access to information. As the torture debates 
were weighing out the relative importance of individual human rights vis-à-vis 
society’s perceived need for safety, Internet communities were embracing Web 2.0 
technologies to empower a cacophony of individual voices to be heard even as 
these individual voices were orchestrated into mass consensus (as a collectively 
authored site like Wikipedia illustrates).20 Edward Snowden’s shocking revelations 
that the US government was effectively spying on its citizens by covertly collect-
ing information about the communications of its citizens sparked intense debate 
about privacy and state security.21 As neocolonial political debates were waged 
about the need to bring democracy to the Middle East, the Internet was hailed as a 
democratizing source of information and positioned as the new public sphere that 
would return the demos to its rightful center at the heart of public life.
The meeting point between these discourses—between secrecy and the free 
flow of information, between darkness and exposure—is political documentary 
media. With its long tradition of alternative/activist media, political rhetoric, in-
formation dissemination, and collective spectatorship, documentary was ideally 
positioned to address both the prominent political questions that came to the fore 
during this period and the competing utopian and dystopian claims about the role 
of digital media in public life.
THE DIGITAL D O CUMENTARY
While the connections between each of these three areas of focus represent 
 mature fields of research (film and digital media, documentary film and politics, 
 politics and new media), the specific area this book addresses remains  surprisingly 
 underexplored. This is an odd omission for several reasons. First, significant 
moments in the development of documentary form and subject matter have re-
peatedly accompanied and coincided with developments in the technology used 
to produce and distribute these films. Discussions of the Direct Cinema and 
 Cinema Verité movements of the 1960s almost as a rule begin with accounts of 
the development of production technologies such as improved 16mm film stock, 
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 wireless sync sound, and lighter, more mobile cameras.22 And no less important to 
the Direct Cinema movement early on was the distribution these films received 
through television networks—another (relatively) new technology at the time. 
Both developments shaped how the films were made and seen by altering their 
content, form, and audience.23
Given the role technology played in prior moments, the emergence of digi-
tal video cameras, nonlinear editing, and streaming video on the Internet would 
seem to portend another period of rapid evolution. The explosion of stream-
ing platforms such as Netflix and Amazon and the popularity and prominence 
of documentary content within these platforms partially demonstrate this.24 But 
we should be wary of concluding that digital technology has simply ushered in a 
utopian better/faster/cheaper era for documentary film. Indeed, the move from 
the big screen of the theater at film festivals and organizational meetings to the 
small screen of the computer, smartphone, or flat-panel display in the home clear-
ly involves a number of trade-offs for filmmakers, particularly in a genre where 
collective viewing is often fantasized as a form of collective action. Furthermore, 
a simple increase in image quality through camera technology, for example, has 
little effect on the quality of the final film as a film. Quoting Godard again, “There’s 
no point in having sharp images when you have fuzzy ideas.”25 Nonetheless, these 
technological shifts did provide a number of benefits for documentary filmmak-
ers, including expanded access to less expensive, higher-quality production equip-
ment and a greater diversity of distribution options.26
Beyond improvements to image quality and distribution channels, the synthe-
sis of digital technology and documentary film also produced more formally radi-
cal experimentation. This book will follow some of these experiments, seeking to 
locate them within the liminal space between the longer documentary tradition 
and the burgeoning applications of digital media. Doing so establishes the under-
explored influence that documentary (its practices, ethics, and practitioners) had 
on digital media during a period when digital media was itself rapidly evolving 
and establishing a dominant presence in everyday life.
THE POLITICAL D O CUMENTARY
Exploring the impact of film and digital technology on documentary aesthetics 
 implies a determinist connection between the two—a specter that haunts any study 
of the emergence of a new technology.27 The influence of technology undoubtedly 
forms a key component of this evolution, but it is only one part of the equation. 
The radical formal innovation that this book connects with technology has also 
occurred during other historical moments. Documentary as the branch of film-
making focused on the historical world has always been influenced by shifts in the 
society that it seeks to reflect and influence. Rather than a smooth  development 
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between history, aesthetics, and technology, documentary evolves at moments 
of historical rupture and social crisis: wars, economic depressions, and cultural 
 revolutions. These underlying events and the political conflicts they expose are 
what drive the changes that I describe here. As historical events create specific 
challenges for society, filmmakers respond to these challenges by utilizing new 
and existing technologies to forge new rhetorical, formal, and aesthetic gestures.
Documentary as a genre is a notoriously capacious concept that covers 
a  heterogeneous variety of rhetorical modes and poetic registers, from state 
 propaganda to cultural ethnography to autobiographical expression. However, 
certain historical periods appear to have pushed the integration of new technology 
into the wider documentary lexicon. In particular, three prior historical moments 
reveal an evolution similar to the digital evolution I am addressing: (1) the 1930s 
and 1940s; (2) the late 1960s and early 1970s; and (3) the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
At each of these points, documentary filmmakers utilized new forms of technol-
ogy to respond to specific social and political crises. In the 1930s and 1940s, film-
makers such as John Grierson, Pare Lorentz, Frank Capra, and Leni Riefenstahl 
utilized new sound technologies to create state-sponsored films that addressed 
social issues related to the Great Depression and World War II. Their films utilized 
what would eventually be termed “voice of God” narration to articulate the aims 
and nationalist endeavors of the state. As previously mentioned, in the 1960s and 
1970s, American Direct Cinema filmmakers and other collectives like Newsreel 
utilized newly available 16mm sync sound equipment, faster film stock, and lighter 
cameras to document the rise of the American counterculture and stimulate resis-
tance to the war in Vietnam. This countercultural ethos was once again mirrored 
in the form of their films, all of which shunned voice-of-God narration in favor of 
observation and participant interviews. And finally, the work of filmmakers such 
as Jill Godmilow, Rea Tajiri, Jenny Livingston, Marlon Fuentes, and Marlon Riggs 
responded in the 1980s and 1990s to the culture war issues of the HIV/AIDS crisis, 
Reagan-era cutbacks of social welfare programs, the defunding of the arts, and 
other issues by turning to video to create deeply personal films meant to reflect the 
issues of specific subgroups. These performative films sought to bring what many 
had deemed the obscene “on/scene” by exploring the experiences and identities of 
these groups in a visible, mainstream form of media expression.28
These previous periods also demonstrate significant developments in docu-
mentary’s rhetorical approach to what Jerry Kuehl calls its “truth claims” about the 
historical world.29 As different groups turn to documentary to further their social 
and political aims, they bring with them very different theoretical and philosophi-
cal influences, which in turn produce different rhetorical strategies for speaking 
about the world. As Jonathan Kahana points out, voice-of-God documentary in 
the 1930s and 1940s, which sought to provide governmental transparency to the 
populace, originated in the pragmatist philosophy of thinkers like John Dewey, 
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Walter Lippmann, and A. D. Lindsay. For these theorists and the filmmakers they 
influenced, the general public needed to understand the true nature of the com-
plicated workings of large government bureaucracies; hence the need for films 
that performed this edifying function.30 As historians of activist collectives like 
Newsreel have pointed out, theorists such as Herbert Marcuse influenced young 
activists to pursue independent representations of truth in opposition to the ideo-
logical truths of the state and mainstream media. In other words, countercultural 
filmmakers were offering the people’s truth to counter the dominant state truth.31 
Finally, films in the 1980s and 1990s reflect the “post” systems of thought (postco-
lonialism, postmodernism, post-Fordism) that deconstructed master narratives 
of truth, giving way to smaller-scale truth claims regarding the legitimacy of al-
ternative identity formulations and a conscious utilization of aesthetic form as an 
expressive tool.
It is worth pointing out that the films that I am highlighting here and the 
 innovative formal characteristics they exhibited do not necessarily represent the 
dominant or most popular styles of the time. Instead, they demonstrate rela-
tively new modes of expression that came to characterize a particular political 
or ideological position within their respective contexts. This stylistic innovation 
emerged from creative uses of new technology—a move driven out of the desire 
to push political expression in new directions. But these formally inventive ex-
periments emerged alongside plenty of more conventional work. Similarly, the 
characteristics that I will outline in the following chapters are not necessarily the 
dominant mode or style of post-9/11 documentary. Many remain one-off experi-
ments that failed to generate any significant trend or imitation. Nonetheless, all 
are  noteworthy because they managed to establish something new within the 
political conversation where they appeared. Many in fact achieved this influence 
because they originated from and came to represent previously marginalized 
groups. This was particularly the case with the formally innovative films that 
appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
THE AESTHETICS OF POLITICS
The performative documentary of the late 1980s and early 1990s deserves  extended 
discussion, not only because it directly precedes the 9/11 political context but also 
because it was a point at which aesthetics self-reflexively emerge as a fundamental 
tool (one is tempted to say “weapon”) for politically motivated work. Whereas the 
two prior periods utilized a particular aesthetic form to express and  instantiate 
the political positions they espoused, for both, questions of aesthetics were an 
unacknowledged, almost regrettable, component of documentary expression. 
 Indeed, one way to characterize the move from the institutionally driven, voice-
of-God films to the Direct Cinema and Cinema Verité films is as a conscious 
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move to limit artifice in favor of directly exposing or observing what was taking 
place before the camera.
For groundbreaking political filmmakers in the 1980s and 1990s, however, 
 aesthetic form was consciously embraced as the fundamental ground on which the 
political battle was to be waged. As before, changes in production and  distribution 
technologies (the emergence of consumer-grade video cameras and public  access 
on expanding cable networks) emerged alongside a broader  epistemological shift 
about the problematic nature of different forms of representation.  Scholars and 
practitioners across fields such as history and anthropology as well as the arts and 
humanities began to question the ethics and accuracy involved in their work. As 
Hayden White demonstrated, clear distinctions between form and  content blur 
to the degree to which meaning becomes a product of the particular  narrative 
form that a given texts adopts.32 Ethnographic filmmakers like David  MacDougall, 
 building on the work of anthropologists like Clifford Geertz, began self- 
consciously inserting themselves into their stories, implicitly undermining the 
objective  authority once taken for granted by the camera/observer. In the work of 
practitioners and theorists such as Trinh T. Minh-ha, aesthetic form became cen-
tral to documentary’s legitimacy as a mode of expression rather than a  regrettable 
drawback to be avoided at all costs.33
These insights shifted documentary expression past its “talking head” ex-
perts and fly-on-the-wall observations to a more experimental, expressive mode 
of representation that consciously utilized and maximized aesthetic form rather 
than minimizing its intrusions. Even a more mainstream filmmaker like Michael 
Moore, whose 1989 Roger & Me falls directly within the performative era I am de-
scribing here, filters his populist politics through an individual, autobiographical 
framework, tracking the impact of capitalism on his hometown of Flint, Michigan, 
and appearing on-screen as the dominant persona of his films. During this period, 
documentary film, fine art, experimental film, video art, and grassroots activist 
practices all began to cross-pollinate.34 This created a level of fluid hybridity be-
tween forms and modes that would reemerge in the post-9/11 period.
But this prior period of political conflict and formal experimentation also pro-
vided a paradoxical legacy for documentary filmmakers and independent activists 
responding to the war on terror. On one hand, in 9/11 and the war on terror they 
were confronted for the first time since the Vietnam War with an acute crisis of 
national magnitude. The scale of the conflict and the urgency of the issues at stake 
created the impulse to speak to the widest possible audience about divisive politi-
cal issues. On the other hand, they were utilizing a medium that seemed to have 
lost its rhetorical power to mobilize a mass population, one less willing than ever 
to take to the streets and march on anything.35 Indeed, the formal turn in docu-
mentary filmmaking during the 1980s and 1990s brought a conscious rejection of 
a single, universal political truth and a recognition that documentary aesthetics 
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were part of the content of the form. This would seem to leave little space for ei-
ther formal innovation or political engagement. And yet, the period after the 2000 
presidential election and 9/11 ignited an era of widespread political engagement 
that was reflected in a surge of politically focused documentary film production.36
The convergence of political and technological forces cast all of the received 
categories up for grabs, creating an opening for this new period of formal evolu-
tion. Rather than a “universal truth,” much of this experimentation was directed 
toward exposing a particular injustice against a common enemy. For example, 
many political documentary films began to levy their truth claims over and 
against those offered by the mainstream media, as Charles Musser has argued.37 
That is, instead of purporting to present a state truth or an antistate truth, as films 
in the 1930s/1940s and 1960s/1970s did (or, in the case of 1980s  documentary, 
an anti-normative truth), documentary films after 2000 counterpose their truth 
claims against an increasingly polarized and politically distrusted “media” truth. 
(For the political right, the object of this distrust is typically the New York Times, 
while for the left, the role is filled by Fox News.) This rejection of mainstream 
news sources only increased throughout this period, reaching a crescendo in the 
divisive relationship between Donald Trump and what he refers to as the “fake” 
mainstream news.
Moreover, in the last thirty years, documentary films that address political is-
sues seem to have realized the futility of speaking to those beyond an audience of 
sympathetic viewers. While this audience has often been a specific constituency, 
the polarized political environment in the wake of the contested 2000 presidential 
election simplified and solidified these constituencies into two major wings. (To 
paraphrase George Bush’s own terms, “You’re either with us or against us.”) This 
divisiveness enlarged the potential constituency for any given film to roughly half 
of the population. Thus, for the first time since Vietnam, documentary films had 
the freedom to speak to specific groups that were already inclined to believe the 
truth claims they presented about issues that affected everyone. This expanded 
audience provided the perfect environment for the renaissance of political docu-
mentary and documentary experimentation produced in the first decades of the 
twenty-first century.38
The historical legacy of documentary film as a viable form of political action 
and mobilization accounts for its reemergence on the national scene. As an activist 
form of independent media, documentary provided an alternative media model 
for a number of activists organizing in various digital environments. The gener-
alized distrust of the mainstream media that characterizes our current moment 
partially explains the resurgence of documentary’s popularity, but we should also 
attend to the incorporation of other alternative forms of participant media, from 
weblogs and podcasts to Twitter feeds and wikis. The same impulse that gave rise 
to political documentary films in prior moments is now a driving force in the 
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way these other, newer forms of digital media are deployed in current social and 
 political battles.
Each of the following chapters offers a comparative analysis of two  different 
media objects or texts situated at some point along the spectrum between 
 documentary film and digital media. I focus exclusively on the historical 
 period that begins with the dot-com crash of 1999, the 2000 election, and the 
9/11  terrorist attacks and ends with the election of Donald Trump. However, I 
draw on  prior  moments as they inform the central texts I consider. Given that 
many of the  political issues that arose during the administration of George W. 
Bush scarcely subsided with the return to power of the Democratic Party and 
reemerged with the Trump administration, my concluding chapter follows 
this formal evolution into the era of “posttruth politics” and “fake news” that 
 characterized the 2016 election.
Chapter 2 explores the impact of nonlinear digital editing and  compositing 
 programs on traditional documentary film by presenting a close reading of 
the  recent work of Errol Morris—particularly his two films about war, politics, 
and technology: Standard Operating Procedure and The Fog of War. In the arc 
of  Morris’s career, the two films present something of a paradox. On one hand, 
both deploy all of the standard tropes of his by-now signature style: Interrotron-
enforced eye contact, richly staged reenactment, plentiful archival material, and 
visually dense montage sequences set to hypnotic music. Moreover, both films 
deal directly with questions of war, the military, and the mediated, moving-image 
representations we have of both. And yet these films respectively represent the 
high and low points of his career. Though somewhat controversial with critics for 
its treatment of  Robert McNamara, The Fog of War generated nearly $21 million 
at the box office and garnered Morris the Academy Award for Best Documentary. 
Going into Standard Operating Procedure, it seemed as though his films had finally 
received the mainstream attention and studio backing many felt he had always 
deserved. The success, however, was short-lived as the film debuted to even greater 
controversy and went on to fail commercially as well (earning just over $300,000 
total). Leaving aside why one film succeeded where the other failed, my reading 
claims that the controversial subject matter both explore allows Morris to address 
a larger point about the capability of media representation. I argue that this col-
lage style is now the product of a certain form of database aesthetic in which the 
elements of the historical record (the archive) act as discrete elements that can be 
mixed and remixed depending upon the particular discursive context one wishes 
to construct.39
The irony inherent in his critique of media representation is that at this stage 
in his career Morris himself can almost be considered a multimedia artist. Both of 
these films were extensively expanded in companion books, and Morris contrib-
utes material regularly to a blog for the New York Times as well as to his webpage, 
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ErrolMorris.com. That is, as Morris’s films critique the omnipresence of represen-
tational recording technology and demonstrate the extent to which it can lead us 
to disastrous conclusions, his other outside activities contribute to the saturation 
he criticizes. These extracinematic materials also demonstrate the beginnings of a 
symbiosis between film and other forms of media.
But radical experimentation was also taking place elsewhere. If Errol Morris 
demonstrates the influence of digital technology and documentary’s encroach-
ment into other forms of media, Robert Greenwald’s 2003–4 film Uncovered: 
The War in Iraq and its relationship to the political advocacy group MoveOn.org 
reveals a full-fledged interdependence between the two. As grassroots political-
organizing groups moved into online spaces in the early days of the web, they pio-
neered the use of streaming video as a recruitment tool. Indeed, a quick glance at 
political-action websites from the period ranging from those on the left (Reprieve.
org, Witness.org) to those on the right (RightMarch.com, TeaPartyPatriots.org) 
reveals a universal reliance on streaming video footage to articulate a group’s mes-
sage and document its past action. The use of video in these contexts demonstrates 
a crucial synergy between newly available online technologies and the century-old 
documentary tradition. As the social web slowly emerged and took shape in the 
early 2000s, online advocacy groups were experimenting with community build-
ing and online organizing. Documentary’s ability to marshal evidence with ar-
gument to present a call to action found a natural home on websites capable of 
providing an immediate outlet for the impulse.
Chapter 3 analyzes one of the key historical moments in the remediation of 
nonfiction video and online political organizing: the 2004 collaboration of director 
Robert Greenwald (Outfoxed and Walmart: The High Cost of Low Prices) and the 
political action powerhouse MoveOn.org. This chapter provides both a historical 
account of the release of Outfoxed and an analysis of the extent to which MoveOn 
and Greenwald relied on one another to achieve their specific goals. Utilizing this 
cross-pollination as a case study, I analyze the mutual synergies between these 
two forms of media in order to demonstrate the necessity of each for the other as 
well as to interrogate the extent to which both forms still rely on real-world action 
to achieve their ends. Even as political action and its attendant images continue 
to move online, the goal remains to move people toward direct action in the real 
world. The efficacy of this new form of digital activism and its comparison with 
other forms of activism also form part of the story that unfolds here.
Whereas chapter 2 presents a traditional documentary film that bears some of 
the imprint of digital logic and chapter 3 explores the use of documentary images 
in online spaces, chapter 4 presents wholly digital media influenced by a docu-
mentary logic. It offers a comparative analysis of two online, interactive video 
games with clear political overtones. The first is the Gone Gitmo project, which 
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attempted to re-create the real but inaccessible Guantánamo Bay prison complex 
in Second Life, a virtual but accessible online environment. The project uses vari-
ous “documentary” sources for its re-creation and seeks to raise awareness about 
the political issues involved in the prison. The second is the America’s Army video 
game, which, since 2002, has served as a recruiting tool for the US Army. The game 
offers players the chance to participate with other players in missions that simulate 
battles in Iraq and elsewhere. Although both games completely forsake the photo-
graphic indexicality that is documentary’s tie to the historical world, both games 
utilize the documentary impulse to intervene in and motivate the individual to 
act in the real world. Both texts engage in a give-and-take exchange with reality in 
ways that mirror earlier documentary film efforts, and yet, the mechanisms that 
drive this exchange are clearly different. Such tactics were utilized by the state in 
propaganda training and recruitment films like the Why We Fight series in World 
War II and by individuals in both observational and performative documenta-
ries in the 1970s and 1980s. As the cultural theorist Johan Huizinga points out, 
the move from spectator to player involves the participant in a methectic rather 
than mimetic relationship to the representation. This move gives Gone Gitmo and 
America’s Army a powerful form of interpellation that engages participants in the 
new forms of subjectivity that both seek to achieve.40
Chapter 5 looks at the use of data visualization in government transparency ini-
tiatives during the first years of the Barack Obama administration. While Obama 
attempted to use twenty-first-century tools to create what he called “the most open 
administration ever,” his efforts were ironically sidestepped by the unprecedented 
information releases of the anarchist/activist group WikiLeaks. At the same time 
that Obama was seeking to digitize and visualize government records, WikiLeaks 
was actively challenging the barriers between public and private entirely. Even as 
WikiLeaks reached for a series of optically driven Enlightenment metaphors to 
characterize its objectives (light, truth, sunshine, transparency), both utilized non-
optical media to achieve this. Moving from the documentary image to digital data 
in an aestheticized form, chapter 5 provides a historical look back into the history 
of the transparency debates while also looking forward to the shape these debates 
will play in coming decades.
Chapter 6 considers two of the primary by-products of the bitterly fought 
2016 presidential election and the emergence of what many have characterized 
as the “posttruth” political style of its surprise winner, Donald Trump. The first 
is the role being played by conspiracy theory and paranoid speculation, both of 
which fueled Trump’s entrée into national politics and clouded his ascension to 
the White House. Prior to the election, many of Trump’s critics highlighted his 
relationship with dubious theories and fringe political figures, including Alex 
Jones of InfoWars, as evidence of his dangerous disregard for the truth. Exhibit 
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A was Trump’s promotion of “birtherism” (the theory that Barack Obama was 
not born in the United States) as a race-baiting means of gaining attention and 
undermining the legitimacy of the sitting president. After the election, however, 
as news began to circulate of possible Russian interference, election hacking, and 
secret dossiers, many of these critics fell victim to the same forms of conspiratorial 
speculation that just months earlier had seemed at best delusional, and at worst, 
irresponsible. As a form of independent speculation and alternative-media cre-
ation that seeks to question power and challenge existing narrative frameworks, 
conspiracy media and the theories it promotes offer a version of nonfiction media 
not entirely divorced from documentary film. And yet, the mode of paranoia and 
suspicion in which they operate forms a corrosive, adversarial context in which to 
debate and engage political ideas.
The second object this chapter considers is the emergence of a new breed of 
independent news outlet that I refer to as the “midstream media.” Positioned 
 between the mainstream media and the more fringe figures like Alex Jones, 
these midtier players exemplify the new breed of news organization that played 
a pivotal in the election and the so-called fake news debates that it produced. 
Steven Bannon’s Brietbart News Network and Glen Greenwald’s news organiza-
tion The Intercept offer good examples of the midstream market more broadly. 
Ideologically, the two sites could not be further separated, and yet they bear a 
striking material resemblance to one another: both are independently funded 
by a select group of wealthy individuals, both occupy a position somewhere 
 between mainstream media and the polarized extremes of independent media, 
and both critique the failure of existing media to hold governments accountable 
and provide truth to the public
While both of these developments (the rise of conspiracy media and the more 
polarized midstream media) seemed to emerge in the context of the 2016 election 
as endemic qualities of Trump and his unique political brand, this chapter dem-
onstrates that both are the result of longer-standing trends in American political 
culture. Indeed, both emerge and grow as a result of the same forces that shaped 
all of the different objects that this book considers: a rapidly evolving media envi-
ronment ever more suffused by digital technology, and a highly charged political 
environment that emerged in the wake of 9/11. In this sense, the chapter continues 
the formal construction and political/technological focus of the earlier chapters 
while providing a conclusion to the argument as a whole.
Taken together, these chapters explore the emergence of the “digital documentary” 
by placing equal weight on both sides of the term, arguing that documentary in-
forms the digital as surely as the digital informs documentary. As “data”  becomes 
the central lens through which we view ourselves and the world around us, 
 existing nonfiction practices such as documentary film will be the primary media 
that shape how digital media impact and express our individual worldviews.41 In 
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seeking legitimacy as a mode of expression, digital media drew on the precedent 
set by documentary, and in grappling with the impact of digital media on our 
lives, documentary began to express the different fears and fascinations surround-
ing the transformation. If the first decades of the twenty-first century did indeed 
cast us into the dark, as our various political leaders would have us believe, it was 
a combination of both digital culture and documentary film that brought us back 
into the light—an evolution of forms and practices that worked to show us “where 
truth lies” for the century to come.
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“We See What We Want to Believe”
Archival Logic and Database Aesthetics in the  
War Films of Errol Morris
Nothing is more frightening than a labyrinth that has no center.
—G. K. Chesterton
INTRODUCTION
In May of 2000, in connection with the premiere of his television series First 
 Person on the Bravo network, documentary filmmaker Errol Morris launched his 
first home page on the World Wide Web at www.errolmorris.com. Initially the 
site greeted visitors with the Chesterton quote above—a wry commentary on the 
 rhizomatic, decentralized structure of the web. But beyond this, it offered little 
more than the standard webpage info (biography, filmography, interviews, etc.—
what the site would later link to as the “BORING stuff ”). After a few months, 
however, Morris published a black-and-white image of a horse’s skull with crosses 
over the eyes next to the following list:
Why It Makes Sense to Beat a Dead Horse
 1. Sets an example for other horses
 2. Aerobic workout
 3. Horse might not be dead yet
 4. Tenderizes the meat
 5. Horse is unable to fight back
 6. Makes you feel good1
This list was one of several the site would feature over the coming months and 
years. (Others include “Why It Makes Sense to Bite the Hand That Feeds You” 
and “Why It Makes Sense to Wear an Albatross around Your Neck”). It represents 
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 Morris’s first attempt at creating original content for his newly adopted medium 
and foreshadows something of the random, ironic tone that he would develop 
further on the site over the next decade. As it stands today, the site is a  teeming 
 labyrinth all its own, with content drawn randomly and in connection with his 
many film projects, commercials, books, blogs, tweets, and other media that the 
director now uses to explore his selected topics of interest. Far from a simple 
 website promoting his moving-image work, the site is a full-fledged creative pro-
duction of its own, and one of the more interesting utilizations of the Internet by a 
filmmaker to connect and expand upon a multimedia body of work.
As the website and its collection of content demonstrate, Morris occupies a 
unique position in the field of documentary film. On one hand, he ranks among 
the more prominent American documentary filmmakers, standing alongside oth-
er mainstream directors like Michael Moore and Ken Burns. On the other hand, 
Morris has embraced digital technology head-on, incorporating it formally and 
thematically into his cinematic work and as a new medium in its own right through 
his website, blog, and social media accounts. Given his reputation as a director 
willing to take on such abstract topics as truth and human perception, Morris’s 
work also became increasingly relevant (and controversial) in a period marked by 
extreme political polarization and overt ideological confrontation in the United 
States. Throughout his career, Morris’s films have always been structured around a 
basic tension between subjective fallibility and objective truth, or, put differently, 
between individual delusion and social history.2 He has a well-established body 
of work dealing with both the intersection between eccentric personalities with 
unique perspectives (Vernon, Florida [1981], A Brief History of Time [1991], Fast, 
Cheap & Out of Control [1997]) and human access to the past via memory and 
evidence (The Thin Blue Line [1988], Mr. Death [1999]). After 9/11, Morris’s projects 
expanded this focus to include a more direct interrogation of the role of specific 
forms of media in altering or enabling our access to events in the world. In this 
category we could include Tabloid (2010), The Unknown Known (2013), and both 
The Fog of War (2003) and Standard Operating Procedure (2008).
Morris’s first two film projects after 9/11, The Fog of War and Standard Operation 
Procedure, demonstrate an acute concern with the impact of digital technology on 
politics and warfare and a deep integration of technology into the text of the film. 
Beyond simply incorporating CGI and other digital effects into their production, 
these two films demonstrate a willingness to interrogate the widespread influence 
of such technologies on individuals and their perception of the world around 
them. The dense collage of archival material that confronts us in The Fog of War, 
for example, inherently encapsulates and interrogates the archival logic that sur-
rounds much of the drive behind the Internet today.3 In Standard Operating Pro-
cedure the focus turns to a specific form of media—digital photography—directly 
addressing the plasticity of meaning that a database of digital imagery affords. This 
combination of factors makes Morris’s output (both online and on-screen) the 
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ideal object for charting the convergence of these forms in the period after 9/11. 
These films are about digital media as much as they are products of digital media.
As the political controversies of the twenty-first century succeeded one anoth-
er with astonishing rapidity (the 2000 US presidential election, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the open-ended “war on terror,” the 
Patriot Act, and the Guantánamo Bay prison camp, to name a few), such issues 
were increasingly presented and debated in a newly fragmented media landscape 
divided between old and new media. Like the web, American politics increasingly 
became a confusing labyrinth of information and obfuscation, a maze without a 
center. Thus, the principles that had long structured Morris’s films increasingly 
seemed to structure American political discourse as well. Dealing with former 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and with the controversial Abu Ghraib 
photographs, respectively, The Fog of War and Standard Operating Procedure are 
Morris’s most overtly political works to date. Unlike his previous works, which 
uncovered the more obscure corners of the world, both films address people and 
events that had widespread social impact, and both focus on war and the techno-
logical media used to wage and represent it. In doing so, these films and their mul-
timedia offshoots enter the labyrinth of images that shape our collective view into 
past and present, thereby offering an entry point into the evolution of technology, 
politics, and aesthetics during the decade after 9/11.
THE FO G OF WAR’ S  T WIN LO GICS
The Fog of War is structured loosely around eleven lessons drawn from the life of 
Robert McNamara. As James Blight and janet Lang make clear in the eponymous 
book that accompanied the film, these lessons are themselves the product of a 
series of conversations and conferences that McNamara participated in along with 
other leaders via the Wilson Institute’s Critical Oral History conference series. Ini-
tiated by Blight, the project brought together former policymakers and academic 
experts to debate the events and records that make up our collective understand-
ing of the past. Many of these reflections had previously been collected in a volume 
called Wilson’s Ghost, coauthored by McNamara and Blight.4 In the books, these 
reflections take the form of a series of aphorisms drawn from McNamara’s direct 
participation in key historical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam 
War, and to a lesser extent World War II. In essence, they are positioned as his-
tory lessons, not in the sense that they hope to teach us facts about the past, but 
rather that the past itself is offering us insight into how to do things differently in 
the future.
Thus, much of the film’s formal structure and the conclusions it draws regard-
ing its subject existed well before McNamara ever stepped in front of Morris’s In-
terrotron.5 But of course, the film itself is much more than a moving-image inter-
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pretation of thoughts put together elsewhere. That is, in the process of translating 
this material to the screen, Morris adds his own interpretation of the lessons these 
events can teach us and his own view on the perspectives of his subject. Among 
these lessons are two that form the core of the film’s critique: “Lesson 2: Rationality 
Will Not Save Us,” which the film uses to critique the use of computer-driven logic 
and statistical control in warfare; and “Lesson 7: Belief and Seeing,” through which 
the film interrogates the relationship between images and the events they docu-
ment and communicate.6 Both lessons perform the double function of depicting 
McNamara’s recollections on-screen while at the same time setting up the film’s 
larger conclusions about our own computational and photographic approaches to 
the past and, indeed, to reality itself.
McNamara is in many ways an ideal figure to explore the connections between 
media, the rise of computational logic and control, and politics and warfare. He is 
most associated with being the early architect of the Vietnam War, an ambitious 
bureaucrat who was appointed by President John F. Kennedy to oversee and over-
haul the sprawling Department of Defense. He eventually led it down the path of 
its most disastrous military endeavor. In a sense, he was neither a media figure nor 
a computer scientist, but his time in politics arrived when computation and media 
were becoming essential elements of both. His tenure as the head of the Pentagon 
witnessed one of the most ambitious integrations of warfare and computation to 
date, and his Department of Defense was one of biggest investors in the early stages 
of computer networking and remote command and control.7 As the United States 
launched its war on Afghanistan in 2001 and word of the first drones and other 
technologized weaponry began to dominate the news cycle, these issues were back 
in the headlines. It is worth recalling that these were connections that began when 
McNamara was at the head of the Department of Defense. These are connections 
that Morris was certainly aware of, and they are themes that permeate the film.
To get a sense of these larger conclusions, we need look no further than the 
opening of the film. The first footage we see is a grainy, black-and-white television 
recording of a young McNamara standing behind a podium adjusting the height 
of a chart and asking his audience if this is “a reasonable height for people to see.” 
The camera then cuts to McNamara at the podium, where he states: “Earlier to-
night . . . let me first ask the TV ‘Are you ready? . . . all set?’ ” Just as he is about to 
begin again, the film cuts to the opening credits. Intercut with the credits and set 
to Phillip Glass’s score are more grainy, archival shots of soldiers on a ship looking 
out at the horizon using various devices (binoculars, sonar equipment, maps, and 
charts) and apparently preparing for a battle of some sort.
Taken together, these two brief moments hint at the primary themes in the 
film. We are introduced, via the news footage, to McNamara not just as the film’s 
main subject and sole interviewee but further as someone who is media savvy and 
thoroughly controls the message he is about to send. This is a message, moreover, 
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that will be delivered with the aid of charts and graphs, delivered in a manner that’s 
“reasonable” to the audience. Reducing the impact of what he wants to say for 
those assembled in the room with him at the time matters less than making sure 
that the “TV” is ready. The film’s opening, an ironic “behind the scenes” begin-
ning from the past, also serves as an indicator and a reminder of the manipulated 
nature of the media through which such messages are transmitted. Lest we miss 
it, the closing of the opening credits gives way to the following exchange between 
McNamara and Morris:
McNamara: Let me hear your voice level so I can know if it’s the same.
Morris: [off-screen]. How’s my voice level?
McNamara:  Fine. Now I remember exactly the sentence that I left off on. I 
remember how it started, and I was cut off in the middle, but you 
can go back and fix it up somehow. I don’t want to go back and 
introduce the sentence because I know exactly what I want to say.
Morris: Go ahead.
McNamara: Okay. Any military commander . . .8
As in his archival appearance before the cameras, McNamara is once again 
fully in control of his message, to the extent that he suggests how Morris should 
eventually edit the film by “fixing it up somehow.” Rather than take this advice, 
 Morris instead chooses to include it, reminding us once again that such messages 
are shaped and framed not just by those who send them but also by the media that 
transmit them.
The footage in between these two clips is no less significant. As described, it 
consists of various soldiers on a battleship studying their environment and prepar-
ing to act on their observations. Although presented only in brief segments lasting 
no more than a few seconds each, they all depict what must be a very routine set 
of events in a hostile environment. A situation is observed via optical, infrared, 
and topographic means (binoculars, sonar, and maps, respectively) in order to 
determine the proper response. Once a decision has been made, the information 
is communicated and a course of action is set. This, of course, is no different than 
what most of us do in every waking moment as we observe and respond to our 
environments, but in this case the stakes are far higher; given the presence of mas-
sive cannons and the assembly of bombs and other munitions, these actions and 
perceptions become a matter of life and death.
Taken together, these reminders of the mediated nature of media and the ar-
chival footage of preparing for battle offer the viewer a stern warning about the 
information we use to reach our own conclusions and determine our actions as 
we take in the flow of information from the media that surround us. We should 
be on guard, it seems, not just against the potentially flawed and mediated mes-
sages we receive, but also against the conclusions we make and the actions we 
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take based on those messages. This point is further reiterated and explored in the 
two “core” lessons from the film.
“LESSON 2 :  R ATIONALIT Y WILL NOT SAVE US”
Throughout the book version of The Fog of War, as well as in the other written 
material by McNamara and Blight, the aphorism that “rationality will not save us” 
forms the backbone of their reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis.9 This is the 
point that McNamara puts forth in the film as well. Throughout the documents 
collected in the text, some of which are excerpted in the film, the authors paint a 
picture of a world standing at the brink of a nuclear war that is narrowly averted at 
the last minute by one factor: luck. As McNamara puts it in the film:
I want to say, and this is very important: at the end we lucked out! It was luck that 
prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear war at the end. [Gestures by 
bringing thumb and forefinger together until they almost touch.] Rational  individuals: 
Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational 
 individuals came that close to the total destruction of their societies. And that 
 danger exists today. The major lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is this: the indefinite 
 combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.10
Thus, for McNamara and Blight, the danger posed by nuclear weapons lies in the 
irreversibility of a single bad decision in the face of a conflict like the one in which 
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro found themselves in October 1962. Even ratio-
nal leaders such as these can make a reasonable choice based on faulty information 
and incorrect assumptions that will lead to disastrous consequences. Surely this 
seems accurate, and nothing in the film works to contradict it.
In their dismissal of the ability of rationality to solve such problems, both Blight 
and McNamara leave oddly unexplored the role that rationality plays in creating 
them. That is, by pointing to rationality’s failure at a key historical moment, they 
miss the extent to which it was responsible for producing this moment in the first 
place. This lesson is not lost on the film. The Fog of War spends a good deal of 
time visually exploring the role that instrumental rationality played in creating 
McNamara’s own perspective. This critique arises subtly from the structure of the 
film’s visual materials. Shortly after the opening sequences examined above, the 
film introduces this theme through archival footage from a CBS Reports segment 
entitled “McNamara and the Pentagon.”11 As observational footage rolls of McNa-
mara scribbling down graphs and percentages for a group, a voice-of-God narra-
tor introduces him with the following description:
This is the secretary of defense of the United States, Robert McNamara. His 
 department absorbs 10 percent of the national income of this country, and over 
half of every tax dollar. His job has been called the toughest in Washington, and 
 McNamara is the most controversial figure to ever hold that job. Walter Lippmann 
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calls him not only the best secretary of defense but the first one who ever asserted 
civilian control over the military. His critics call him a con man. An IBM machine 
with legs. An arrogant dictator.12
The nomination of McNamara as an “IBM machine with legs” is one the film un-
derscores throughout via other archival materials and reenactments. For  example, 
when he discusses his biography and the events that led to his involvement in 
World War II, McNamara describes his role in creating the “US Army Air Corps 
Statistical Control School” in 1942, a post that led directly to his commission in 
1943 as a lieutenant colonel in the Air Corps, overseeing logistics and success rates 
in the air campaigns over Europe and Japan. McNamara hints here that one of 
his great achievements was the insistence that the school take the punch cards on 
which the military had collected data on every soldier and run them through the 
IBM sorting machine for criteria like “age, education, accomplishments, etc.” “We 
were looking for the best and the brightest. The best brains, the best capacity to 
lead, the best judgment.”13 McNamara thus positions his ability to act in a rational 
manner using logic and statistics as among the key factors in his success both at 
Harvard and in the military afterward.
But the film’s image track throughout this segment is telling. In addition to the 
interview footage of McNamara, the film oscillates between archival footage of 
animated charts with titles such as “Analysis of Striking Power in Heavy Bombers 
in ETO” and reenacted footage of punch cards sliding through an IBM Hollerith 
tabulating machine—the very same IBM machine to which McNamara’s critics 
compared him. The footage of the Hollerith foregrounds this earlier criticism and 
initiates a chain of associations that that film directly connects back to its subject. 
Developed for the 1890 census, such machines have long been synonymous with 
statistical information and population control.14 Moreover, during the period of 
the film’s production, a minor controversy erupted regarding the role of IBM’s 
complicity with the Nazis and the role of the Hollerith in the German war ma-
chine.15 By invoking the comparison between McNamara’s own thought process 
and the mechanized efficiency of this early computer, the film establishes a visual 
metaphor that unites computational logic and human rationality with inhuman 
Figure 2.1. A soldier scans the horizon 
in The Fog of War.
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aggression and destruction—a theme reiterated each time this same footage reap-
pears. Even as McNamara points to the importance of rational decision-making, 
the film pairs this form of rationality with acts of violence and aggression. Most 
damningly, as McNamara states that he wanted people with “the best judgment,” 
the image track cuts to footage of bombs falling from a plane.
McNamara, of course, was not alone in introducing rationality, computers, and 
statistics into the perfection of warfare. The historical role of other academics such 
as Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener in the creation of encryption and targeting 
systems for the military has been well established.16 Nor is he the only one to paint 
these activities in a positive, patriotic light—as having had a beneficial impact 
both on the war effort and on society in general. After heading the military’s Of-
fice of Scientific Research and Development, Vannevar Bush famously lamented 
the loss of a common research goal that the end of the war would bring and called 
on scientists to collaborate in creating tools that would enable them to share and 
communicate more effectively during peacetime. One such solution was a tool 
called the Memex, based on a technology that many see as an early model for 
hypertext and the Internet.17 Others, however, rethought the ethics of applying 
science to warfare. Wiener, for example, even went so far as to forgo any type of 
military funding for his postwar research.18
Unlike his academic counterparts who took part in the war effort, McNamara 
declined to return to academia and opted instead to put his newly perfected op-
timization and rationalization procedures to bear on production and design in 
private industry for the Ford Motor Company. Here, McNamara describes once 
again the importance of personality testing (accompanied again by shots of the 
Hollerith) and explains how he set up a marketing office to “get the data” about 
who was purchasing cars. He also describes commissioning research on accident 
statistics to understand how to manufacture safer vehicles. The image track cuts 
between various charts and graphs, again visualizing McNamara’s approach to 
solving problems. The problem, he states, was “packaging,” or the materials that 
surround and secure the driver in the car. This determination led him, with the 
help of scientists at Cornell, to research how the human body could be better pro-
tected by dropping human skulls wrapped in various materials down the stairwells 
of the school’s dormitories.
Here, the film cuts to what Morris describes in an interview as his favorite shot 
of the film.19 As he tells Terry Gross on NPR’s Fresh Air, “Whenever I hear a story, 
particularly if it’s a good story, an image comes immediately to mind and it be-
comes very hard to resist the temptation to shoot those images. . . . [P]art of The 
Fog of War is a story of dropping things from the sky, bombing if you like.  .  .  . 
But this is an instance where dropping things actually produces good rather than 
evil.”20 The slow-motion shot Morris produced to illustrate McNamara’s anecdote 
is thus in part one of the redemptory moments in the film for McNamara and the 
rational approach that he expounds throughout.
26    “We See What We Want to Believe”
As with all of Morris’s reenactments, there is something here that exceeds the 
image’s purported meaning. The image of a human skull falling in slow motion 
through space and eventually smashing into pieces at the bottom of a stairwell 
opens itself to any number of readings beyond simply illustrating McNamara’s 
story of dropping things for “good rather than evil.” On one hand, the skull has 
long been the symbol of death and mortality, a reading compounded by the 
frailty it demonstrates in coming apart as it hits the stone surface below. Thus, 
we are reminded of the true cost of calamities like auto accidents and high-tech 
warfare. On the other hand, the skull is itself the “packaging” for the human 
brain, the seat of the thought and rationality that the film reminds us again and 
again will not save us. Its destruction in this sense speaks to its fragility in the 
face of “dropping things.” Regardless of which reading we choose, the image 
 nonetheless  presents a damning indictment of the application of rationality to 
human  aggression that McNamara celebrates throughout the film. Again, this broad 
critique of  rationality—indeed, that it “will not save us”—not only comes from 
McNamara and the supplemental textual materials but also grows discursively from 
the image track of the film itself.
“LESSON 7 :  BELIEF AND SEEING ARE B OTH  
OFTEN WRONG”
Shortly after recounting his invitation to Washington by John Kennedy to serve 
as Secretary of Defense, McNamara (or the film; we’re never sure which is 
 structuring the chronological narration of the events) turns to his account of the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident, the discussion of which makes up the core of the second 
key  lesson in the film: “Lesson 7: Belief and Seeing Are Both Often Wrong.” Here, 
the film thematically and formally points back to the two segments analyzed previ-
ously by including the same archival shots of soldiers on a ship preparing for battle 
that accompanied the opening credits.
As McNamara recounts the miscommunication that led to the misperception 
that Vietnam had attacked the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, the film cuts 
to an audio recording of a conversation between the Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp 
Jr. and General David Burchinal, who determine that the error was the result of 
a “mistaken sonar reading.” Here, an archival image appears of three sonar men 
staring into a screen. As the error is revealed, the film cuts back to McNamara 
briefly as he recounts the chain of events that led from this event to the escalation 
of the war, which Morris pairs with original footage of a chain of dominoes falling 
across a map of Southeast Asia. McNamara reflects on the experience:
McNamara:  It was just confusion, and events afterwards showed that our 
 judgment that we’d been attacked that day was wrong. It didn’t  
happen. And the judgment that we’d been attacked on August 2nd 
was right. We had been, although that was disputed at the time.
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  Ultimately President Johnson authorized bombing in response 
to what he thought had been the second attack—it hadn’t 
 occurred but that’s irrelevant to the point I’m making here. He 
authorized the attack on the assumption it had occurred and his 
belief that it was a conscious decision on the part of the North 
Vietnamese political and military leaders to escalate the conflict 
and an indication that they would not stop short of winning.
  We were wrong, but we had in our minds a mind-set that led to 
that action. And it carried such heavy costs. We see incorrectly 
or we see only half the story at times.
Morris: [off-screen]. We see what we want to believe.
McNamara:  You’re absolutely right. And belief and seeing, they’re both 
often wrong.21
Here we have a chorus of voices: the voices of the two men on the phone, the 
voice of McNamara, the voice of Morris, and, of course, the visual “voice” of the 
images we see. The film rhetorically pairs the image of the sonar men staring 
into the screen with the image of McNamara staring into the camera, implicitly 
 connecting their faulty observations with his own subjective point of view. The 
slow-motion shot of dominoes falling both alludes to the “domino theory” behind 
the escalation of the war and provides a visual metaphor of historical causality.22 
This connection between an ideological framework and series of errors suggests a 
causal chain between faulty observations and the unintended consequences that 
result from acting on such observations. Thus, while giving McNamara the final 
“word” (at least in the spoken sense) on one of the most debated events in the 
 Vietnam War, the film simultaneously demonstrates that any individual interpre-
tation is open to flaw and failure—a point that undercuts not just McNamara’s 
perspective but also our own.
If the prior lesson demonstrated that “rationality will not save us,” then its 
 combination with these thoughts on “belief and seeing” becomes all the more 
alarming. The film’s skepticism toward rational decision-making is expanded here 
to include skepticism about human perception and its ability to gather the proper 
information in the first place. This indeed is the point that McNamara and Blight, 
as well as Blight and Lang in the book, want to make about the event. As the 
text states: “How ironical and tragic—how absolutely surreal—that the August 4, 
1964 watershed leading to a war in which three million people were killed was the 
 result of a double misunderstanding.”23 The double misunderstanding in this case 
refers to both the error of the “overeager sonar men” and the misperception by 
the  leaders of the two countries that this event and its response indicated a shared 
commitment to go to full-scale war.24
But as with “Lesson #2,” the film expands the scope of the critique that  McNamara 
offers to include its own larger claims. Rather than provoke a broad suspicion of 
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Figure 2.2. “Overeager” sonar men.
Figure 2.3. The domino theory in  action.
observation, the film scrutinizes the specific forms of mediated “ seeing” that we 
engage in via media technology. The segment therefore includes archival material 
of not just the sonar men but also the subsequent footage of Johnson announc-
ing the attack on television and committing the nation to a  justified response. 
 Misperception thus occurs not only at the level of the individual and their given 
ideological mindset but also in the tools and technologies that we use to extend, 
record and transmit these perceptions to others.
This same theme reappears as McNamara narrates the events of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in another of the crucial reenactments that structure the film. As 
McNamara discusses the inability of the US to determine definitively the  presence 
or absence of Soviet missiles inside of Cuba, the film cuts to footage of large 
 photographic transparencies of the aerial surveillance photos from the Cuban 
missile crisis illuminated by a series of light boxes. As the camera inspects the 
photographs alongside an unseen human observer, various lenses and magnifying 
devices pass over and in front them, distorting and manipulating their contents. At 
one point, we see an image of a human eye peering through a photographic loupe, 
the magnification from which gives the eye a bulbous, distorted appearance. 
 Considered alongside the discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, this sequence 
reveals that the view from above can be just as faulty as the view from the ground. 
Placed in the context of McNamara’s revelation that the Kennedy administration 
had wrongly assessed the presence of missiles in the photos, the images illustrate 
that looking closer does not always mean seeing more clearly.
The reflexive nature of their content gives these moments in the film a special 
charge. As the film invites us via the cinematic apparatus to explore the  perspective 
of a man who played a key role in history, it foregrounds the subjective nature 
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of human vision and questions the reliability of the technology we rely on to 
help us extend and improve this vision. While these sequences demonstrate that 
 intelligence gathering in a hostile environment rests precariously on the limits of 
technology and the distortion of framing ideology, I would argue that the film 
extends this critique even further. That is, McNamara’s reflections on the failure 
of “belief and seeing” in hostile environments give way to a larger critique of the 
 relationship between reality and its media representations—a point I’ll turn to 
now in considering the film’s digital manipulation of its archival materials.
ANIMATING THE ARCHIVE
As the above demonstrates, one of The Fog of War’s primary concerns is the 
 formal nature of the media we use to transmit information—often the same 
forms of  media that Morris relies upon for much of the core visual material 
in the film. However, as I have also argued, these materials are not included 
simply to “ illustrate” the content of McNamara’s narration. Instead, these ar-
chival  images form a visual voice that challenges, amplifies, and expands upon 
the claims of its subject. But their formal presentation also undermines their 
own claims. Even as Morris relies heavily on the archive to create the film, these 
 historical records  often  communicate meanings that are decidedly different 
from those they originally expressed.
Consider, by way of contrast, the work of another documentary filmmaker 
credited with “bringing history to life” in his films: Ken Burns. Similarly laden 
with archival material, Burns’s films earnestly attempt to collect and coordinate 
a wealth of historical material by pairing elements that will expand upon and 
Figure 2.4. The observed and the observer in The Fog of War.
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reinforce one another. Archival photographs, panned and scanned in what has 
famously become known as the “Ken Burns effect,” are accompanied by period 
music and the narration of letters, diaries, speeches, and newspaper articles from 
the time. This archival unity implies that a variety of media perspectives provide a 
sufficient representation of the past to comprehend its enormity.
In The Fog of War, however, the archival representations from the past 
are  revealed to be not only fallible but fallible to a degree that undermines the 
 evidence they provided in the past as well as the present. Thus, Morris’s inclusion 
of this archival material seeks critically to unpack its pretensions and mispercep-
tions to discover the sort of hidden truths that may lie beneath. This skepticism 
 regarding access to the past is, of course, the thrust of the film. As McNamara 
states at the outset, “In my life I’ve made mistakes, but my rule has always been 
to try and learn, and pass these lessons on to the future.” The film’s contribution 
to this  project is to question not just past events themselves but also the material 
residue they leave in their wake.
In part, this aim is achieved through the sort of selection and recontextualiza-
tion that Jayne Loader, Kevin Rafferty, and Pierce Rafferty mastered so  artfully 
in films like The Atomic Café (1982). The Fog of War similarly takes footage 
from any number of sources and recontextualizes it to illustrate the film’s larger 
points. Whatever its original purpose, it seems unlikely that the footage of  battle 
 preparation from the opening credits was ever intended to question the  ability 
of the military to gather proper intelligence, as I’ve suggested here. The film’s 
 inclusion of the  outtakes from the press conference that open the film suggests 
a similar, subversive rereading of the footage’s original intended meaning. In this 
sense, the industrial and propaganda materials that form the backdrop for the film 
all play unwitting roles in testifying to their own limitations and reveal their latent 
potentiality for remediation and reinterpretation. Such a move marks the film’s 
unique utilization of the archive and sets its approach off from the earnest, good-
faith quotation of a Ken Burns film.
At other points, however, the film goes beyond simply recontextualizing its 
source material to overtly manipulating it. Again, Bruce Conner, Craig Baldwin, 
and others have long utilized and manipulated archival material to critique and 
undercut its original rhetorical use. But unlike other found-footage films, The 
Fog of War combines this material with the testimony of an eyewitness observer. 
 Consider, for example, Bruce Conner’s use of found footage and media coverage 
in Report (1963–67). Conner’s juxtaposition of the footage from John F. Kennedy’s 
funeral procession with battle footage and a bullfight offers a startling, subtle cri-
tique of a society that thrives on the media-driven spectacle of violence.25 While 
Morris’s work clearly shares political sympathies and formal methodologies with 
Conner’s biting, ironic media satire, he differs from Conner in his utilization and 
juxtaposition of this archival material with the first-person interviews of his sub-
jects. The Fog of War thus seeks a middle ground between the earnest archival 
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unity of Ken Burns’s work and the ironic self-reflexivity of Conner’s assemblages. 
Neither entirely redemptive nor dismissive of the archive, Morris takes a unique 
approach to these materials by digitally altering them at key moments to punctu-
ate and critique McNamara’s thoughts. Digital alteration—usually associated with 
undermining the truth or faking it—here suggests that such transformations can 
reveal the truth.
In what has become one of the film’s more notorious segments, McNamara 
relates how he and General Curtis LeMay arrived at the means and methods for 
firebombing Japan. As Morris has claimed, this is the first place where McNa-
mara discussed his participation in these events—events that many consider to 
be tantamount to the eventual choice to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. After stating that an operation had burned to death “one hundred 
thousand civilians—men, women, and children—in a single night,” Morris asks 
McNamara if he knew this was going to happen. He replies, “In a sense, I was 
part of a mechanism that recommended it.” At this moment, after having chaoti-
cally flipped through documents, photographs, and images from the period that 
document the missions, the film cuts to an image or footage (we aren’t sure what’s 
causing the movement) of animated blue numbers and statistics falling out the 
bomb-bay doors of an aircraft down onto a city below. The original source ma-
terial, a black-and-white, sepia-toned photo, is identical to countless others that 
feature bombs falling out of an airplane, but this one overtly implies that the use of 
statistical rationality was equally damaging. Again, whatever its original purpose, 
through the use of CG animation the photograph becomes the film’s most direct 
indictment of its subject.
Shortly after the “falling statistics,” McNamara describes a report he wrote for 
LeMay that argued for flying the B-29s at a lower altitude during their bombing 
Figure 2.5. The “number cruncher” becomes the bomber.
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missions. While this decision increased the risk of a plane being shot down, it dra-
matically increased its effectiveness in “target destruction.” Utilizing a technique 
that Morris has described as “3-D photography,”26 the film cuts to a black-and-
white image of bombs dropping from a plane. The camera appears to zoom in to 
the image, but rather than simply enlarge the elements equally as a typical zoom 
would, elements in the foreground appear to expand and move more rapidly out 
of the frame relative to those in the background. The visual effect not only yields 
the impression of three-dimensionality that Morris describes but also gives us the 
feeling of dropping out of the plane alongside the bombs themselves. In a sense, 
this is exactly what the men who piloted the planes were doing, given that, under 
McNamara’s direction, they lowered their flight altitude to the extent that they 
became targets themselves for Japanese antiaircraft fire. While the shot lasts only 
approximately eight seconds on-screen, the 3-D effect is startling enough to call it 
out among the dozens of similar images that the film contains and marks the sig-
nificance of this portion of McNamara’s testimony. As the image digitally “comes 
to life” relative to the others, we gain the sense that McNamara has gone from 
being a witness of history to one of its actors, directing its outcome rather than 
passively observing its course.
One final instance of digital manipulation further illustrates Morris’s approach 
to his archival material. Although less technically innovative than the previous 
two, its effect is no less powerful. This moment comes as McNamara discusses the 
result of the firebombing that LeMay carried out on Tokyo and the devastating 
impact the bombs had on what he calls “a wooden city.” Morris’s voice is heard off-
screen asking McNamara: “The choice of incendiary bombs, where did that come 
from?” McNamara replies to the effect that the problem lay not in the method 
of destruction so much as in its extent. He goes on to list the other cities that 
were similarly destroyed, comparing each target to a similarly sized American city. 
He states: “[LeMay] went on from Tokyo to firebomb other cities: 58 percent of 
Yokohama, Yokohama’s roughly the size of Cleveland; 58 percent of Cleveland de-
stroyed . . . 99 percent of Chattanooga destroyed, which was Toyama; 41 percent of 
the equivalent of Los Angeles, which was Nagoya.” As he lists the cities destroyed, 
a black-and-white photograph of ruins appears, with the name of the Japanese city 
and the percentage destroyed superimposed in red text. This black text fades, giv-
ing way to the name of the US city in black text over the same photo. At first, the 
technique simply illustrates McNamara’s examples, but once he stops with the list 
above, the image track goes on, listing dozens of other cities at an accelerating pace 
in time with the music. McNamara’s point is certainly powerful enough on its own. 
But combined with the effect of the extended list and its chaotic, accelerated pace, 
it becomes ample evidence of McNamara’s admission, at the end of the sequence, 
“that [Lemay], and I believe I, were behaving as war criminals.”
Graphic superimpositions of this sort are nothing new, but their use here none-
theless stands out for the ambivalent position they occupy between McNamara’s 
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message about the past and the film’s message about him. They pose a contrast 
between two forms of evidence and representation: the statistical and the pho-
tographic. The images of devastation are sufficiently generic that they simply be-
come signifiers of the concept itself rather than descriptors of a given event. Their 
historical specificity and emotional connection to the audience derive entirely 
from the names and numbers affixed to them. And yet, the film simultaneously 
calls this type of statistical information into question, or at least aligns it with the 
rational worldview that brought about this devastation in the first place. Thus, the 
statistical information also lacks a level of historical sufficiency without a view 
toward the physical devastation that it corresponds to—a dimension provided by 
the images that form the backdrop.
This series of images and their superimposed identifiers occupy a curious mid-
dle space. On one hand, the statistics represent the startlingly calculated rational 
efficiency with which the destruction of Japan was carried out. (As McNamara 
states, LeMay was the only general who focused exclusively on the percentage of 
target destroyed per unit lost.) And yet, the film pairs them with photographic 
representations to redeem and represent that loss by powerfully conveying its true 
extent. What was once used for the rationalized optimization of destruction (sta-
tistical quantification) is now used to generate commemoration and empathy. That 
which had faded into generic, historical obscurity (photographic evidence of the 
devastation) is once again rooted into historical time and space. At the time of 
their creation, such representations were utilized to document and perfect the de-
struction that they quantify and capture. In retrospect, these same representations 
stand as evidence of the guilt of both McNamara and LeMay by documenting 
Figure 2.6. Tokyo 51.0%. Graphic superimpositions of the percentage of 
 devastation for each city firebombed in World War II provide a powerful 
 combination of two information sources: data and photography.
34    “We See What We Want to Believe”
their crimes and reinforcing the extent of their impact. While neither form of 
 representation—statistical quantification or photographic evidence—is sufficient 
on its own to reach this conclusion, figured together in this series of superimpositions 
they reinterpret one another and provoke a self-consciously synthetic visualization 
of this untold moment in the history of the war.
THEORIES OF HISTORY AND THE ARCHIVE
Along with the falling statistics and the 3-D animations, these graphic superim-
positions demonstrate the film’s ambiguous approach to its archival material and 
interview subject. I say “ambiguous” because although there is a reliance on the 
archive to represent the past, its constant manipulation throughout the film be-
trays a clear suspicion about its ability to self-sufficiently convey historical truth. 
Of course, even terms like “historical truth” and “representation” are notoriously 
slippery and ambiguous, opening themselves to extensive debate by credentialed 
historians and theorists about the existence of objective truth and its ability to 
be captured or represented in any given form of history.27 Despite this ambiva-
lence, however, the film nonetheless approaches its subject with a definite theory 
of truth and history. Academics may not have agreed on the existence of an objec-
tive reality or the possibility for unmediated, individual access to it, but Morris as 
a filmmaker clearly believes in both propositions. For example, in the June 2000 
interview with Cineaste cited earlier in which he discusses the tendency of people 
to “live in a cocoon of one’s own devising,”28 he contrasts this tendency toward in-
dividual, subjective delusion with a resolute belief in objective reality. Responding 
to a question about his background in philosophy and the influence of thinkers 
like Foucault on his work, his response is worth quoting at length:
Morris:  I’m certainly aware of it. But my background is in American analytic 
philosophy rather than in Continental philosophy, and that’s where 
my sympathies lie. I once said that one of the good things about 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, is that Baudrillard isn’t in the phone 
book. Because first and foremost there is a kind of realism behind 
all of the movies that I’ve made. Realism in the philosophical sense. 
That there is a real world out there in which things happen. . . . This 
is not up for grabs. You don’t take an audience survey.
Cineaste:  So we have an unmediated relationship with the fact.
Morris:  I wouldn’t say that our relationship with the fact is unmediated, but 
there is a fact out there.
Cineaste: But we have direct access to it.
Morris:  Well, the world leaves a trail, and it is our job as investigators—or, 
specifically my job as an investigator—to try to lead myself back to 
the world. It’s not something that you just grab hold of. . . .  
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[W]e know about the world, we know about our history, through 
the things that history has cast off, whether it’s pieces of evidence, 
documents, the testimony of people who have lived through those 
times. . . . History comes by only once, and the residue of history 
can be lost.29
Although using interviews to interpret a film risks confusing textual meaning 
with authorial intention, this is an instance where such statements merit a little 
 scrutiny. As a “conversation” between McNamara’s words and Morris’s images, 
the film  explicitly addresses competing theories of history, and its release along-
side a book and countless other interviews testifies to a desire to make this theory 
 explicitly part of the film’s reception. While Morris’s theory of history may not 
be identical to the film’s, it at least forms part of its backdrop, and this exchange 
clearly demonstrates the interplay between the archive and McNamara’s testimony 
that I have been describing in the film.
The theory of history that Morris puts forward offers historical truth as a 
 possibility, but a fragile and fleeting possibility that must be delicately  unearthed 
through diligent investigative efforts. On one hand, Morris claims,  individual 
 social actors have the potential to delude themselves about “reality” and 
 construct for themselves “a cocoon of their own devising”—a possibility shared 
by  McNamara and Morris in the contention that “belief and seeing are both 
 often wrong,” and one more than amply demonstrated in Morris’s prior films The 
Thin Blue Line and Mr. Death. And yet, he also argues for the potential of critical 
reflection by an eyewitness to provide one of the “pieces of evidence” that make 
up the “residue of history.”
But such testimony is only one piece of the puzzle. Hence the need for the 
other forms of evidence that history has “cast off,” from documents and photo-
graphs to archival footage and statistics. This archival focus on different types of 
media is what partially differentiates both The Fog of War and Standard Operating 
Procedure from Morris’s earlier work (although there are similarities as well). At 
the same time, however, none of these individual records—the “trail” that history 
has left behind—sufficiently leads us “back to the world.” This lack necessitates 
their critical evaluation and reassemblage in the film. Taken as a whole, Morris 
believes these revised sources may lead back to some level of historical truth, al-
though even when they are preserved and present, the truth they offer is far from 
self-evident. Individual testimony, historical documents, and archival materials 
on their own are insufficient. But when reworked, digitally manipulated, critically 
interrogated, and contradicted, these materials contain a latent potential for rep-
resenting the past.
A level of skepticism regarding the self-sufficient transparency of the past oper-
ates in the background of the film and its treatment of the archive. The film’s dense 
collage of archival material is animated (or reanimated) in a manner that inter-
rogates its specific historical truth but also the archival impulse more broadly. One 
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gathers from the film’s eagerness to tinker with these materials that the “residue” 
of the past collected in the archive is perhaps a necessary condition for achieving 
historical truth, but not a sufficient condition in its own right. The investigator—
the one who will seek out and critically interrogate the evidence—is also essential 
to the process. If we are to achieve historical truth via the archive, if we are to lead 
ourselves “back to the world,” we must tease out this truth from a mass of material 
in which truth is anything but self-evident.30 “It’s not something you just grab hold 
of,” as Morris puts it.31
Interestingly, however, the film arrived at a moment when our culture was wit-
nessing an extreme bout of “archive fever,” to borrow Jacques Derrida’s phrase.32 
One of the fastest-growing portions of the Internet before the rise of user-gen-
erated content on social media was the digitization of existing analog archives. 
This effort was motivated by the hope that putting these materials online might 
finally arrest the process of physical decay, thereby transforming them into du-
rable, universally accessible resources.33 But, as Wendy Chun points out, the digital 
technologies that the computer and the Internet comprise were, from their very 
conception, viewed as tools capable of organizing the world’s information, long 
before Google took this as its mission.34 As early as Bush’s “As We May Think” and 
John von Neumann’s “First Draft of a Report on the EVDAC,” a desire existed for 
a living, accessible archive of information.35 But the various technologies we use to 
achieve this goal are universally reliant on regenerative repetition—a quality that 
makes them more similar to human memory than archival storage. Rather than 
a permanent, accessible archive of all the world’s information, the experience of 
the online archive is one of broken links and missing files on a micro level and 
the medium-specific churn of old and new material on a macro level. The archival 
Internet is at once a place of both memory and forgetting, creation and deletion, a 
state Chun calls the “enduring ephemeral.”36 “New” material seems instantaneous-
ly outdated, and old material is constantly rediscovered and recirculated as new.
Morris’s concerns about the “perishability” of history in his Cineaste interview, 
as well as The Fog of War’s general thrust to draw lessons from the past, both align 
with the positivist, archival thrust that Chun locates in the drive to digitize. And 
yet the film’s critique of McNamara as an “IBM machine with legs” and its willing-
ness to digitally tinker with rather than faithfully transcode its archival sources 
point to a certain skepticism regarding the transparency and self-sufficient utility 
of the archive, digital or otherwise. Of course, the film is not “about” the digital 
archive but rather its critique of computer-driven logic and rationality. Its conten-
tion that “rationality will not save us” points to an awareness that there is more to 
unearthing the past and unlocking the truth in the archive than simply transcod-
ing it into a digital form.
Perhaps the best way to characterize the historical theories of Morris and the 
treatment of history in the film is by way of reference to an existing if not main-
stream approach to visual historiography advocated by the art historian Stephen 
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Bann. Bann’s work charts the rise of what he calls “historical consciousness” in 
the visual culture of nineteenth-century Europe. Drawing from Hayden White’s 
tropological theory of historiography, Bann contends that this growing historical 
consciousness over the last two centuries has delivered us into an era of post-
modern irony regarding the visual presentation of history in venues ranging from 
Colonial Williamsburg (which effaces the difference between present and past in 
a move not unlike a Ken Burns film) to more overt, self-conscious juxtapositions 
of multiple temporalities like the work of landscape architect Bernard Lassus. Las-
sus’s work restoring historical spaces seeks to preserve the present of the space 
together with, in Bann’s words, “yesterday, and the day before yesterday”37 in such 
a way that all are simultaneously present and yet faithful to the individual periods. 
While such juxtapositions might seem confusing, Bann argues that contemporary 
spectators have developed the faculty of “seeing double”—that is, holding in their 
vision multiple sites of historical engagement at once.38
The notion of an “ironic museum” in which past and present are preserved in 
their temporal and formal separation but sit self-consciously and playfully side 
by side perfectly captures the approach to the archive that we see in The Fog of 
War. This ironic gesture of juxtaposition without reconciliation helps square the 
film’s various paradoxical positions: a critique of computational rationality pre-
sented using extensive digital effects, camerawork that reveals the biased nature of 
the camera itself, a man reminiscing about the fallibility of human memory and 
perception. Like a museum that places today and yesterday (and the day before) 
side by side, these points are laid out but not reconciled. The film’s insistence that 
the past is worth preserving and contains lessons for the present saves its ironic 
methodology from devolving into parody or pastiche. Even as the film’s opening 
footage reminds us that all media are manipulated, there is a gravity to its tone and 
subject matter that compels our attention. Indeed, the film’s manipulation of its 
source material continually reminds us that the “truth” of images is never entirely 
immanent to the media themselves; rather, truth derives from the rhetorical and 
critical contexts in which media appear. At once distrustful of the archive but reli-
ant upon it, dismissive of logical rationality but earnest in pursuing some level of 
historical truth, the film sits evenly between an abstract meditation on media and 
an exploration of the past that it has captured—a divided attention that will carry 
over to Morris’s next cinematic project, Standard Operating Procedure.
STANDARD OPER ATING PRO CEDURE ’ S  
IMAGE AESTHETICS
If The Fog of War works as a meditation on the archive writ large that draws on 
many forms of media from many different sources, then the focus of the archive 
in Standard Operating Procedure is far more closely circumscribed. Rather than 
exploring charts, graphs, reconnaissance photos, news footage, audiotapes, news-
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papers, and other media as The Fog of War does, Standard Operating Procedure 
turns its attention to one specific form of media—the digital photograph—as it 
is instantiated in one specific collection: the images that emerged from the Abu 
Ghraib prison complex in Iraq in April 2004. In spite of this shift in scale, however, 
Standard Operating Procedure continues The Fog of War’s exploration of the colli-
sion between historical events, social actors, and the media representations they 
leave behind. Like The Fog of War, the film is as much about the media representa-
tions of an event as it is about the event itself.
Indeed, the two films share a sort of inverse, mirror relationship with one 
another in several other ways as well. Morris himself calls Standard  Operating 
Procedure the “flip side” of The Fog of War, “because instead of a policy- maker—
perhaps the most important person in the government save the president 
 himself—here you have grunts, people with little or no power,”39 a point Linda 
Williams echoes in her discussion of the film.40 Beyond the difference in rank of 
their subjects, both films are obviously about war and its effect on both perpetra-
tors and victims, and both films explore the media that these conflicts produce. 
Furthermore, while The Fog of War was a critical and commercial success, receiv-
ing generally positive reviews in the mainstream media and garnering Morris an 
Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, Standard Operating Procedure 
received mostly negative reviews from critics and went on to fail miserably at 
the box office.41 But if The Fog of War received more attention than Standard 
Operating Procedure in the mainstream popular press, in academic circles the 
situation was reversed. Since its release, The Fog of War has been largely ignored 
in journals and other publications, whereas Standard Operating Procedure has 
generated a great deal of controversy and attention from film and media scholars 
at conferences and in publications.42
Beyond their reception, the two films also mirror one another in that both were 
released with an eponymous companion text. But whereas Blight and Lang’s text 
expanded the historical facts and philosophical issues explored in The Fog of War, 
Philip Gourevitch’s text instead offers a narrative account of events leading up to 
the Abu Ghraib scandal and its aftermath.43 For their source material, Blight and 
Lang drew from their own preexisting research (generated over a decade of work-
ing with McNamara before he sat down with Morris). Gourevitch, on the other 
hand, derived his text largely from the material Morris himself collected for the 
film. (The interviews alone ran to almost 2.5 million words.44)
The treatment of both films on Morris’s website also offer parallels and dif-
ferences. Morris, in the four years between his two films, was slowly becoming 
a multimedia artist, using the web to expand his films rather than just promote 
them. Whereas errolmorris.com largely followed The Fog of War’s release as it 
was  covered by other media (collecting reviews, release events, and interviews 
with Morris), for Standard Operating Procedure the site began to feature original 
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 content that explored points in the film further and defended Morris’s actions in 
several of the controversies that erupted during its theatrical release. While much 
of this new material was also part of the blog Morris began writing for the New 
York Times in September 2007, other material on the site related to the film is 
unique to the site itself (e.g., the sections “The Grump” and Morris’s thoughts on 
several of his “Aborted Projects”). Furthermore, as Standard Operating Procedure 
comes to focus on an exclusively digital medium—photography—his own “digital” 
activities online begin to expand as well.45
The shift from The Fog of War to Standard Operating Procedure is thus not a 
clear thematic break, but rather a shift in focus and scope. Instead of focusing on 
the life of a single individual who had a hand in several of the bloodiest and most 
technologically mediated wars of the twentieth century, Standard Operating Pro-
cedure meditates on the role of a specific media technology in relation to a specific 
event. But if Morris tightens the focus of Standard Operating Procedure to a single 
technology and event, the problem he explores—namely, the role of photography 
in our understanding of an event—is approached on a number of fronts at once. 
In addition to the film, Morris begins simultaneously exploring these ideas on his 
blog, and considering his work there alongside the film expands our understand-
ing of both.
THE OPINIONAT OR:  MANY THOUSANDS OF WORDS
Tellingly, Morris’s first post to the New York Times blog The Opinionator appeared 
nearly a year before Standard Operating Procedure premiered, but its content clear-
ly reflected what must have been a major preoccupation at the time given the film 
that he was in the midst of making. Entitled “Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire,” it offers a 
discussion of the possibility for photographs to be faked and the role that context 
plays in their reception and interpretation—an issue that would return front and 
center once the film came out. It begins: “Pictures are supposed to be worth a 
thousand words. But a picture unaccompanied by words may not mean anything 
at all. Do pictures provide evidence? And if so, evidence of what? And, of course, 
the underlying question: do they tell the truth?”46 This post offers a fitting pre-
amble to the blog itself, and subsequent posts deal further with photography and 
reenactment, perception, memory, and any number of other issues central to the 
investigation in Standard Operating Procedure. Many of the posts are extremely 
long by blog or even newspaper-article standards, often running to thousands of 
words and spread out over several installments. In one post, Morris even acknowl-
edges, in response to reader comments, that he’s not blogging so much as posting 
essays—a point he admits before comparing his own method to Descartes’s in the 
latter’s Meditations on First Philosophy.47 This, moreover, stands in marked con-
trast to the laconic presence within his films, where he speaks little, if at all, and 
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offers no narration or voice-over. If, as his first post reiterates, a picture is worth a 
thousand words, then he seemed focused on using the blog to give the photos he 
discusses their textual due. Given its thematic preoccupations and its simultaneity 
with the production and release of Standard Operating Procedure, the blog thus 
forms an additional if indirect background text to the film.
Unlike the focus of the film, Morris’s thoughts on photography in his blog 
only occasionally turn to the Abu Ghraib photographs. Morris’s subject is more 
generally the issue of truth and photographic representations—an issue that 
leads him to explore the work of Roger Fenton, Matthew Brady, Walker Evans, 
and others. In typical Morris style, his posts generally begin with a series of older 
archival images. He then poses a series of questions the images raise upon closer 
inspection in the tone of an investigation or a detective mystery. These ques-
tions often relate to the historical circumstances surrounding the photos and the 
extent to which they can be said to reflect the “truth” of the scenes they capture. 
Morris the blogger and Morris the filmmaker draw on a similar set of ingredi-
ents: equal parts quirky detective fiction and meditative philosophical reflection 
on the nature of reality/representation and history/memory. Given the nature 
of his films, it is not surprising that he often gravitates toward the eccentric and 
bizarre sides of subjects. A post on anosognosia (the lack of awareness about 
one’s own illness or impairment), for example, begins with an anecdote about 
a bank robber who covered his face in lemon juice, mistakenly thinking this 
would allow him to remain invisible to the security cameras that were eventually 
used to apprehend him.48 But beyond mirroring the style of his films in general, 
the material on his blog often relates directly to the issues addressed by Standard 
Operating Procedure.
In one of Morris’s first posts, for example, he takes the two Roger Fenton images 
from the Crimean War entitled “Valley of the Shadow of Death” that have been 
discussed by Susan Sontag and others and proposes that one of the two nearly 
identical images must have been staged.49 Calling them “ON” and “OFF” in refer-
ence to the placement of a series of cannonballs in the middle road, Morris inves-
tigates a number of different techniques to determine whether Fenton or another 
party moved the cannonballs into the road or into the ditch for the second image. 
As a choice of topic, the Crimean War is a natural one in that, as Ulrich Keller has 
noted, it represents a sort of transitional stage in the visual history of warfare.50 On 
one hand, it was the last war to be fought as a grand spectacle for the eyewitness 
observer, since modern weapons like the machine gun made bold charges toward 
the enemy dangerously obsolete. But on the other hand, it was the first war to be 
thoroughly visually documented by modern forms of media representation like 
lithography and photography. Fenton’s photographs, then, are the first to be taken 
of any war ever, and Fenton, as Sontag notes, is repeatedly cited as the first war 
photographer. None of this is lost on Morris, as he cites Sontag’s book repeatedly, 
and interviews Keller himself. The blog thus reveals the degree to which Morris 
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researched the relationship between war and photography as he prepared to make 
a film about the Abu Ghraib scandal.
Beyond their status as historical forerunners to the Abu Ghraib photos, 
the  Fenton photographs are also relevant to the making of Standard Operating 
 Procedure given the nature of the questions they pose. That is, once we allow that 
the scene on the hillside was altered for one of the images, we must immediately 
ask which image and why. Leaving aside most of the intricacies involved in  Morris’s 
attempt to order the images temporally (suffice it to say it takes him nearly nine 
thousand words and the use of spectral analysis to do so), it is worth noting that 
he traveled back to the location where the images were taken to record his own im-
ages and reenact the conditions of their capture—an effort not uncommon in his 
film projects, and one that led to a great deal of the criticism of Standard Operating 
Procedure.51 Moreover, the images provide Morris with an occasion to reflect on 
Fenton’s motivations for altering the landscape of his subject. Was he trying to put 
the cannonballs back in the position where they would have originally landed? (In 
other words, was Fenton himself reenacting the scene?) Or was he simply trying 
to capture a more dramatic shot? (And would that have consequently been more 
or less faithful to the subject he was attempting to capture?) In essence, Morris is 
concerned with the interplay of visual aesthetics and factual reportage in the two 
images and which version was more faithful to the veracity of the subject Fenton 
felt it was his charge to document.
With both the Abu Ghraib photos and the Fenton photos, Morris delves into 
images of war that were staged or acted out for the benefit of the camera. As many 
commentators have noted, there is a complicated co-incidence in the Abu Ghraib 
images between the presence of the camera and the acts of torture that it records.52 
On one hand, the absence of a camera would deprive the world of evidence of 
these acts, so the camera and its images are necessary to understand what took 
place. On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence that some of the forms of 
torture documented by the camera were specifically staged to create a visual spec-
tacle for the benefit of the camera itself. Thus, what happened before the camera 
might not have happened without the camera (or at least not in the same fashion). 
Paraphrasing Morris’s title from the Fenton post, we might ask, “Which came first, 
the spectacle or the camera?” But like Fenton, the perpetrators of the Abu Ghraib 
images arranged the scene in a certain fashion for maximum dramatic impact. 
Summing up his search, Morris takes a moment to wax philosophic about his de-
sire to arrange the images:
I sometimes wonder: is the entire meaning of photography contained in these twin 
Fenton photographs—one the doppelganger of the other and often indirectly  described 
as such? The good Fenton photograph, honest and unadorned by a  desire for contriv-
ance or misdirection, and the bad Fenton photograph—the photograph decried by 
Sontag—corrupted by the sleight of hand, the trick, the calculated  deception.
But which is which?53
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In a sense, the Abu Ghraib images present a quandary because they occupy the 
space between the two Fenton images, and that perhaps is why they came to 
 occupy Morris in the first place.
I raise the issues presented in the blog because how we read that content in rela-
tion to Standard Operating Procedure affects how we interpret the aim of the film, 
and, as I will argue, this is a film in which context and the classification or catego-
rization of an object is very much at stake. That is, if we see Standard Operating 
Procedure as an investigation into the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the question 
of US policy on torture, then we are inclined to place it alongside other films deal-
ing with similar issues, like Alex Gibney’s Taxi to the Dark Side (2007), Michael 
Winterbottom’s The Road to Guantánamo (2006), and Rory Kennedy’s Ghosts of 
Abu Ghraib (2007).54 This, of course, is perfectly appropriate given the subject mat-
ter and thrust of the companion text and the simple fact that it is a film by a well-
known filmmaker. But if we place the film in the context of Morris’s previous film 
on war, The Fog of War, and his other activities on his blog and elsewhere, then 
the subject matter takes on a different valence entirely. Seen as part of an ongoing 
meditation on the relationship between representation and reality, photography 
and the external world, the film is less about specific policies and events or indi-
vidual culpability and more about the nature of perception, representation, and 
human behavior. As the content on the blog indicates, the role of photography 
in warfare and the nature of photographic technology in documenting and in-
terpreting such momentous events are topics that occupy Morris far beyond any 
one particular instance or set of photos. We might conclude, then, that Standard 
Operating Procedure is not so much about Abu Ghraib the historical event as it is 
about the Abu Ghraib images, and their role in the event.
How one determines the film’s true focus seems to dictate the extent to which 
one finds any merit in the film’s overall project or approach. Returning to the con-
troversy the film generated, we can draw a fairly clear line between those who did 
or did not “like” the film based on what they thought its overall subject and inten-
tions were.55 Scholars who fall into the latter category, like Bill Nichols and Irina 
Leimbacher, for example, read the film as being about torture and the circum-
stances behind the events captured in these images.56 Given this, they find Morris’s 
treatment of the images and his method of reenacting the torture sequences they 
depict to be fraught with a fetishized aestheticization of the events that lacks a 
moral center. Such critics further assert that his signature Interrotron interviews 
simply provide an opportunity for the perpetrators to deny ultimate culpabil-
ity. Nichols’s three primary objections, which nicely sum up the general reaction 
against the film, are: (1) the limited perspective of the guards, and their inability 
to assume any of the guilt; (2) the aestheticized nature of the reenactments; and 
(3) the absence of any voice for the victims.57 His is a trenchant critique of the 
film, and if the film is about acts of torture, then all of Nichols’s claims are indeed 
 accurate and the film’s flaws are, to some extent, inexcusable.
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But if we shift the focus of the film from being about the event of Abu Ghraib 
to being about the images it generated, our reading of its method, and perhaps its 
faults and omissions, also shifts. Consider, for example, the description Julia Les-
age (who was largely positive on the film) offers of its subject:
I use a textual analysis of Standard Operating Procedure, which takes as its  topic just 
the Abu Ghraib photographs, to explore issues of affect in the torture  documentary. 
However, I also explore how the film works as an analytic  documentary, one 
that explores what the photograph, or indeed witnesses, can and cannot convey. 
 Standard Operating Procedure particularly raises the question of “authenticity” in 
relation to its interviewees. We are asked to evaluate not only the history of Abu 
Ghraib torture that these participants tell us about but also how much we trust 
what they have to say.58
Lesage clearly feels that the film is about “just the Abu Ghraib photographs” and 
what they or their creators “can and cannot say.” Linda Williams similarly reads 
the film as an interplay between the images and their creators, insisting that the 
images have as much to do with the larger ideological context that exists as they do 
with the frame they impose.59 In a reading that lies closest to the one I am propos-
ing here, Caetlin Benson-Allott writes:
Standard Operating Procedure focuses on how atrocities become media files.  Morris’s 
film asserts that although the abuse at Abu Ghraib is undeniably terrible and true, 
the photographs neither speak directly to us nor offer transparent access to the 
events. The photographs are insufficient and require interpretation from viewers, 
who may bring external impressions and motivations to the task. Standard  Operating 
 Procedure tries to communicate this problem by focusing on how mediation, and 
digital mediation in particular, disorients rather than facilitates our processes  
of interpretation.60
Like Williams and Lesage, Benson-Allot determines that the film focuses on the 
subject of digital photography and the photographs themselves and that, in this 
particular arena, the film offers an important, worthwhile intervention and addi-
tion to the collection of films on the Iraq war.
Interestingly, none of the scholars who praise the film deal very extensively 
with the reenactments it contains. Their discussion of the interview segments 
(which, for Nichols, allowed the subjects to deny guilt) emphasizes the way in 
which the film forgoes the question of guilt, leaving this for the audience to decide. 
My aim here is not to determine which side of the debate is correct or incorrect 
(though the thrust of the reading I’m offering obviously aligns more closely with 
those who think the film is about photography and mediation). While I agree with 
Benson-Allot and the others that the film is ultimately about this collection of 
digital images, I believe that the emphasis here is not on the images per se but on 
the collection itself. That is, the extensive commentary thus far offered on the film 
largely misses the images’ status as a database of images.
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DATABASE AESTHETICS
Almost without fail, nearly every critic of the film points out that the images that 
it deals with are “digital” rather than analog photographs, and that this fact has 
something to do with the mutability and transportability of their contents. Had 
they been analog images, they would have been far easier to contain and per-
haps less likely to have been created in the first place. Digital images are at once 
more and less private. Lacking the need for a third party to develop and print 
the negatives, they can reveal their contents but remain the exclusive property 
of their creators. And yet, digitality also facilitates copying and sharing, lending 
them an instantaneous ubiquity that analog photos lack. Digital photos, more-
over, are far more open to manipulation via programs like Adobe Photoshop. All 
of this is surely accurate, and as we will see, the film does highlight their status 
as digital images. And yet, the film doesn’t emphasize either of these particular 
properties, even though both lend themselves to the sort of questions Morris 
often addresses. Rather, Standard Operating Procedure emphasizes and questions 
another facet of their role as digital media: their status as a collection of files, or, 
more accurately, as a database. Interrogating the database, Morris most clearly 
advances the larger themes of representation, mediation, and truth that became 
so evident in his blog posts.
As it was with The Fog of War, the opening sequence of the film is telling. As 
the opening credit sequence rolls, or rather floats, the viewer is immersed in a 
cloud of spatially diffuse images floating back and away, a double movement that 
yields the impression that, as we drift steadily forward, our attention is directed 
stubbornly backward at images fading slowly into the distance. While many are 
immediately legible as the more iconic images from the Abu Ghraib scandal, they 
appear here robbed of any framing context but the frame itself. But what inter-
ests me here is not the images themselves or the frame around them, but rather 
the blank, nonrepresentational space in which they appear—a space that is rather 
overtly rendered as “no place.” While focusing on this blank space instead of the 
sensational content of the images will at first seem counterintuitive and perhaps 
the epitome of disinterested spectatorship (how could one not look at them?), their 
distinct aesthetic milieu in the sequence foregrounds the film’s relationship to the 
controversial material it explores.
The aesthetic of this dark nonplace can be illuminated with the area of digital 
art known as database aesthetics.61 As far back as his influential The Language of 
New Media, Lev Manovich described the database as the dominant symbolic form 
of the digital age. It provides a new interface to the cultural field and replaces 
the centuries-long dominance of the narrative form that appeared in older media 
such as the novel and film.62 While both forms, the database and the narrative, 
have always existed alongside each other, he argues that at different points either 
form rises to prominence—an exchange currently taking place thanks in part to 
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the widespread adoption of the computer as the “Universal Media Machine.”63 The 
database as a cultural form is characterized as a collection of discrete entities with 
an infinite number of possible connections to each other but lacking in any neces-
sary connections that order or prioritize these items. Unlike the narrative, which 
imposes specific cause/effect, beginning/middle/end relationships on its constitu-
ent elements, the database leaves these connections undefined.64
Returning to the opening credit sequence, the cloud of images that float there 
before the viewer present themselves, in this reading, as a collection of discrete 
digital records, which, as products of various digital imaging technologies, they 
undoubtedly were/are. Presenting them as a random cluster with no immediate 
logic to their arrangement or spatial distribution renders aesthetically the material 
status these records had at various points in their existence, from the nonlinear 
editing software that rendered any particular shot, to the hard drives of the com-
puters to which the images were downloaded, to the memory cards of the cameras 
with which they were originally recorded. As digital files, they can be ordered ac-
cording to any number of different principles—foregrounded or elided depending 
upon any number of preferences.
We can see this same aesthetic principle at work at several other points in the 
film. The discrete nature of the image as individual record, for instance, is fore-
grounded most explicitly in the discussion by army investigator Brent Pack about 
“metadata.” He defines metadata as the “fancy two-dollar word for information 
about information” that allows him to order the images according to various fac-
tors including the date they were taken and the specific camera that captured 
them. The collection of images is, at other points, foregrounded as a database of 
such records. When Pack describes the beginnings of his investigation, he reveals 
that the army gave him twelve CDs’ worth of images, which he then began to go 
through and organize. Here, the image track explicitly illustrates a screen with the 
“thousands of images from Abu Ghraib” as tiled icons on an apparently enormous 
screen. His goal, as he states it, was to find the images that depict prisoner abuse 
and to identify who might have been in the area at the time. As the screen rapidly 
flips through these records, sound effects reminiscent of a hard drive spinning 
click frantically away. As Pack focuses his attention, the screen isolates specific 
images, aesthetically calling them forth from the cloud; they appear as records 
pulled up from the database with individual labels enumerating the aforemen-
tioned metadata.65 As he describes organizing the photographs according to vari-
ous criteria, the screen image responds by arranging and rearranging images into 
various timelines.
Again, the material form of this collection of images outside the film is a data-
base. This is not, therefore, a quality the film imposes on them. Instead it works to 
retain and foreground this materiality in their aesthetic treatment each time they 
reappear. The various visual and sound effects that connote the database here in 
46    “We See What We Want to Believe”
Figure 2.7. The database of images rendered in different aesthetic configurations.
this narrative medium are somewhat the reverse of the artificial shutter sound that 
plays when one snaps a picture on a digital camera: aesthetic, sensory appendages 
held over from another medium to remind one of their origins. Pack’s investiga-
tion as it is presented in the film is this migration from one form, the database, 
into another, the linear narrative. As he puts it, “The pictures spoke a thousand 
words, but unless you know what day and time they were talking, you wouldn’t 
know what the story was.”
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WHAT THE STORY WAS
Again and again the various social actors in the film highlight this same tension 
between the extreme legibility of what the images depict and their inability, as 
Pack says, to narrate the story adequately. This is the tension inherent in the data-
base/narrative distinction that Manovich makes. As critics of New Media art point 
out, much of what constitutes database art in the strictest sense often presents itself 
as a “choose your own adventure”–style set of individual materials for participants 
Figure 2.7 continued.
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to use in creating their own narratives. And this is largely what happened with the 
database of images from Abu Ghraib. Once they surfaced from the prison, any 
number of individuals and media outlets began selecting specific images and plac-
ing them into various discursive contexts, from the army investigation that Pack 
started in early 2004 to the 60 Minutes broadcast that eventually introduced the 
scandal to the public. Indeed, the film itself is an attempt to understand “what the 
story was” that produced these images.
I would like to linger on this question of the insufficiency of the images them-
selves to stand for and represent the events they depict in a complete and self-
evident fashion. This is, after all, the ineffable paradox of still photography: on 
one hand, so automatically, irrevocably indexically bound to the historical world, 
and on the other hand, so mediated, insufficient, and misleading about that world. 
Taken together, these fragments of time fail to offer a sufficient account of the 
circumstances of their creation. As a collection, they are, in the strictest sense of 
the term, nonrepresentational. While each individual image may offer a mediated, 
representational glimpse of what existed before the camera at a given moment in 
time, the photographs’ collective meaning has to be supplied externally. The data-
base allows us to order its contents according to any number of criteria, to declare 
certain images relevant and others irrelevant, and to classify them into categories 
like “criminal act” and “standard operating procedure,” but these organizational 
schemas are necessarily external to the database itself. In database terms, the indi-
vidual record itself may be representational, but the data set as a form is manifestly 
nonrepresentational. It can contain information, but meaning has to be found 
elsewhere. This is precisely what the film reveals in the extended CGI sequences 
that I describe as a form of database aesthetic.
Though the film foregrounds the plasticity of its source material, it does not, 
however, evacuate it of meaning entirely. Quite the opposite. By translating the da-
tabase into a linear narrative, the film utilizes any number of techniques to account 
for the structure the database lacks, including the interviews, Sabrina Harman’s 
letters, and, notoriously, the reenactments. Interestingly, the film lacks entirely 
those elements so omnipresent in The Fog of War. Rather than a broad collage of 
external media sources and archival documents, the film focuses exclusively on 
the Abu Ghraib images and supplements them with interviews, letters, log books, 
and reenactments. Instead of animating the contents of the archive by digitally 
manipulating their appearance or content as he did in The Fog of War, Morris aes-
theticizes the archive itself in order to foreground its immaterial, mutable nature.
The lack of an external, secondary media context of the sort that we saw in The 
Fog of War is, of course, supplied in our contemporary context by the flurry of me-
dia coverage that surrounded the Abu Ghraib images when they first appeared and 
were widely taken up and debated from any number of perspectives. For some, 
the Abu Ghraib images represented the work of “a few bad apples.” For others, 
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they offered a glimpse of the moral vacuity at the heart of the Bush administra-
tion’s prosecution of the war on terror. For still others, they were the unsurprising 
proof of Western aggression against the Middle East, a manifestation of the larger 
“crusade,” as Bush himself once called it. As W. J. T. Mitchell asserts, these images 
proliferated for a brief time with the rapidity and uncanny duplication of the act 
of cloning, and in each new manifestation they accreted meanings and interpreta-
tions along the way. In reference to the infamous “hooded man” photo, he writes: 
“If ever an image has been ‘cloned’ in the circuits of mass media, this one was, 
both in the sense of indefinite duplication, and in the further sense of taking on 
a ‘life of its own’ that eludes and even reverses the intentions of its producers.”66 
For Mitchell, the image’s resemblance to Christian passion iconography and its 
transposition onto an Arab body indicate its inherent openness to interpretation 
in multiple pro- and antiwar discourses.
I would instead argue that the fluid nature of the images as a collection allowed 
them to be inserted into multiple competing discourses. That is, lacking a fixed 
story of their own, the database of images from Abu Ghraib provided ready source 
material for people on every side of the issues involved: when the images emerged, 
they had no captions to anchor or interpret their meanings. As Morris, echoing 
Susan Sontag, claimed in his first blog post, “[A] picture unaccompanied by words 
may not mean anything at all.”67 But as they circulated through the mediascape, 
any number of commentators stepped in to fill the void. Thus, the same “hooded 
man” image appeared on Fox News with the caption “Detainee ‘Abuse’ ” and on 
the cover of The Economist with the headline “Resign, Rumsfeld.”68 This is exactly 
the flexibility of meaning enabled by the database, and it is this aspect of the Abu 
Ghraib images that the film repeatedly highlights in its CGI sequences depicting 
them moving about the screen.
And this is why the film generated so much controversy among critics and aca-
demics and so little interest among viewers. That is, by opening up these images 
to multiple interpretations and by insisting, as Morris’s films always do, that the 
images themselves mean nothing outside of a specific discursive context, the film 
confronted a sociopolitical landscape already heavily populated with very defini-
tive interpretations. And unlike McNamara’s reflection on events and debates over 
thirty years old, these discourses were still in wide circulation. Coming rather late 
to the party, the film’s claim that these images are still open to reconfiguration 
proved to be an unwelcome contribution to the discussion. Documentaries, after 
all, are interpretations of the historical world that invite us to agree or disagree—a 
move Bill Nichols describes with the enjoinder “This is so, isn’t it?” Unfortunately 
for Morris and his studio, a majority of the viewing public answered this question 
with a resounding no.
Outside of the film’s success or failure, however, considered among his oth-
er projects of the last decade it clearly stands as his most technologically driven 
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project to date in both form and content. As digital media came to dominate the 
field of filmmaking, its implications for truth and representation obviously came 
to dominate Morris’s projects as well. But an event as divisive as the Abu Ghraib 
scandal lacks the historical distance and twenty-twenty hindsight that the Crime-
an or even the Vietnam War provides, and as a consequence, the film became 
swept up in the controversy it explored. While the film has already faded into the 
background of documentaries addressing torture, it nonetheless exemplifies the 
ever-growing integration of moving images and digital media, making its thoughts 
on the dangers therein all the more timely.
C ONCLUSION
If we return to the rather cryptic epigraph at the beginning of this chapter that 
first adorned errolmorris.com in 2000, it now seems a prophetic inauguration for 
the shifts to come in both Morris’s own work and the political landscape we have 
been considering here as a whole. As Morris’s interests expanded from film to 
many forms of media both old and new, Chesterton’s fear of the “labyrinth that has 
no center” seems to have served less as a warning than as an inspiration for Mor-
ris. Amid a decade that witnessed the extreme polarization of American politics, 
however—an era in which the center all but disappeared—Morris’s work seems to 
have heeded the call. Moving from the more arcane fringes of obscure Americana 
into the stormy waters of political filmmaking, Morris’s two major projects from 
this period offer unique attempts to carve out an ethical and political center in 
the issues they explore. Surely Morris had made political films before, but noth-
ing on this scale.69 Taking on such notorious figures as Robert McNamara and 
Lynndie England guarantees that viewers will come to these films with strong, pre-
conceived notions about their subjects—notions that the films attempt to confuse 
rather than clarify. Thrusting us into the center of complicated ethical issues, both 
films further force us to empathize to some extent with those who were vilified as 
the “bad apples” or “bad guys” in their respective circumstances—a move that Mc-
Namara himself reminds us is essential if reconciliation is to be achieved and hu-
manity preserved. If his next project was any indication, Morris’s work from this 
decade may prove to be an aberration. Released in 2010, Tabloid centers on former 
Miss Wyoming Joyce McKinney and her odyssey of kidnapping, cults, and non-
consensual sex. While it certainly continues his preoccupation with mass media 
and social mediation, Morris has returned once again to his previous emphasis on 
idiosyncratic subjects. While it may prove to have been a detour for Morris, how-
ever, the intersection of film, politics, and technology that these two films explore 
was rapidly becoming the center of online activism and documentary filmmaking 




MoveOn.org and Brave New Films
Revolution doesn’t happen when society adopts new technology, it happens 
when society adopts new behaviors.
—Clay Shirky, “Here Comes Everybody”
On December 4, 2016, a man carrying an AR-15 stormed into Comet Ping Pong, 
a pizzeria in Washington, D.C., and demanded to see evidence of the child sex-
trafficking operation that he believed was headquartered in the basement. Over 
the preceding months, stories had been circulating on InfoWars and various other 
right-wing news websites about the alleged conspiracy and its connections deep 
within the Democratic Party. Several mainstream news organizations including 
the New York Times and the BBC had covered and debunked the story, but promi-
nent Republicans in the Trump transition team continued to fuel speculation on 
Twitter, and the man had the impression that “something nefarious was happen-
ing.”1 Though no one was injured, “Pizzagate” set off an immediate series of alarm 
bells about the power of fake news to mislead people, and the role of social media 
in accelerating its spread. Alongside the growing awareness that similar “news” 
sources might have helped Trump win the election (a topic addressed more fully 
in chapter 6), the incident seemed symptomatic of a much wider ailment within 
the media and the public. But long before the 2016 election, before Hillary Clinton 
was a candidate for office or Facebook a website, independent sources on the left 
were decrying what they described as right-wing media manipulation. The culprit 
was the cable network Fox News, and its accusers were MoveOn.org and Brave 
New Films, a pair of progressive grassroots media organizations working to con-
nect and galvanize members of the left.
Independent media production has a deep history of both working to effect 
political change and critiquing more-established media in the process. In the title 
of the introduction to his influential study of radical political documentary on 
the left, Show Us Life, Tom Waugh cleverly poses the inversion “Why Documentary 
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Filmmakers Keep Trying to Change the World, or Why People Changing the 
World Keep Making Documentaries.”2 Like the book it is drawn from, the title 
hits directly on a theme that has run throughout the last eighty years of documen-
tary filmmaking—namely, its connection with the people and organizations that 
hope to produce social change. Waugh’s title also uncovers two possible routes to 
the production of a social-issue documentary: the first stems from the desire to 
“change the world” and settles upon documentary as a means, while the second 
originates in the ability to make a film and alights on a particular issue as an ap-
plication of the medium. Either way, Waugh’s playful rearticulation firmly binds 
political activism and social change with documentary film. But it also  inadvertently 
describes the paths of two progressive activist units—the husband-and-wife 
team of Wes Boyd and Joan Blades, and the filmmaker Robert Greenwald—whose 
 respective organizations, MoveOn.org and Brave New Films, would take  dramatically 
 different routes toward the level of hybridity that Waugh implies. What Waugh 
couldn’t have foreseen in the pre-Internet era in which he was writing, however, 
was the  importance of newly available digital technology for both approaches.
The political polarization that intensified after 9/11 radicalized a new genera-
tion of political activists who already possessed lives and livelihoods outside of 
organized party politics but who nonetheless felt called upon by the events they 
saw unfolding to do something about newly perceived injustices. A figure like Jon 
Stewart, for example, combined a career in comedy and entertainment with an im-
pulse to speak out politically into a new form of political entertainment, The Daily 
Show. This found an audience among a generation of like-minded and similarly 
politicized viewers.3 For Blades and Boyd, and for Greenwald, this metamorphosis 
took the form of blending careers in technology and in filmmaking, respectively, 
with large-scale political organizing to create two of the most influential inde-
pendent political organizations to emerge during the decade after 9/11. As of the 
2016 presidential election, MoveOn.org boasted over eight million members and 
participated daily in organizing campaigns across the country on targeted issues 
from civil rights to health care to budget reform.4 For its part, Brave New Films 
was responsible for some of the decade’s most successful and influential political 
documentaries, from Walmart: The High Cost of Low Prices (2005) and Outfoxed: 
Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism (2004) to several of the most overt attacks 
on the Bush administration and its war policies, including the so-called “Un” 
 Trilogy—Unprecedented (2002), Unconstitutional (2004), and Uncovered (2004)—
and Iraq for Sale (2006), among others.
After several years of collaboration, the two organizations evolved into surpris-
ingly similar operations. In spite of the early (and in many cases pioneering) social 
media that enabled it to become an archetype of netroots organizing, MoveOn.org 
regularly turned to the decades-old technology of documentary media as a means 
to mobilize members. Likewise, Brave New Films began to rely heavily on social 
media in order to fund, publicize, and even produce its film projects. Both ended 
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Figure 3.1. Robert Greenwald’s “Un” 
 Trilogy marked his move into  political 
 documentary and brought him into 
 collaboration with MoveOn.
the decade as hybrids of documentary film and political activism of the sort that 
Waugh alluded to twenty years earlier. For both, however, the glue that enabled 
this synthesis was the technology that had emerged in the two decades since. Their 
parallel evolution, moreover, is not simply a coincidence. At several points around 
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key political events during the Bush years—notably, the 2004 elections—the two 
organizations collaborated on projects that convinced each of the efficacy of the 
other’s tactics. Both organizations started the decade with the conviction that their 
respective media forms (filmmaking and the Internet) could, as Waugh put it, 
“change the world,” but both left the decade with the conviction that it would take 
some combination of both to do so.
This chapter looks at these organizations and considers the way both utilized 
differing measures of documentary film and digital media to change the world. 
While scholars and historians look to the role of YouTube videos in the Iranian 
Green Movement in 2009–10 or the part played by social media technology like 
Facebook and Twitter in the Arab Spring or the rise of the alt-right over the 
last several years, Greenwald and MoveOn were pioneering similar practices 
years before these eventual mainstays of Web 2.0 even existed.5 Despite their 
 disconnected roots in technology and filmmaking, during the period of 2000–
2008 the two organizations collaborated with one another, and both evolved into 
hybrid organizations that challenge easy distinctions between documentary film, 
political activism, and social media. The heated, gloves-off environment of polit-
ical debate surrounding the series of close political contests from 2002 through 
2008 emboldened both groups to engage in radical media experimentation to 
advance their political agendas. Their individual and shared histories during this 
period provide an ideal illustration of the natural synergy between these forms. 
In MoveOn and Greenwald, we find a praxis-driven example from early in the 
era of social media that reflects many of the broader theoretical debates that 
would eventually emerge. As Greenwald and MoveOn both  demonstrate, people 
trying to change the world were still making documentary films, but they were 
also doing other things as documentary images became one part of a widespread 
strategy aimed at social change.
MOVING IN THE SAME DIRECTION
The MoveOn–Brave New Films collaboration begins with the enormous popular-
ity of two unrelated pop-culture relics of the past: singer, songwriter, and some-
times actress Olivia Newton-John; and the iconic Flying Toasters screen saver of 
the pre-Internet computer. Both were the forerunners, and in a sense the angel 
investors, of what would later become Brave New Films and MoveOn.org. Before 
his engagement with political documentary, Robert Greenwald worked for several 
decades producing and directing what the New York Times described as “a num-
ber of commercially respectable B-list movies,”6 including 1984’s The Burning Bed, 
starring Farrah Fawcett, and 1980’s Xanadu, starring Olivia Newton-John. While 
several of these early films evince a clear interest in social issues, nothing foreshad-
ows the dramatic transition Greenwald made in the wake of the 2000 presidential 
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election to producing and directing some of the most critically and commercially 
successful political documentaries of the post-9/11 period.
Joan Blades and Wes Boyd got their start founding Berkeley Systems, a San 
Francisco Bay Area software company that created a number of different appli-
cations for the Mac including the early text-to-speech program Outspoken and 
the virtual-desktop program Stepping Out. Mainstream success arrived for the 
company with its popular screen-saver program After Dark, which featured the 
signature Flying Toasters, and the later trivia game You Don’t Know Jack. After 
selling the company in 1997, Blades and Boyd began circulating an online petition 
via e-mail in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky scandal that directed Congress to 
“censure President Clinton and move on.” The petition eventually generated over 
a half a million signatures and established an issue-oriented, technology-driven 
campaign model that the political action group has followed ever since. Since its 
founding, MoveOn has experimented with and adopted various social media tech-
nologies like Meetup, Facebook, and Twitter to expand and extend its network of 
political activists. It has covered a number of domains ranging from election cam-
paigns for individual candidates to more general issues like health-care reform, 
gun control, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
As innovators in the fields of film production/distribution and political orga-
nization, respectively, Brave New Films and MoveOn have both been the objects 
of extensive study by film scholars, political scientists, and sociologists seeking 
to analyze the impact they have had in producing social change. Charles Musser 
and Christian Christensen, for example, both point out the innovative distribution 
techniques Greenwald and Brave New Films pioneered in the period from 2004 
through 2008.7 Christensen demonstrates that Brave New Films, via its partner 
organization Brave New Theaters, began building nontraditional screening outlets 
for its films (in homes, churches, and other public venues) into a hub for sympa-
thetic groups and individuals to initiate further social action.8 Similarly, MoveOn 
has been the object of extensive research for social and political scientists seeking 
to unpack the group’s use of newly evolving technology for political organization 
and mobilization. Studies have focused on the role of MoveOn in relation to oth-
er grassroots movements, the group’s use of technology (particularly e-mail and 
other social media) to create a new model for social movement organizations, and 
the rhetoric of its campaign materials in manufacturing a virtual imaginary com-
munity.9 In addition to this, both organizations have received an impressive degree 
of attention from the mainstream press.10
Less discussed, however, has been the influence of the two organizations on one 
another—a critical oversight given the influence of older media practices like doc-
umentary activism on new technologies like social media. Furthermore, despite an 
acknowledgment of the obvious role of films and other media in their efforts, most 
of the coverage has left aside any formal or aesthetic discussion of specific pieces 
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of media (films, videos, e-mails, etc.) and what role these qualities might play in 
shaping the tone or direction of the action to be taken. What follows will argue for 
the essential role that the documentary form played in fostering a new model for 
media activism and political participation in the post-9/11 period.
ROBERT GREENWALD:  
FROM X ANADU  TO  AFGHANISTAN
Prior to working with MoveOn.org, Greenwald got his start in the documentary 
form when Richard Ray Perez and Joan Sekler, both longtime activist filmmak-
ers, approached him with “paper bags filled with tapes they had shot in Florida.”11 
Outraged by the outcome of the 2000 election, Greenwald found it surprising that 
no one else was working on a film about the myriad of controversies and inconsis-
tencies surrounding the Bush victory. He agreed to take on producing the project, 
which eventually became Unprecedented: The 2000 Election (2002), directed and 
cowritten by Perez and Sekler. Timed to coincide with the 2002 midterm elections, 
the film premiered on September 17, 2002, and went on to be screened at several 
film festivals and high-profile events but did little to change the results of the elec-
tion, which was widely perceived as another victory for the right. Its impact on 
Greenwald, however, was significant. As Musser put it, although “the documen-
tary changed the trajectory of Greenwald’s filmmaking career . . . its limited dis-
tribution and impact provided the filmmaker with issues to ponder as he looked 
toward the 2004 election.”12 While he felt confident that his films were focused on 
the right issues, he wasn’t sure that the right people were seeing them.
In June of 2003, with the war in Iraq already well under way, Greenwald began 
work on his next film. As with Unprecedented, his goal was to shed light on an issue 
being ignored by the mainstream media. For Greenwald, the film seems to have 
resulted from something of an epiphany:
It was an early morning in late June, I was reading the paper, and in the middle of a 
long article about Iraq, one of the Bush administration folks was quoted, speaking 
about “programs for weapons of mass destruction” and how sure he was that they 
would find “programs.” I got a knot in my stomach and a feeling of deep concern. 
We did not go to war for a program. . . . We went to war because we were told there 
were “weapons” and that the threat was imminent and dangerous. But the article did 
not in any way challenge this revisionist explanation of the “why.” I imagined a head-
line—‘Programs for WMD Found!’—and I feared that we would all just accept that.13
This recollection reveals that his decision to make the film stemmed from two 
interrelated forces: his perception that the administration had changed tactics and, 
equally significant, his conviction that the mainstream media was failing to hold 
it accountable. His oppositional stance toward both institutions (the government 
and the media) not only informed the overall direction of his career afterward 
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but also placed him in step with a number of other newcomers to the progres-
sive-media landscape, including comedians like Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, 
emerging left-wing bloggers on sites like the Daily Kos and Huffington Post, and 
of course, MoveOn.org. This group of activists, forged in the polarized environ-
ment of post-9/11 politics and empowered by new digital frameworks, formed the 
cohort that Theodore Hamm referred to as “the new blue media.”14 Although still 
a novice to documentary film, Greenwald was immediately drawn to its potential 
as an alternative to the mainstream media. This same potential had been attracting 
activists and artists, from the Workers Film and Photo League in the early 1930s 
through groups like Newsreel in the 1960s and on to the groundbreaking (and on-
going) efforts of groups like Paper Tiger Television and Deep Dish TV to sidestep 
the mainstream media.15
Like these forerunners, Greenwald realized that an effective alternative media 
required not just a different message but also a different channel of distribution. 
He states: “I have made over fifty films including theatrical, cable, and television, 
all utilizing the existing distribution system. In the case of Uncovered, I wanted it 
seen quickly. So I never considered the traditional gatekeepers.”16 For Greenwald, 
circumventing the existing distribution system entailed approaching John Podesta 
of the Center for American Progress (CAP) (a newly formed progressive think 
tank largely funded by George Soros) and Wes Boyd of MoveOn. Both organiza-
tions provided funding for the completion of the film but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, tapped into their existing member networks for what Greenwald 
called an “upstairs-downstairs” distribution model. This involved CAP organiz-
ing screenings for key decision makers (including every member of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate—the presumed “upstairs” center of power) and 
MoveOn organizing screenings in twenty-six hundred house parties across the 
country (the “downstairs” segment of disaffected voters.)17 Further upending the 
traditional distribution model, Greenwald also sold DVDs of the film directly from 
his website via alternative outlets beyond CAP and MoveOn, including AlterNet, 
BuzzFlash, and The Nation, eventually enlisting a commercial distributor and sell-
ing over 120,000 copies of the film. As its reputation grew, the film attracted the 
attention of a commercial distributor who took it to the Cannes Film Festival and 
released a longer version in theaters around the world.
In addition to breaking new ground in distribution, Uncovered: The Whole 
Truth about the Iraq War, also forged another principle Greenwald’s films have ad-
hered to since: timeliness. Initially, Greenwald had planned on a year to complete 
the film, but at the request of Wes Boyd (who asked if it would be possible to com-
plete it in a month), Greenwald cut the schedule down to just under five months. 
While certainly longer than the immediacy of mainstream television news cov-
erage, by film standards this time frame is relatively quick. As events continued 
to unfold and new information came to light, Greenwald further demonstrated 
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a willingness to rework the film, eventually expanding it by nearly thirty minutes 
and shortening the title to Uncovered: The War on Iraq. Later, even five months 
would seem too long. Greenwald’s 2008 project Rethink Afghanistan was shot in 
a series of installments that were released to the web before eventually being re-
worked into a longer DVD release for event-based screening and direct sales.18 
Greenwald’s desire for speed and a more flexible cinematic text demonstrate both 
his desire to compensate for the poor coverage of the war by the mainstream news 
media and a wholesale reliance on emergent technology in order to do so.19
With Uncovered, Greenwald established the two features that have been the 
hallmarks of his activity since: (1) cooperation with other activist groups for 
 production, funding, and exhibition (what Christian Christensen identifies as the 
“coalition model” of documentary advocacy20); and (2) distribution via whatever 
technology will allow the work to be seen by the greatest number of people in 
the shortest amount of time, be it DVD, theatrical release, or, eventually, online 
streaming. The film’s commercial and critical success firmly established Greenwald 
in the circuit of progressive liberal activists and media makers—connections he 
would increasingly rely upon in future projects. Greenwald’s next project not only 
 perfected this model but also resulted in a newly formed production  company–
cum–activist organization, Brave New Films, which has since become the  umbrella 
organization for all of his political activities. But before Greenwald could take that 
next step, he needed some additional help from MoveOn.org, which itself was 
quickly evolving from an e-mail petition to a political media powerhouse.
MOVEON.ORG
The story of MoveOn.org’s evolution toward political power and media advocacy 
offers a paradigmatic example of the “power of the Internet” that has now be-
come commonplace, one in which an organization’s speed of success comes as a 
surprise for everyone involved, including its founders. Although the unexpected 
is by definition difficult to anticipate, MoveOn managed to capture that spirit re-
peatedly in its first decade of existence. The viral success of Boyd and Blades’s 
original e-mail petition to “censure President Clinton and move on” (garnering 
hundreds of thousands of signatures in a few weeks) exemplifies an often repeated 
theme in media accounts of its organizing ability: an ability to capitalize on pub-
lic reaction by raising money quickly or turning out supporters for last-minute 
events. Although MoveOn made an early push for tougher gun legislation in the 
wake of the Columbine High School shootings in 1999, for the most part its early 
years were focused on issues related to the Clinton impeachment and reshap-
ing Congress away from its Gingrich-based social conservatism.21 In the run-up 
to the 2000 election, MoveOn repeatedly broke online fund-raising records for 
candidates it supported in races against some of the most outspoken proponents 
Networked Audiences    59
of  impeachment,  including James Rogan of California (the House impeachment 
manager) and Florida Congressman Mark Foley.22 Although it scored a few early 
victories in these races and established itself as a player in political fund-raising 
and viral campaigning, MoveOn sat out the postelection protests over Bush’s elec-
tion (a move Boyd later regretted) and seemed resigned to periods of inactivity 
between election cycles.
However, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on  September 
11, 2001, and their political consequences pushed MoveOn’s membership and its 
founders to a more issue-oriented protest model. Rather than focus solely on 
 elections, MoveOn began mobilizing between elections to oppose specific policies. 
In 2001, the group merged efforts with 911-peace.org and recruited its founder, Eli 
Pariser, to be its executive director. In a story reminiscent of MoveOn’s own, on 
September 12, 2001, Pariser had sent out an e-mail to thirty friends asking them 
to sign a virtual petition he set up urging “moderation and restraint” in response 
to the attacks. In two weeks, the petition generated over five hundred thousand 
signatures and elevated the twenty-year-old Pariser to national prominence as a 
leader in the growing protest movement to the invasion of Afghanistan. It also 
brought him to the attention of Boyd and Blades, who clearly recognized Pariser’s 
potential and saw him as a natural fit for their efforts.
Over the next few years, Pariser would be instrumental in MoveOn’s foray into 
media campaigning as a key component of its political strategy. In early 2002, 
during the buildup to the war in Iraq, the group launched another online petition 
calling on Congress to “let the [weapons] inspections work” and sought member 
donations to raise $40,000 for a full-page ad in the New York Times. When the ef-
fort generated nearly $400,000, MoveOn took this as a sign that its members were 
“very interested in being heard through advertising,” as Blades put it.23 MoveOn 
used the additional funds to create what became known as its “Daisy” ad, named 
after the controversial Lyndon Johnson television advertisement that aired during 
his 1964 race against Barry Goldwater. While reaction to the MoveOn version was 
mixed, it succeeded in generating attention and airplay far beyond the original 
thirteen cities in which it was shown as a paid spot.24 David Fenton, MoveOn’s 
communications consultant, claimed that thanks to its coverage on the Internet 
and cable news outlets, it had become the most viewed advertisement in the his-
tory of the medium.25
Seeking to build on this success, MoveOn next created a contest to replicate 
the success of the Daisy ad in a more distributed fashion. Called “Bush in 30 Sec-
onds,” it challenged MoveOn members to create a political ad that summed up the 
Bush administration in thirty seconds. The winner’s entry would be aired during 
the Super Bowl halftime show, its broadcast paid for by MoveOn contributors. 
The contest was judged by a panel of celebrities, from the musician Moby (who 
was credited as one of the contest’s creators) to other high-profile personalities 
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like Jack Black, Russell Simmons, and Michael Moore.26 Citing a policy against 
 advocacy advertising during the game, CBS declined to sell MoveOn the spot. But 
the winning ad and the controversy the contest generated nonetheless earned an 
enormous amount of free publicity for MoveOn.27 MoveOn continued to make 
political advertising a primary tool in its efforts throughout the next few years, 
spending over $10 million airing its own material in the 2004 election alone.28
A closer look at the home page for MoveOn from January 2004 (available via 
the Internet Archive’s invaluable Wayback Machine) demonstrates the extent 
to which MoveOn at this point already conceived of politics and media—both 
new and old media—as an intertwined enterprise.29 Laid out in a standard three-
column format with a header and footer at the top and bottom, the page essen-
tially remediates the format of a newspaper—or, in the case of MoveOn, perhaps 
a newsletter or pamphlet is the more relevant print reference.30 Red, white, and 
blue predictably dominate the color scheme, implicitly emphasizing that this is a 
newsletter about the state of US politics and democracy. The top-level categories 
across the top announce to visitors the organization’s areas of focus, from infor-
mational (“Home” and “About”), to referential (“Press Room” and “Media Cover-
age”), to political praxis (“Make a Donation” and “Become a Volunteer”). While 
they appear as discrete categories, however, these different areas—information, 
action, organization—are connected as equal parts, or steps, in a cohesive whole. 
Figure 3.2. MoveOn’s remake of the “Daisy” ad generated 
 controversy and coverage, demonstrating the power of media for 
online organizing.
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Figure 3.3. The MoveOn home page circa January 2004.
“Democracy in Action,” the header claims, involves pulling individual activity and 
resources (time and money) into a collective, organizational form (MoveOn itself) 
in order to provide information and influence the larger mediasphere.
This theory of politics carries across the lower, content portion of the page, 
finding various iterations in each of the specific stories and items featured. The 
organizational logic behind the page seems to devote the left-hand sidebar to 
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past items, each with an image; the center frame to the current campaigns and 
 information; and the right-hand sidebar to quicker, press-release style bulletins—
almost lending the whole a “past, present, and future” split. In its content, each of 
these items cements MoveOn’s larger message. On the left-hand side, links and im-
ages are given for three discrete streaming or rich media pieces, including a replay 
of the “Bush in 30 Seconds” winner, a recording of a MoveOn-sponsored lecture 
given by Al Gore on climate change (a full two years before An Inconvenient Truth 
in 2006), and an interactive map of the screenings and house parties that were 
held for the premiere of Uncovered. The central frame is dedicated to mobiliz-
ing members to sign petitions censuring President Bush for misleading the public 
and censuring CBS (the network carrying the Super Bowl) for boycotting its ads. 
Political impact, these central items imply, arises out of the regulation of the flow 
of information: providing information to supporters to recruit and mobilize them, 
creating information to convert others, and gaming the mass media into support-
ing these and other efforts.
The footer of the page further underscores and revisits these connections. The 
left side of the footer is dedicated to recruiting for MoveOn’s “Media Corps” and 
reporting on its actions on the organization’s behalf, and the right footer makes 
one last plea to members to join or donate. The Media Corps was a group of vol-
unteers MoveOn had mobilized as a type of rapid-response unit focused on the 
mainstream media and its coverage of the war. On the recruitment page, it de-
scribes the Media Corps as a group of “committed MoveOn volunteers who will 
mobilize to push the media to fairly cover this war.”31 Volunteers were asked to 
commit to taking an “action” every day, which would usually involve contacting 
mainstream media outlets regarding their coverage of various issues. In its focus 
on shaping and critiquing the mainstream news by mobilizing its volunteers, the 
Media Corps offers an interesting precursor for the crowdsourced production 
model that Greenwald’s Outfoxed would rely on later that year.
A great deal of MoveOn’s resources (both the labor of its volunteers and the 
money that it collected from volunteers) were hence dedicated to influencing, 
making, and distributing media. Starting in 2004, MoveOn’s other channel for dis-
tributing these short political advertisements has been through embedded video 
clips on its website and Facebook pages. While MoveOn had used streaming video 
in campaigns before (notably for the “Bush in 30 Seconds” contest), the advent 
of YouTube in 2005 brought simplified video streaming to mainstream users, 
obviating the need for custom browser plugins or software downloads to deliver 
video over the web to a mass audience.32 Less than a year after YouTube launched, 
MoveOn had established a profile on the site and began uploading campaign-
related videos to embed in their webpages. Short videos explaining the issue at 
hand became a regular feature on its campaign pages, alongside a brief written 
explanation and a form to use to respond (donating, signing a petition, e-mailing 
a specific politician, etc.). Unlike the messages it paid to broadcast on mainstream 
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television channels, these embedded campaign videos were more akin to in-house 
advertising and offered short bursts of information and rhetorical appeals to in-
cite the viewer/member to some kind of action. Since its first posts, MoveOn has 
posted hundreds of these short videos on its YouTube channel, which, collectively, 
have been viewed millions of times. YouTube’s allowance of embedded video on 
other sites meant that a significant portion of these videos were watched by users 
visiting the MoveOn campaign pages rather than on YouTube’s site. Most users 
would have encountered them within the context of an overt political message 
rather than in the heterogenous context of user-submitted video that forms the 
bulk of YouTube’s content. While the inclusion of streaming video on a webpage 
has by now become commonplace across the Internet, MoveOn’s specific use and 
early experimentation were a clear indicator that the organization realized the 
power of moving-image media in general.
Beyond direct advertisement and short embedded video clips, MoveOn’s most 
consistent use of media in its campaigns has been its support of outside projects 
it feels are relevant to its larger goals. After the dispute between Michael Moore 
and the Disney Corporation over the distribution of Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11 
(2004), MoveOn started a pledge drive of members willing to see the movie on its 
opening weekend, hoping to make the film a success in spite of the efforts to block 
it. In exchange, Moore participated in an online virtual “town hall” meeting that 
connected thirty thousand members at a number of house parties across the coun-
try with the director to discuss issues raised in the film. In calling on members to 
see the film, Pariser praised MoveOn for taking up a mission similar to Green-
wald’s: holding the administration accountable on issues when the mainstream 
media didn’t. He wrote: “Despite years of television coverage on Iraq and the war 
on terror, most of the movie consists of footage you’d never see on TV.  .  .  . The 
film is filled with this stuff, and it’s hard to imagine seeing it and not being moved, 
shocked, and outraged.”33 Since then, MoveOn has sponsored screening and atten-
dance drives for many films, including An Inconvenient Truth (Davis Guggenheim, 
2006), Moore’s later films Sicko (2007) and Capitalism: A Love Story (2009), the 
Leonardo DiCaprio–produced and -narrated The 11th Hour (Leila Connors and 
Nadia Connors, 2007), the Iraq war film The Ground Truth (Patricia Foulkrod, 
2006), and, of course, several of Robert Greenwald’s films, including Outfoxed: 
Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism (2004), which would prove to be the most 
extensive collaboration between the two organizations.
FOX NEWS:  A C OMMON ENEMY
In mid-2003, reports began surfacing in the mainstream press that a Republican-
led effort to filibuster the Senate in an all-night session pushing for an up-or-down 
vote on George W. Bush’s judicial appointees had in fact been the idea of an edi-
torial in the Weekly Standard, a publication owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News 
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Corporation.34 Furthermore, the Washington Post and The Hill both reported that 
Fox News had asked Republicans to schedule the filibuster to coincide with the 
opening of Special Report with Brit Hume at exactly 6:02 p.m. (EST) to capture 
their dramatic entrance live on television.35 While the story itself simply became 
a footnote, for progressive activists and media-watch groups, it seemed to pro-
vide clear evidence for their long-held suspicion that Murdoch’s company, and 
Fox News in particular, were heavily biased in favor of Republicans. For MoveOn.
org and Robert Greenwald, it was a call to arms—one that would direct their next 
collaboration and shift the future direction of both organizations.
Given their mutual opposition to the Bush administration and their mistrust 
of the mainstream media’s ability to hold it accountable, Greenwald and MoveOn 
saw in Fox News an opportunity to critique both groups at once. Claiming, as Gre-
enwald did, that “Fox is a Republican, not merely a conservative, network” meant 
that confronting the network would simultaneously allow them to confront the 
entire Republican agenda.36 This move, in turn, further solidified the position of 
MoveOn as an alternative to conservative and Republican policies and Greenwald 
and other filmmakers as alternative media outlets to the mainstream press.
Fox had long been an object of scorn for the left based on what many saw as its 
destructive effect on television news in general. Initially dominated by CNN, the 
market for twenty-four-hour news began expanding in 1996 with the addition of 
Fox and MSNBC. To launch the new network, Murdoch hired Roger Ailes, a for-
mer NBC executive and Republican political consultant. Ailes was responsible for 
designing the network’s emphasis on live news coverage during the day followed 
by opinion programming in the evening. To anchor these evening programs, he 
hired large personalities like Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity in order to differenti-
ate Fox from the staid programming of CNN. The network’s emphasis on visually 
dense graphic presentation and sensational stories earned it comparisons to USA 
Today. But despite these dismissals, between the terrorist attacks in 2001 and the 
run-up to the Iraq war, Fox moved into first place in the cable-news ratings—a 
prominence that drew attention to its effect both on cable news specifically and on 
American political opinions in general. The heightened tension surrounding the 
9/11 attacks and an impending war played directly into the dramatic, sensational 
presentation that Fox brought to the business of television news. Its style was so 
extreme that even First Lady Laura Bush once criticized the network for “scar-
ing people” with its continual coverage of the terror threat level.37 As Ken Auletta 
pointed out in a widely read profile of Fox and Roger Ailes from 2003, CNN and 
MSNBC both found themselves in the position of playing catch-up, often by inef-
fectively imitating the leader.38 Moreover, many widely suspected that conservative 
media such as talk radio and Fox News were responsible for the ascendancy of the 
Republican Party on a national scale—an influence sociologists would later dub 
“the Fox News factor” or “the Fox News effect.”39 Thus, for progressive political 
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action groups like MoveOn, Fox News was not just a convenient target, but rather 
an essential one for the advancement of the progressive agenda.
In 2003, MoveOn and Greenwald teamed up again to work on a political  action 
campaign that would expose what they believed to be Fox’s abuse of mainstream 
journalism, the centerpiece of which would be the Greenwald documentary 
 Outfoxed: Rupert Murdoch’s War on Journalism. As with Uncovered, MoveOn pro-
vided production funding alongside the Center for American Progress, but this 
time it also lent its numbers and organizing strength to the production of the film 
itself. After looking over six months’ worth of twenty-four-hour-per-day record-
ings of the Fox News channel, Greenwald outlined what he believed to be the most 
egregious of the Fox News tactics, which he categorized into a series of themes 
that would form the backbone of the film. MoveOn then put out a call to  members 
asking for “Fox Monitors,” individuals who would sign up to watch Fox News 
programs during specific times throughout the week.40 When monitors found 
examples of Greenwald’s themes, they would fill out a spreadsheet detailing the 
date, time, and context and forward it on to him. Greenwald then compiled these 
reports for his team of editors, who would pull the footage and work it into the ap-
propriate sequences. To complement the Fox footage, Greenwald also conducted 
interviews with a series of former Fox employees, several of whom disguised their 
voice and appearance, as well as outspoken critics of the network like Al Franken 
and Eric Alterman.41
Once Outfoxed was complete, Greenwald, together with CAP and MoveOn, 
pursued the same upstairs-downstairs distribution method that they had used on 
Uncovered. To leverage the film, MoveOn conducted a series of specific actions 
based around the film that it dubbed the “Unfair and Unbalanced” campaign. 
These included a petition to the Federal Trade Commission to block’s Fox’s use 
of the phrase “Fair and Balanced” on the basis that it was inaccurate and mislead-
ing, a night of 2,750 house parties to screen the film, and a series of press releases 
and e-mail campaigns calling on Congress to force the network to “come clean 
about its rank partisanship,” as Wes Boyd put it.42 In his letter to MoveOn members 
urging them to participate in the campaign, Boyd also announced that members 
who made a thirty-dollar donation to the alternative news organization AlterNet 
would get a copy of the film for free, stating, “As part of this campaign, we’ve got 
to support good media, and AlterNet is a great independent outlet.” In addition 
to AlterNet, MoveOn, Greenwald, and CAP also teamed up with several other 
independent news organizations and watchdog groups including FAIR (Fairness 
and Accuracy in Reporting), Common Cause, Media Matters, and the Center for 
Digital Democracy, among others.
Predictably, Fox responded to the claims presented in the film. Instead of  suing 
for copyright infringement (as it had against Al Franken for his book Lies (and the 
Lying Liars Who Tell Them): A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right), Fox  instead 
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leveled its own accusations on air against MoveOn, the New York Times, and 
George Soros for colluding to “corrupt the journalistic process.”43 Fox’s insinua-
tion that the New York Times was itself a liberal mouthpiece overtly echoes claims 
that the network, and the right in general, have repeatedly made about the general 
liberal bias of much of the mainstream media news, from NPR and CNN to the 
New York Times.44 Regardless of the validity of either side’s accusations—a topic 
too vast and vexing to take up here—these claims only further bolstered progres-
sive calls for an independent media apart from the larger corporate conglomerates 
that had come to dominate virtually every channel of the news media. Indeed, the 
website for Outfoxed directs visitors to “sign the petition to break up the big media 
conglomerates and get higher quality news” and to “volunteer with Independent 
Media Centers all across the globe.”45 What Fox failed to realize in its counterat-
tack was that the progressive activist groups aligned against it weren’t advocating 
for one corporate media organization over another, but rather against corporate 
media organizations in general. For Greenwald, the entire shift of his career into 
documentary filmmaking and his partnership with organizations like MoveOn 
were based on the belief that people not only wanted but also needed an alterna-
tive form of media and a different channel through which to access it. While this 
desire would tangibly manifest itself in a series of mixed results with the rise of 
midstream media outlets such as The Intercept and Breitbart News (see chapter 6), 
in 2003 Fox News and corporate media were the problem.
OUTFOXED:  THE EVENT
Like much of Greenwald’s documentary output, Outfoxed works within a bare-
bones style that offers little in the way of aesthetic flourish or formal innovation. 
The talking-head interviews juxtaposed with footage from Fox itself simply seek 
to prove the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the network engages in blatant 
political favoritism and consistently presents editorial opinion as unbiased news. 
As one reviewer described it, “[T]he result is an unwavering argument against Fox 
News that combines the leftist partisan vigor of a Michael Moore film with the so-
ber tone and delivery of a PBS special.”46 The film’s strongest evidence is its use of 
the Fox material itself to decontextualize and lay bare what it describes as the Fox 
style of journalism. Its smoking gun lies in a series of memos leaked to the film-
makers by Fox employees (and later published on the film’s website) that detail the 
way Fox sets its agenda for covering specific events. The memos, sent out by Fox’s 
vice president for news, John Moody, suggest specific angles from which the news 
should be approached, and are the film’s irrefutable evidence that Fox directs its 
employees to cover the news from an overtly political standpoint.
The film’s conclusion—that Fox News is politically biased—is, as the New York 
Times put it, “not exactly earth shattering.”47 By the time it was released, studies 
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had already been published by the Columbia School of Journalism and Maryland’s 
Program on International Policy demonstrating these exact conclusions, and Fox’s 
particular style of reporting was sufficiently well known that it had already become 
fodder for parody on popular political satire outlets like The Onion and The Daily 
Show.48 But the simple fact that the point had been made elsewhere doesn’t make 
the film itself irrelevant, nor does it deny the utility it afforded the progressive 
groups who created it as a documentary. Although academic studies had been car-
ried out and jokes had been delivered, all pointing to the same conclusion, the case 
had yet to be made in the particular form that Outfoxed delivered. Put differently, 
the “sober tone . . . of a PBS special” that the film manifests is not simply the result 
of a lack of creativity but, rather, an intentional part of its larger rhetorical strategy.
Form in this case refers not only to the particular organization of Outfoxed 
itself but also to the documentary form in general, both of which played a decisive 
role in the film’s argument and in its circulation within progressive political dis-
course when it premiered. As a type of moving-image media, documentary natu-
rally lends itself to the method of media quotation essential to the film’s strategy 
of using Fox’s own material against itself. As Julia Lesage points out, documentary 
film is adept at taking vast quantities of information and synthesizing them down 
into salient points and a digestible format—a skill that would be brought entirely 
to bear by Greenwald and MoveOn as they sought to distill six months’ worth 
of twenty-four-hour-per-day Fox News coverage down into the hour-and-a-half 
running time of the film.49 This level of decontextualization and synthesis allows 
the film to achieve the small degree of stone-faced humor it allows itself as, for 
example, Bill O’Reilly repeatedly commands his guests to “shut up” in a variety of 
ways across a multiplicity of contexts, all presented in rapid montage succession. 
Pairing this sort of comedic evidence with the more traditional expert-interview 
segments positions the film directly between the academic studies and the parodic 
attacks that came before it.
Moreover, set in the context of mainstream-media criticism, the film utilizes 
the documentary mode to reflexively position itself as the type of product that it 
is advocating for. When paired with its unique production methods, Outfoxed be-
comes a powerful organizing tool for MoveOn and its members. In collaborating 
with MoveOn members to identify the material that would later appear in the film, 
Greenwald was effectively engaging in an early form of what Jeff Howe would later 
call crowdsourcing, or using technology to assign a large task to a group of dis-
connected individuals to complete in parts.50 Crowdsourcing as a method of dis-
tributed labor would eventually come to refer to everything from the creation of 
Wikipedia to attempts by businesses to utilize slave labor in the developing world 
via platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The service, as Lily Irani and others 
have demonstrated, enables companies to quickly and inexpensively offload tasks 
that might otherwise require significant investment through a process that she 
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refers to as “massively mediated microlabor.”51 As Irani persuasively demonstrates, 
the service excels at the “redistribution of tedium” and enables many informa-
tion-era high-tech companies to maintain an aura of innovation despite fostering 
industrial-era levels of alienation and exploitation for the workers who create this 
value. While various tools and platforms have emerged to facilitate labor organiza-
tion among the workers on these platforms, for the most part the crowdsourcing 
platforms themselves are antipolitical and anticommunal.52
But for MoveOn, crowdsourced production represented a unique opportunity 
to engage its members in the form of direct, participatory democracy that the 
group stands for. The implicit belief here is that a strong democracy requires an 
equally strong press to hold the government accountable and provide the elec-
torate with the information they require to make informed choices. This is what 
motivated the attack on Fox and the mainstream media, and is overtly proclaimed 
in the rhetoric used by the independent media partners the film promotes as an al-
ternative. For Greenwald and MoveOn, the first step in achieving this goal was ex-
posing what it felt was the most egregious example of corrupt journalism—a goal 
it could achieve only through the help of its many members. In this sense the film 
is a tangible product of group action, much the same way that MoveOn tries to be.
The documentary form also lent itself to a particular method of organizing 
that MoveOn had pioneered: the house party. If MoveOn members were an im-
portant part of the film’s production process, they made up an even larger part 
of its intended audience. Through its use of the house party to screen films for 
its members, MoveOn had essentially become an ad hoc exhibitor for political 
documentary films, able to produce thousands of viewers for a given film. Indeed, 
MoveOn’s house-party event for Greenwald’s Walmart: The High Cost of Low Pric-
es put together seven thousand simultaneous screenings. Arguably, it enjoyed a 
wider release than James Cameron’s Avatar (2009), which, at its height, played 
in 3,461 theaters simultaneously.53 There is no comparison between a nationwide 
theatrical release sustained over many weeks and a stand-alone event arranged 
in a myriad of private venues, but in the realm of documentary film this level of 
exposure is impressive. Given Greenwald’s commitment to political action, access 
to a group of committed audience members presented an enormous opportunity. 
Using MoveOn’s member base would allow Greenwald to directly translate his film 
into action, not to mention DVD sales. (Party hosts are often required to purchase 
the films at their own expense, typically at a discount.)
For MoveOn, the events also double as membership-recruitment and 
 volunteer drives. Since house parties are typically paired with a conference call 
afterward that includes MoveOn organizers and the filmmakers, attendees feel 
part of something larger than their particular gathering. As an eighty-six-minute 
text delivered in a “sober tone,” a documentary like Outfoxed functions as a crash 
course for MoveOn members in the issues the organization seeks to advance. Of 
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course, such events have long been a staple of political documentary films, often 
screened in public venues to sympathetic audiences to generate awareness of and 
motivation for specific issues or causes.54 Where MoveOn differs from its fore-
runners is in the sheer scale it achieves through technology. When a house party 
is planned, members are notified via e-mail and other channels of the upcoming 
event and asked to host a party. Once a sufficient number sign up on the website 
to host an event, a second wave of e-mails invites others to RSVP to screenings 
in their area using their zip codes. If no party is being held nearby, members are 
asked to hold one of their own, soliciting participation from friends and family 
who might be interested. From here, hosts are asked to purchase copies of the 
film and provide an Internet-connected computer or telephone to participate in 
the discussion afterward. After the screening, hosts will typically call or log in 
to a conference call where MoveOn staff and/or the filmmakers will address the 
audience and answer questions.
Paired with this online connection is the offline, face-to-face interaction at the 
party itself. Situated in people’s homes but open to the general public, these events 
hinge upon turning the shared experience of the film into an interpersonal con-
nection among people whose primary interface with the organization that brought 
them together is through their computers. Reportage on the house parties in the 
mainstream press paints a heterogeneous picture that thwarts easy character-
ization, with accounts ranging from catered gatherings in the homes of wealthy 
celebrities attended by hundreds to small get-togethers in apartments offering 
homemade appetizers to a dozen people.55 Regardless of the nature of individual 
events, however, in their mass simultaneity they offer a unique hybrid of public 
and private spectatorship that troubles the traditional distinction between the the-
ater and the home. Despite talk of the Internet and the high-definition living room 
atomizing the traditional theater audience, the MoveOn house party works toward 
creating the same sense of collective spectatorship offered in a theatrical screen-
ing.56 While hosts and other attendees are encouraged to publicize the screenings 
to friends and family as a distributed publicity tool, there is little expectation that 
a given event will be composed solely of people familiar to the host. The inclusion 
of the conference call also requires the nationwide screenings to take place at the 
same time. This simultaneity strengthens the collective sense of a shared experi-
ence, which in turn fosters greater identification with the organization and the 
collection of individuals who constitute it.
The structure of the house party also assumes that people will want to discuss 
the film and the issues it raises after they have watched it, and the gathering pro-
vides a natural outlet for the impulse. Centering the party on the film screening 
gives the people in attendance a built-in conversation topic on an issue they are 
already predisposed to support. Furthermore, it also gives them a chance to act 
upon the problem structure that organizes most of Greenwald’s films. In spite of 
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his reluctance to utilize the pathos-driven approach that comes more naturally to 
someone like Michael Moore, his films nonetheless deal with controversial issues 
that he and MoveOn feel people will act on. Attendees are often asked to conclude 
the event by writing postcards, signing petitions, making phone calls, or volun-
teering to participate in future events—all of which provide an outlet to respond 
to the call to action that problem documentary films typically end with. This move 
implicitly pairs collective spectatorship with collective action, and in the context 
of the house party, the two sit side by side. In this sense, the documentary form 
offers MoveOn the ability to bring its members together around an event (the 
screening), provide them with a shared body of knowledge (the film), and then ask 
them to act immediately on the information they have been given.
In the context of the house party, the “sober tone” of a film like Outfoxed thus 
sits ideally between the seriousness of academic studies and the accessibility of 
the popular-culture parodies on Fox’s bias that had already been presented. The 
minimal style that Greenwald’s films employ fits within a logic dictating that once 
people have the information, they will feel compelled to act. The house parties 
are structured to capitalize on this. The social ritual of coming together to watch 
a film and the impulse to participate in a nationwide “event” are both centered on 
the experience of the film text, and the film text derives its agency from the context 
in which it is presented. No other media form offers this same level of symbiosis.
OUTFOXED ’ S  OFFSHO OT S
Greenwald himself went on to adapt the material from the film into addition-
al forms of media—in this case, a book (cowritten with Alexandra Kitty) and a 
website (now defunct). Both offer interesting gestures toward the two ends of the 
spectrum that I am arguing his film sits astride. If Outfoxed the film is less weighty 
than more serious academic studies on the topic, then the book is clearly an at-
tempt to make up the deficit. As was the case with the companion texts to both of 
Errol Morris’s films from the same period, the book essentially works as a set of 
footnotes to the film: citing sources, reprinting transcripts from the interviews and 
Fox broadcasts, and presenting a more detailed argument than a film would allow.
And where the book grounds the film’s assertions in a solid body of evidence, 
the website extended its argument and call to action forward in time and updated 
its documentation of Fox’s tactics. In addition to a standard film website housed 
at www.outfoxed.com (which contained a trailer, synopsis, reviews, links to pur-
chase the DVD, and other information), Greenwald also launched an offshoot site 
at http://foxattacks.com that contained a series of viral videos created after the 
film’s release. Utilizing the tagline “They Distort, We Reply” in response to Fox’s 
well-known “We Report, You Decide,” the videos were intended to expose Fox’s 
coverage of ongoing issues for inaccuracy and political bias. Thus when Fox went 
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“on attack” against an individual or issue like Michelle Obama or health care, the 
staff at Brave New Films would post a video documenting their claims and notify 
subscribers, who would then forward the video on to others. For content, the site 
relied on partnerships with other independent watchdog groups like Newshounds 
and FAIR to alert it to inaccuracies in Fox reporting (a group it called the “Fox 
Attacks Coalition”).57 In essence, Brave New Films was creating a version of Fact-
Check.org or Politifact a decade before Donald Trump’s eccentric campaign style 
made fact-checking news sites and political candidates a virtual necessity.
In another context, a website like FoxAttacks.com could be interpreted as an 
advertising mechanism to spur on DVD sales of the film, much as the popular 
Freakonomics blog implicitly advertised for the books even as it provided ongoing 
analysis that the books didn’t contain.58 In this context, however, there are several 
indications that the site’s purpose was more than purely commercial. The first is 
that Greenwald, under the Brave New Films production company that came out 
of Outfoxed, has offered all of his films, including Outfoxed, for free on YouTube, 
Google Video, Facebook, and other platforms. The aim was to get the film’s larger 
Figure 3.4. The FoxAttacks home page circa October 2007. The “Pssst!” function on each 
video enabled users to share the video with others.
72    Networked Audiences
message out regardless of the particular channel of distribution. The second is that 
Greenwald made all of the source material in the film, including the interviews he 
conducted, available for use by other filmmakers under a Creative Commons li-
cense. Like the FoxAttacks website, publishing the raw material treated the film as 
part of an ongoing project for further development, as opposed to a finished text. 
More broadly, Greenwald has claimed that, like many documentary filmmakers 
before him, his aim is not to make money from the film, but rather to advance his 
political agenda.59 Funded by nonprofit foundations and promoted for free across a 
variety of channels, such films, as well as their patrons, find their payoff elsewhere. 
As Jonathan Kahana notes, “Such entities usually expect to generate cultural, po-
litical, or ideological, rather than financial, returns on their investments.”60 In this 
sense FoxAttacks was a political extension of, rather than commercial support for, 
the film that inspired it.
FoxAttacks also demonstrated Greenwald’s keen awareness of the need to tailor 
the broader message to the individual media channel in which it appears. If the 
house parties acknowledge that a feature-length documentary lends itself to dis-
cussion and follow-up action, the website asserts that a video clip on a web page 
lends itself to brevity and sharing. In making the videos highly portable (they were 
capable of being e-mailed to viewers and linked to and embedded in other web 
pages), Greenwald is taking advantage of the interconnected, entirely transferable 
nature of digital media on the Internet. In making them brief, he is admitting 
that the attention span of the Internet audience is relatively short. It is telling, for 
instance, that even after Outfoxed was made available on the web for free, DVD 
sales continued coming in, owing perhaps to the preference of one medium over 
another depending on the length and tone of the message, although habits in this 
regard are hardly fixed.61 As Musser points out, this awareness of the power of the 
short form on the web would become key to Greenwald’s work during the 2006 
and 2008 elections.62 But regardless, the lessons learned during the Outfoxed proj-
ect would have an ongoing influence on the political activities of both Greenwald 
and MoveOn.
OUTFOXED:  THE AFTERMATH
Although Greenwald and MoveOn continued to collaborate on projects and cam-
paigns and to mutually support each other’s projects, their integration has never 
been as extensive as it was on the Outfoxed project. Nonetheless, the collaboration 
established a model combining the informative power of moving images with the 
organizing power of the Internet that both groups have continued to follow. With 
the meteoric rise of Facebook as the primary social media outlet, both groups 
have migrated a great deal of their content sharing and event organizing onto the 
platform.
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For its part, MoveOn still supports films and filmmakers who share its causes 
through house parties and screening drives. As video streaming became simpler 
and more ubiquitous, MoveOn’s campaign messages and other web pages increas-
ingly featured short video clips of materials relevant to a particular issue. Its use of 
these materials runs the gamut from thirty-second attack ads aimed at television 
to short testimonials by MoveOn members about an issue or their experience with 
the organization. Like FoxAttacks, MoveOn’s video strategy demonstrates a canny 
awareness of the Internet as a medium. Two particular styles seem to dominate 
their output, and both offer examples of the larger role of MoveOn’s in-house 
media production.
The first type of video that MoveOn regularly produces is closely related in 
form and purpose to the television advertising the organization has sponsored. 
As the “Bush in 30 Seconds” contest, the infamous “Daisy” spot, and its equally 
infamous 2008 follow-up “Not Alex” demonstrate, MoveOn has clearly become 
adept at turning a controversial advertisement aired in a few states into a national 
conversation topic that replays in news segments on television and becomes vi-
rally distributed across the web on blogs and other social media sites. MoveOn’s 
in-house advertising for its specific campaigns may be intended for a different 
audience and distributed in a more limited fashion, but it nonetheless functions in 
much the same way. Slightly longer than a thirty-second spot, these videos are still 
quite short, in keeping with the brevity principle for web-based video. They reach 
their conclusions quickly and seek to make one brief call to action, usually via the 
web page in which they appear.
In 2018, for example, MoveOn created a campaign to preemptively enlist mem-
bers to join protest rallies should Donald Trump interfere in the independent in-
vestigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election. As part of its enlistment 
drive, it produced a series of short videos calling on MoveOn members to be pre-
pared and register to join future protests, which it then posted to its Facebook 
page. One video, If Mueller Is Fired Here’s What To Do, makes its case by featuring 
short testimonials from other members, including Karla in Illinois, Mary in Texas, 
and Steve from California, all of whom plan to protest should Trump attempt to 
disrupt the investigation.63 The video ran just under two minutes and garnered 
nearly a million views in twenty-four hours, demonstrating MoveOn’s continued 
ability to draw an audience. Like the original e-mail petitions that Blades and Boyd 
created in 1998 and Eli Pariser sent around in 2001, the hope for these videos is 
that they will “go viral” and spread around the Internet via e-mails, links, and posts 
to social networking feeds. But failing this, these embedded clips and the enjoin-
der to “share them with your family and friends” clearly serve another purpose, 
since most of the people viewing them on MoveOn pages are already members. 
Not only does sharing the video by posting it to a Facebook page, e-mailing it to 
a friend, and so forth work to publicize the issue, but it also provides members 
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doing so with the sense that they have done their part for the cause. MoveOn’s 
conception of itself as a member-driven organization clearly depends not just on 
getting its members to participate but also on giving them the perception that this 
participation is what makes a difference. Providing them with a palatable, humor-
ous, easily distributable message introducing an issue enables these clips to serve 
both functions.
The second type of video that seems to dominate MoveOn’s video production is 
the member testimonial. These clips feature members, often self-recorded via web-
cams, testifying to their experience with MoveOn and entreating other members 
to become similarly involved. In another context such limited production values 
might be a detriment, but in this context the format actually works as a strength. 
In a video called Host an Event!, a woman named Elinor shares her experience 
hosting a party for MoveOn and asks others to follow her lead.64 Sitting before the 
camera in what appears to be a dimly lit living room, Elinor states, “If you’ve only 
interacted with MoveOn on the Internet, let me tell you, it’s better in real life!” She 
goes on to ask viewers to “[s]ign up now to deliver a petition to your congressman, 
it’s an easy thing to do. All you have to do is fill out the form that’s located there, 
or there, or maybe there.” As she gestures around the screen, acknowledging her 
virtual location on a web page, her call to participate “in real life” urges the viewer 
to move beyond the medium that currently connects them. Her on-screen appear-
ance and its webcam aesthetic reflexively mirror the members who are watching 
her from their computers; as she sits and looks into her computer screen, the view-
ers sit and gaze into theirs. Even as it emphasizes the technological interface, the 
video also puts a human face on an organization that otherwise largely exists as a 
web page on the Internet. Like the house party, these member testimonials seek to 
personify MoveOn the organization. Their DIY aesthetic and their status as index-
ical moving images speak to a desire on MoveOn’s part to reveal the people behind 
its organizing prowess—people who, like the spectator, can do it themselves. As 
Paul Arthur might claim, it is through these aesthetic limitations that the videos 
gain the “jargon of authenticity” they seek to impart.65 Significantly, even an orga-
nization as rooted in digital technology as MoveOn still has consistent recourse to 
the power of the documentary testimonial to further its aims.
For Greenwald, Outfoxed represented the formalization of his move into 
documentary activism as the founder of a new production company and non-
profit political foundation, Brave New Films. Functioning until this point as 
 Robert  Greenwald Pictures, Brave New Films signaled that political documentary 
would take center stage as part of a larger, issue-driven nonprofit media company. 
Since then, the foundation has evolved in a direction remarkably similar to the 
 collaborative model that Greenwald pioneered with MoveOn. Brave New Films 
focuses on media creation—from short, viral video series like the “Justice” series, 
targeted at specific issues around prison and justice reform, or the immigrant 
voices project, which captured short autobiographical stories in episodic form, 
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to longer,  feature-length projects that tackle a similar range of issues. Some, like 
the “Rethink Afghanistan” project, started as a series of video installments but 
were later built into films. For each project, the organization partners with allied 
organizations working in the areas the films address, thereby building a support 
and funding network and often providing a screening venue or built-in audience 
network. The films are also targeted toward educational frameworks like class-
rooms, offering free screenings and course materials to supplement the informa-
tion shown in a film. Beyond this, the foundation’s website enlists users, much the 
way MoveOn does, to host screenings and function as information sources within 
their communities on the issues addressed in any given campaign. Nearly two 
decades after it was founded, the organization continues to grow. Its 2017 annual 
report details dozens of projects, many of which draw audiences and views in the 
millions. While the organization’s focus is on media production and distribution, 
there is also a clear effort to integrate the organizational components into the pro-
cess in a fashion similar to that of MoveOn.
Though similar, the two organizations do not necessarily compete with one 
another. Rather, they view themselves as partners in an ongoing struggle to cre-
ate a more effective democracy. MoveOn positions itself to organize members to 
make their voices heard, utilizing old and new media in the effort to do so. Brave 
New Films seeks to empower independent media organizations to hold politicians 
accountable and make the voices of the electorate heard by bypassing the “tradi-
tional gatekeepers,” as Greenwald himself put it. The irony in their evolution is 
Figure 3.5. Elinor from Host an Event! In her testimonial video, she 
reflexively gestures around the screen to encourage the members she’s 
addressing to click on the associated links of the webpage in which her 
video is embedded.
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that MoveOn’s roots in new media technology have increasingly led it to forms 
of old-media moving images, and Greenwald’s skills in old-media production 
have increasingly found an outlet on new-media platforms. The question remains: 
Does either form of media, old or new, actually achieve what both groups seek— 
political change?
D O CUMENTARY AGENCY AND  
READ/WRITE CULTURE
Documentary film scholars and practitioners have frequently struggled with an-
swering the exact question posed above. In what has become a classic essay in 
the field of documentary film scholarship, Jane Gaines posed a question that had 
hung over the heads of filmmakers and scholars for much of the existence of the 
genre: have documentary films changed the world, and if so, how? Referencing a 
1995 study by Kirwan Cox for the National Film Board of Canada, Gaines notes 
that the “forty-eight scholars and filmmakers polled had difficulty thinking of any 
films that had actually ‘changed’ ” anything, opting instead to point to films that 
had achieved some level of local influence. Undeterred, Gaines decided to conduct 
her own poll of scholars and filmmakers, but her results were largely the same. In 
lieu of films that had created change, they opted to discuss films that should have 
changed the world. She writes: “[A]lthough they could list films which had moved 
them personally, they could not be certain that these films had actually changed 
anything for anyone.”66
Given documentary’s long history of social activism, from the work of John 
Grierson on down, this result is surprising. As Gaines notes, it flies in the face of 
the desire of legions of filmmakers and activists who look to film as a tool for so-
cial transformation and social justice. While it seems absurd to believe that every 
film documenting a pressing social issue will produce a desired change, it seems 
impossible that eighty-plus years of documentary output had failed to produce a 
single, exemplary case study of a film that had.
Rather than a failure of the documentary form to produce change, Gaines’s 
essay demonstrates not only the difficulty of the precise, quantitative cause-and-
effect measurements of “media effects” more broadly, but also the emergence of 
a widespread skepticism regarding documentary film’s relationship to notions 
of objectivity, truth, and reality. Indeed, as many of the essays in Gaines and 
Michael Renov’s Collecting Visible Evidence anthology demonstrate, the entire 
modern period of documentary film scholarship—initiated, among other things, 
by the 1992 publication of Bill Nichols’s landmark Representing Reality—is char-
acterized by the assumption that the necessary relationship between documen-
tary and reality is at best tenuous and at worst a fiction.67 The scholars polled 
by Gaines had trouble finding a film that changed the world because the solid, 
indexical links between a film and the world at that particular poststructural, 
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postmodern moment were under broader scrutiny. For those questioning the 
solidity of documentary’s “truth claims,” the ability of truth to be captured and 
then convince an audience was equally suspect. And, as the work of Errol Morris 
discussed in the last chapter exemplified, this skepticism about the relationship 
between truth and documentary is held not just by scholars but by many film-
makers as well.
Beyond academia, however, a belief in and desire for documentary agency 
persists. In October of 2011, for example, an article in The Guardian subtitled 
“Can Documentaries Change the World?” provocatively echoed Gaines’s ques-
tion.68 The occasion for the article was the announcement of the creation of the 
Creative Impact Awards by the BRITDOC Foundation, which aimed to “honor 
the documentary film creating the most significant impact in the world.”69 In 
an indication of the somewhat straightforward way the issue would be judged, 
BRITDOC (which renamed itself the Doc Society in 2017) elected a jury that 
included mainstream directors such as Morgan Spurlock, whose 2004 film Super 
Size Me claimed responsibility for forcing the restaurant McDonald’s to remove 
its “supersize” option from its menu. As a marker of public perception regarding 
the agency of documentary film, the article set a fairly stringent standard for 
what it defined as cause and effect. Along with the example of Spurlock’s film, 
Errol Morris’s film The Thin Blue Line (1988) is also offered as an example of a 
film that was able to achieve direct results—in this case, the release of Randall 
Dale Adams from prison for murder.
Needless to say, this sort of one-to-one relationship between cause and effect in 
a given documentary film and its call to action is fairly rare. Many of the problems 
that documentary films seek to solve or address cannot be simply fixed with a 
single decision or outcome on the part of the government or a company. Films that 
have since won a Creative Impact Award, such as Eugene Jarecki’s The House I Live 
In (2014) and Laura Poitras’s Citizenfour (2016), present vastly complex problems 
for which no easy solution emerges. Even the two films the article cites as clear evi-
dence of documentary agency present broader agendas than the release of a single 
individual or even an admittedly large product change by a major corporation. 
Such intangible, amorphous results are open to interpretation and refutation, and 
they certainly don’t make for a clear and compelling newspaper article. But they are 
nonetheless the stakes most feature-length social-issue documentary films seek to 
achieve. The article gestures in this direction, speculating that perhaps filmmakers 
aren’t so much interested in changing the world as they are in changing the minds 
of the people in it. Thus the question “Can documentary films change the world?” 
is at once too simple and too complex to answer. The mere act of bringing a film 
into the world changes it, even if only imperceptibly, and it would be difficult to 
argue that spectators remain entirely unchanged after watching a film, even if their 
opinions on a given issue are. How documentary films change the world is where 
things get complicated.
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SO CIAL MEDIA FOR SO CIAL CHANGE
About the same time that BRITDOC was inaugurating its Impact Awards and 
The Guardian was pondering the possibility of documentary agency, scholars and 
journalists began asking similar questions of another new form of media: social 
media. In the October 4, 2010, issue of the New Yorker, a debate that had been 
quietly rumbling inside of academia for several years spilled out into the conver-
sation of the general public. Malcolm Gladwell, the New Yorker’s prominent and 
popular debunker of conventional wisdom and social statistics, argued that social 
media like Twitter and Facebook were incapable of producing meaningful social 
change or challenging the status quo. Using a history of the civil rights move-
ment in the 1960s, particularly the lunch counter sit-ins that began in Greensboro, 
North Carolina, Gladwell claimed that true social change requires the presence of 
strong-tie relationships between social actors. Social media, built on weak-tie con-
nections between disparate people, are consequently incapable of producing the 
level of commitment necessary to foster something like the civil rights movement. 
Gladwell acknowledged that weak-tie connections are capable of initiating lower 
levels of commitment from a greater number of people but maintained that such 
groups would never change the world. As Gladwell put it, “The Internet lets us ex-
ploit the power of these kinds of distant connections with marvelous efficiency. It’s 
terrific at the diffusion of innovation, interdisciplinary collaboration, seamlessly 
matching up buyers and sellers, and the logistical functions of the dating world. 
But weak ties seldom lead to high-risk activism.”70
Gladwell’s argument arrived against the backdrop of the initial stages of what 
eventually would be referred to by Western media as the Arab Spring, which, 
among other changes, provided a less-than-clear test case for competing theories 
about the efficacy of social media in producing social change. On one side, the 
popular uprisings across the Middle East, reported in many major news outlets to 
have been organized and carried out using popular, widely available social media 
networks, seemed to confirm the predictions of scholars like Clay Shirky and Yo-
chai Benkler, or journalists like Tim O’Reilly and Andrew Sullivan. Long predicted 
to change the world, events like the “Twitter revolutions” in Moldova and Iran 
seemed to fulfill technology’s promise. On the other, less optimistic side, scholars 
like Evgeny Morozov and Golnaz Esfandiari pointed out that the role of technolo-
gy in these events was misunderstood, and more a product of Western journalists’ 
imaginations than activists on the ground. Gladwell clearly sides with the more 
dystopian outlook, even going so far as to maintain that substantive social change 
can occur only as the product of closely integrated hierarchical organizations that 
are run in a rigid, top-down fashion. While a decentralized, crowdsourced net-
work might produce a project like Wikipedia, Gladwell concludes, “[t]he things 
that [Martin Luther] King needed in Birmingham—discipline and strategy—were 
things that online social media cannot provide.”71
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The exact role of social media in the Arab Spring and in other populist dem-
onstrations, from the Occupy movement (2011–12) to Black Lives Matter (2013–), 
continues to be a topic of debate among scholars and activists.72 Most acknowledge 
that the technology plays a definite role, but also reserve credit for people and 
offline forms of action like protests and petitions.73 Theses debates strongly echo 
the fears that seemed to plague Gaines in relation to documentary film. No one 
disputes that Facebook has changed the world; the question comes down to the 
extent to which it upholds, or disrupts, the status quo in a given political context 
or on a specific issue. For Shirky, the major impact of technology on society lies in 
allowing people to organize differently, and these new types of organization can 
inevitably lead to social change. Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody collects count-
less examples of groups coming together in an ad hoc fashion to establish new 
resources and institutions (like Wikipedia) and disrupt the status quo for oth-
ers (like newspapers). In facilitating connections between individuals, new com-
munications technologies enable novel collaboration and social organization. He 
claims, “More people can communicate more things to more people than ever 
before, and the size and speed of this increase makes the change unprecedented.”74 
Given the breathless enthusiasm with which much of the book is written, it’s easy 
to see why Shirky is often accused of utopian technological determinism. And yet, 
Shirky’s pronouncements are often more circumscribed than his critics acknowl-
edge. Gladwell, for example, faults him for celebrating the positive potential of 
technology in recovering a lost cell phone as though this somehow portended a 
revolution but skips over his discussion of the Catholic sex-abuse scandal or the 
Howard Dean campaign—both cases of legitimate social change, if not on the 
scale of the civil rights movement.
Even as it potentially empowers individuals, however, the emergence of social 
media has also placed more power in the hands of the state. For Evgeny Morozov, 
the Internet has evolved over the last two decades toward greater and greater levels 
of state administration over the policies and potential that online communication 
has to offer. The illusion of the democratizing, connective power of technology 
(what he calls “cyber-utopianism”) leads to misguided policy and regulation of the 
Internet (in his terms, “Internet centrism”).75 The abstract belief that the Internet 
and the cohesive, spontaneous networks and forms of expression that it fosters are 
unequivocally conducive to democratizing principles is what fools individuals into 
complacency about the policies and principles that should be used to regulate it. 
This opens citizens in repressive states to greater and greater levels of government 
scrutiny and blinds those in the West to the surveillance and censorship taking 
place in their own backyards. The typical dichotomy drawn between the relatively 
democratic West and more authoritarian countries like Iran, Myanmar, and China 
hides the fact that competing forces are at work—forces that in both environments 
are working toward greater control, censorship, and surveillance of the individual 
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by the state. So long as a country like Moldova allows for a certain level of free 
expression, not only will it identify problematic individuals for closer monitoring, 
but it will also give the rest of the population the illusion that they enjoy complete 
freedom online.76
Moreover, fears of the commercially disruptive nature of open networks re-
sult in greater censorship and scrutiny by the government. Consider the debate 
in the United States over the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), and the Preventing 
Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act 
(PIPA), both of which were targeted at online file sharing but were criticized as un-
necessary government intrusions into the privacy of individuals. Hence, the West 
is looking more and more like China even as China is looking more and more 
like the West. Morozov writes: “Anyone designing [online regulations] should be 
aware of some major inconsistencies between the strong anti-regulation impetus 
of Western foreign policy and the equally strong pro-regulation impetus of West-
ern domestic policy.”77 Privacy and anonymity are the expectations imposed on US 
companies like Google and Apple operating in domains as diverse as the European 
Union and China. But many media companies, keen to protect their intellectual 
property from anonymous file-sharing sites, work to oppose these same principles 
within the United States itself. Given the number of variables (business model, 
political context, policy), generalizations remain elusive.
These commercial contradictions also connect with a common inconsistency 
in discussions about the ability of the Internet to empower individuals and disrupt 
existing organizations. As the subtitle of Shirky’s book Here Comes Everybody as-
serts, the struggles that we see taking place in networked environments are the 
result of “the power of organizing without organizations.”78 This newfound power 
puts the existing organization, be it a business, industry, or government institu-
tion, at odds with a newly united group of previously disparate individuals. The 
work of scholars like Shirky and Lawrence Lessig are filled with examples of this 
newfound power at work. But, as Morozov repeatedly stresses, context matters. 
What works in one political and cultural context may not translate across borders. 
And what’s true in the commercial sector may not apply to government institu-
tions. Too often in cyber-utopian discourse, these contextual details are ignored in 
favor of a string of success stories pointing to the seemingly limitless potential for 
the Internet to change the world. This leads commercially disruptive trends to be 
conflated with a politically disruptive form of individual agency that may or may 
not exist in any given political context. The effect that blogs and online file sharing 
have had on newspapers and record companies is undeniable, but the impact that 
Twitter and Facebook have on emerging and established democratic societies is 
more elusive.
Too often proponents or critics of the “democratizing” power and potential of 
new technology frame the discussion as though the entire future of democracy 
itself would be determined (or not determined) by the emergence of a particu-
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lar technology. The idealist, revolutionary ethos behind the open-software move-
ment and early networking technology seems to have infused the debate around 
technology’s impact with an all-or-nothing tone.79 Both stances ignore the obvi-
ous middle ground, where existing social forces shape new technologies, and vice 
versa. Gladwell demonstrates both extreme stances on the issue when he states, 
“Activists used to be defined by their causes. Now they’re defined by their tools.”80 
As he points out, the church gathered people and disseminated information just 
as Twitter or Facebook would today, and yet we don’t call what it did the “church 
revolution.”81 But this doesn’t mean the church was incidental to the advent of the 
civil rights movement. Calling an event the “Twitter revolution” is surely absurd; 
denying that Twitter played any role, equally so.
THEORY MEET S PR AXIS
These universal pronouncements about the power of social media and other 
technologies to cause (or not cause) social change demonstrate the need to 
consider such questions on a case-by-case basis. Examining scenarios that put 
newer technologies alongside older ones allows us to examine the historical 
and cultural environment in which these two forms collide. This is where the 
partnership between MoveOn and Greenwald becomes essential to understand-
ing the way two particular forms of media technology mutually influence one 
another. Three innovations in particular emerge from their collaboration and 
seem to have shaped the current hybrid approach that both organizations have 
taken. Each of these strategies implicitly capitalizes on many of the strengths 
that scholars have identified within these tools and mitigates the potential pit-
falls that Morozov and others identify in relation to utilizing social media to 
achieve social change.
The first outcome of the collaboration that both organizations exhibit is a clear, 
early mastery of many of the elements of what later came to be referred to as par-
ticipatory culture. MoveOn in particular demonstrated clear, early innovation in 
several key areas long before other commercial websites developed and perfected 
them as tools for building an audience and monetizing its attention. The organi-
zation was operating as a type of social network before MySpace and Friendster 
developed or Facebook perfected any particular model of community. MoveOn’s 
genesis into a progressive powerhouse coincides almost perfectly with the early 
period that José Van Dijck identifies as the genesis of social media platforms (circa 
2001).82 Van Dijck’s working definition of the social media platform as a socio-
technical configuration that “connects people to ideas to things to money” reads 
almost like a description of MoveOn’s attempts to use digital tools to foster what it 
refers to as “people-powered democracy”: fund-raising, petitions, demonstrations, 
media sharing—all focused within the framework of progressive political organiz-
ing and network building.83
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This description is broad enough to fit many different organizations, of course, 
but MoveOn’s initial direction and consistent focus are enough to mark the orga-
nization as an early mover in this space. In its roots as an e-mail petition, MoveOn 
seems to have understood the strength of leveraging people’s existing relation-
ships. This leverage allowed the group to grow at viral speeds, and the general shift 
of politics in the United States after the Monica Lewinsky scandal gave members 
something to focus their energies on.
The second innovation, the adoption of the “house party” model, also worked 
as a form of location-based organizing similar to what other services like Meet-
Up would eventually develop. And finally, in its model of funding—and, in the 
case of the Outfoxed production, creating—media items and political campaigns, 
MoveOn developed early models of crowdsourcing and crowdfunding before oth-
er services like KickStarter and Mechanical Turk emerged.
All of these technologies (social networking, location-based media, and crowd-
sourcing) became essential features of what we associate with Web 2.0 and partici-
patory culture more broadly, but all three, under different names, are clear features 
of grassroots political organizing. MoveOn’s achievement was to take the means 
and methods of grassroots organizing and adapt them to emerging technologies 
more fully and successfully than anyone else had up to that point.
For its part, Brave New Films anticipated participatory culture by evolving a 
collaborative, responsive model of filmmaking that I will refer to as a form of  remix 
documentary. Its output demonstrates a clear willingness to adapt its  production 
and distribution methods to work within the evolving domains of political orga-
nizing and participatory culture. Its responsiveness to emerging political issues 
seems to answer the call Jane Gaines put forth in her provocatively titled article 
“The Production of Outrage” in 2007. Here she argues that the production of a film 
is itself is a form of social action.84 She outlines the need for filmmakers to “image 
out,” in the same way that people might speak out against a given social atrocity, by 
creating films that address the need and the problems inherent in a set of histori-
cal events. Images of suffering and other atrocities, recontextualized through the 
documentary film, have the power to initiate and inspire social change that they 
might not in other contexts. In this way, film is able to “use the world to change 
the world.”85 Rather than simply being a middle step that might advocate for social 
action, film itself is a form of social action.
Gaines was specifically responding to what she saw as a level of social fatigue 
with images of the war in Iraq, as a form of iconophobia, or as a war on images 
of war. But her call for the further “production of outrage” perfectly describes the 
particular call to action that Greenwald felt when he made the transition to po-
litical filmmaking after the 2000 election. The emergent iconophobia in 2007 was 
a result of the massive quantity of digital imagery now available, a quantity that 
inures spectators to the problem instead of inspiring political action.86 But rather 
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than destroying or limiting exposure to such images, many of the Brave New Films 
projects repurpose such images to break through the noise and lay bare the social 
contradictions they conceal. This method of reformulation or recontextualization 
sits at the heart of several of Brave New Films projects, including Outfoxed and 
Rethink Afghanistan.
This method of recontextualization eschews a more traditional, representation-
al conception of documentary (film as a “mirror” or “window” of the world) in 
favor of something much closer to Lawrence Lessig’s description of remix. Just as 
remix depends upon preexisting material and disparate fragments that are pulled 
together in novel formulations, documentary film must utilize and recontextualize 
preexisting representational tropes and narratives to articulate novel arguments 
about the world. A documentary about the Iraq War, for example, wouldn’t neces-
sarily reveal something previously unseen but would, rather, try to break through 
the existing representations of the war by posing an alternative formulation and 
inviting a response from the audience. Indeed, Lessig’s description of remix, or 
what he calls “Read/Write” culture, could be mistaken for Gaines’s descriptions 
of documentary culture: “RW culture extends itself differently. It touches social 
life differently. It gives the audience something more. Or better, it asks something 
more of the audience. It is offered as a draft. It invites a response. In a culture in 
which it is common, its citizens develop a kind of knowledge that empowers as 
much as it informs or entertains.”87 While the concept of remix has been heavily 
associated with a certain aesthetic common to the sort of “mash-up” videos one 
finds commonly going viral on sites like YouTube and Facebook, at a more funda-
mental level it is rooted in a desire to challenge the existing cultural and political 
narrative through recontextualization.
In addition to channeling the remix zeitgeist in its film work, Brave New Films 
was also reworking other elements of the industry. While still producing feature-
length films that formally fit within the boundaries of documentary practice, its 
distribution methods rapidly evolved over a few short years to disintermediate 
what Greenwald called the “traditional gatekeepers” at film festivals and studios. 
His means were largely the organization that MoveOn was simultaneously build-
ing and the new uses of technology that it was adapting. At the center of these 
innovations, particularly the house party and crowdsourced production, were 
Greenwald’s films. Thus, politics was the ground that enabled the coevolution of 
documentary film and technology for both organizations.
The second exceptional feature about the Greenwald–MoveOn collaboration 
is its utilization of what we might refer to as a coalition model of documentary 
production. As David Whiteman points out, within a social-movement organiza-
tion, the documentary form often forces stakeholders to synthesize and articu-
late their issues and concerns and to work to establish a common blueprint for 
their competing desires and outcomes.88 According to Whiteman, each stage of 
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 documentary production, distribution, and exhibition might have the effect of 
bringing together different parties related to a particular issue and inviting them 
to engage in dialogue. Making a film, it turns out, can educate filmmakers and 
participants in the same way that seeing one can educate audiences. Whiteman 
calls this the “coalition model” of documentary film, a model that describes the 
social fabric the film can weave among disparate or previously disconnected social 
groups.89 Like the broader coalition of nations that would eventually invade Iraq 
twice in 1991 and again in 2004, Whiteman’s coalitions are often made up of dispa-
rate, heterogeneous groups connected to a broader social issue like labor relations 
in the southeastern United States or strip-mining in rural Appalachia. Once in 
conversation, Whiteman demonstrates, such groups often remain united in their 
common cause. Indeed, MoveOn and Brave New Films offer a clear example of the 
kind of coalition building that Whiteman describes. Rather than changing people’s 
minds, such documentaries may have their greatest impact on those who already 
agree with the film. While such films might be “preaching to the choir” of sympa-
thetic audiences, their overall aim in Whiteman’s model is to unite the choir and 
to get it to sing louder.
The form of remix documentary that Brave new Films and MoveOn produced 
relies on bringing disparate, preexisting elements together into novel configura-
tions and relations in much the way that remix or Read/Write culture does.  Whether 
“elements” here refers to the social actors involved in the production/distribution/
exhibition of the film or the disparate images and media fragments that make up 
the text itself, documentary as remix circumvents the traditional identification of 
photographic indexicality as an essential component of documentary truth. This 
more experiential, process-based form of documentary agency acknowledges and 
even depends upon the presence of alternative representations of the world for its 
own intervention. Rather than relying on a privileged connection to the world for 
its form of truth, a film like Outfoxed seeks a version of truth about the falsity of a 
network like Fox and the untrue images it broadcasts.
The type of documentary remix that Brave New Films and MoveOn put forth 
nonetheless maintains documentary’s traditional identity as an alternative form 
of media expression that circumvents and subverts the traditional, commercial 
monopolies that dominate the media landscape. This model of documentary as 
“user-generated content” has existed at least as long as the Workers Film and 
Photo League first emerged in the 1930s. As Lessig claims, Read/Write culture is 
neither new nor isolated to any particular form of technological media. The im-
pulse to “speak back” to a dominant cultural text is already common to language 
and writing. For Lessig, all that has changed is the ability for the average person 
to access and alter forms of modern media traditionally protected by significant 
technological barriers. Less emphasized by Lessig is the extent to which remix 
culture might be capable of producing novel forms of social organization and 
consequently social action. This, however, was the focus of the type of docu-
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mentary remix that Brave New Films and MoveOn produced throughout their 
collaborations with one another.
It is important to note, however, that this remix takes place as a result of the 
two organizations coming together and collaborating with one another. Put dif-
ferently, it takes both the presence of Greenwald’s documentaries and MoveOn’s 
digital organizing to achieve this. None of Greenwald’s films during this time con-
tained radically novel material or arguments that no one had seen, nor did they 
contain any investigative “smoking guns.” They were effective because they put 
into a single text what many people, MoveOn members in particular, already sus-
pected: that Bush stole the election, that the Iraq War was unjust, that Fox News 
was biased. They served as rallying points for MoveOn members to come together 
and mobilize in opposition. The “remix” of ideas and groups depended on both 
the films and the virtual organization in which they were seen and produced.
Finally, the MoveOn–Greenwald collaboration also demonstrates a solid 
 middle-ground case between the all-or-nothing extremes of the debate over tech-
nology and social change. Much of MoveOn’s activity seems to fit solidly within 
the model of “clicktivism” that critics of technologically fueled social activism 
decry. That is, that signing petitions, forwarding links, donating small amounts 
of money all have the appearance of political participation but don’t necessarily 
produce the types of momentous social change that critics like Andrew Keen or 
Malcolm Gladwell describe. And yet, within and alongside these activities, and 
very much dependent upon them, is another set of activities that fit very much 
within the model of traditional, strong-tie activism. This is where the house-party 
model once again becomes essential. The “nationwide” screenings of Greenwald’s 
films provided MoveOn members with an event that let them take their virtual 
connections and map them onto a series of local, geographic areas. Since these 
house parties formed the basis for other offline activities (protest marches, phone 
calling campaigns, etc.), the event of the film screening acted as a conduit between 
the online and offline worlds in a way that enabled MoveOn to translate the size 
and scale of a network of weak-tie connections into the commitment and motiva-
tion that comes with strong-tie, face-to-face interaction.
While the MoveOn–Brave New Films collaboration might not have changed 
the world as radically as either might have hoped, it nonetheless advanced to some 
degree the agenda of the progressive causes for which both advocated. And it 
certainly advanced the organizational structure and approach that both adopted 
in utilizing media as a form of connective thread between members, audiences, 
and their political leaders. As these forms of organizing spread across the politi-





The Paradox of Virtual Documentary Representation
Shortly after his inauguration in January of 2009, President Barack Obama made 
headlines by signing an executive order that pledged to close the prison camp at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and revise US policies for questioning and detaining ter-
ror suspects. These moves sought to signal his administration’s shift in waging the 
“war on terror” declared by his predecessor. He stated at the time: “The message 
that we are sending around the world is that the United States intends to prosecute 
the ongoing struggle against violence and terrorism” but will do so “in a manner 
consistent with our values and our ideals.” In language intended to signify his re-
jection of the Bush-era binaries that drew stark contrasts between opposing sides, 
Obama added, “We continue to reject the false choice between our safety and our 
ideals.”1 After several attempts at closing the base failed within that time frame 
due to concerns over where to move prisoners, the administration admitted that 
finding a solution would take longer than expected and would contain provisions 
for extrajudicial trial and “indefinite detention.” In spite of what may have been 
a sincere and honest attempt to undo the ethical and political damage created 
by Guantánamo, once established, such a place proves rather unyielding to the 
changing political tides that surround it.2
In the early months of his second term in office, long after the issue of 
Guantánamo had moved to the political and national back burner, Obama 
once again faced questions relating to his administration’s policies on trying 
and prosecuting perceived enemies in the war on terror. This time, however, 
the issue at stake was the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to track and kill 
enemies of the United States without trial or official oversight. Rather than 
detain and imprison terror suspects, it seemed that the so-called kill policy 
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simply  eliminated them outright.  Attempting to draw attention to the issue, 
Senator Rand Paul took the extraordinary step of filibustering the Senate for 
thirteen hours, questioning the legality of using drones to kill US citizens on 
 American soil without any congressional or judicial oversight.3 Citing the need 
for  national security and the authority to act quickly, the Obama administration, 
in its defense of its policy, sounded reminiscent of many of the rationalizations 
of its predecessor’s. Many began to wonder if the “regime change” of 2008 had 
delivered much change at all.
The legal and ethical complexity of both the Guantánamo prison camp and 
the drone policy demonstrate the bizarre political and legal limbo entailed in 
waging the ongoing war on terror. Faced with a nonconventional enemy, one 
free of state identification and capable of blending in with existing populations, 
the US government eliminated any pretense of upholding long-standing  ethical 
and legal norms around individual privacy, state transparency, and inter national 
human rights and political sovereignty. Starting with the passage of the Patriot 
Act, and extending through an ad hoc series of memos, policy declarations, and 
public and covert actions, the government began tracking, detaining,  torturing, 
and killing those it suspected of further terrorist acts against the United States. 
In the process of justifying and carrying out these actions, it created a patch-
work assemblage of legal and logistical anomalies—“vanishing points” that 
enabled the US government to execute and expand its war on terror.4 Outside of 
the legal and ethical questions they present, drones and other forms of weapon-
ized technology further sit at the heart of an increasingly technological arsenal 
that utilizes video-game and virtual technologies to recruit, train, and equip 
the soldiers fighting in and across the various “battlefields” that make up the 
war on terror.5
For those opposing the war and the way it is/was being fought, these same 
tools and technologies offer a means of exposing and opposing these policies. 
This chapter will contrast two radically opposed approaches that use virtual 
technology to simulate, document, and engage the bizarre battlefields of the war 
on terror: the US military’s integration of networked technology and virtual en-
vironments as exemplified by the America’s Army video game and its expansive 
drone program, and the Gone Gitmo project created on the Second Life plat-
form. Gone Gitmo was an early attempt to use the sandbox of a virtual world to 
expose one of the vanishing points in the military’s arsenal of off-scene spaces: 
the Guantánamo prison complex, which had become ground zero for the gov-
ernment’s unprecedented and unlawful imprisonment of terror suspects after 
9/11. Created on the virtual platform Second Life, Gone Gitmo demonstrates the 
problematic power of pushing documentary reality into a space of fantasy and 
play, challenging the easy distinctions between real and virtual spaces.  America’s 
Army and its drone program travel these same boundaries. Shortly after 9/11, 
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the military utilized the extensive assets it had invested in training simulators 
and virtual combat technologies over the previous decade to launch a free, 
multiplayer first-person-shooter video game to the public. Dubbed America’s 
Army, the game was a clever tool for training and recruiting a new generation 
of soldiers to fight the war on terror.6 Even as the game achieved these aims 
with a blockbuster degree of success, its prominence and purpose also attracted 
the attention of artists and activists seeking to complicate and critique the easy 
exchange it afforded between real and virtual conflict—a relationship further 
complicated by the military’s increased reliance on drone technology to project 
power even farther from the soldiers tasked with fighting these battles.
Though the landscapes of the war on terror have become inaccessible to the 
type of optical recording technology traditionally used to wage and oppose war, 
both of these projects attempt to relay players back to reality in a way consistent 
with traditional documentary film. And yet, the military’s massive recruiting and 
training efforts in America’s Army end up distorting the reality of warfare, whereas 
the activist exposé Gone Gitmo skillfully plays on the realities of virtual representa-
tion to critique the military’s policy of torture and indefinite detention. This differ-
ence enables one to offer a critique of the other, and together both demonstrate the 
possibility of maintaining a documentary impulse in the absence of the traditional 
documentary image.
TR AVELING FROM GUANTÁNAMO TO GONE GITMO
The question that Obama faced when he took office—how to handle  Guantánamo—
was also one that faced the myriad of political activists who opposed Guantánamo’s 
existence, a group that included civil rights attorneys and human rights groups 
as well as journalists and documentary filmmakers. The military had repeatedly 
blocked requests for media access to the base and adequate legal representation for 
the men imprisoned there. This left such groups struggling to find a way, legally 
and visually, to represent Guantánamo in order to draw public attention to the is-
sue and the individuals involved. Some of the unique tactics these groups utilized 
to “represent” Guantánamo offer insight into the complicated political issues sur-
rounding it.7 One such solution—the Gone Gitmo project on the virtual platform 
Second Life—demonstrates that the nature of such environments uniquely mir-
rors the paradoxical political nature of the physical place that they re-create.
Gone Gitmo, the product of a collaboration between University of Southern 
California (USC) graduate student Nonny de la Peña and USC visiting profes-
sor Peggy Weil, was created in 2007 during a residency of theirs at the Bay Area 
Video Coalition.8 The guiding idea behind the project was to allow users of the 
Second Life platform to experience the Guantánamo Bay prison camp “firsthand” 
by virtually re-creating the prison in exacting detail. As the pair explained at an 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) event featuring the work:
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Our purpose is to raise awareness, initiate discussion and educate on habeas  corpus 
issues by making a virtual but accessible Guantánamo Bay Prison in contrast to 
the real, but inaccessible, U.S. prison camp. We are using Second Life to expose a 
 substantially new audience to these issues by extending the methods and images 
from documentary filmmaking into new online, participatory environments. . . . Our 
overriding philosophical challenge is to communicate a gravely serious matter in a 
medium known for games and entertainment.  .  .  . As artists, we confront how to 
portray the practices in Guantánamo effectively and design an experience that does 
not trivialize torture (we will not torture your avatar) but will provoke thought and 
insight into the complicated issues surrounding detainees’ rights.9
When users of Second Life typed in the project’s address, their on-screen  character 
(or avatar) was immediately hooded and transported, with the screen darkened, 
to a holding cell in the prison simulation on the project’s space. Once there, 
they were free to explore the virtual space, which included links to  numerous 
articles about the prison as well as a video feed running testimony by the few 
detainees who had been allowed to speak on camera about their experiences in the 
real prison. In order to leave the prison, visitors could simply enter the address of 
another Second Life location, whereupon their avatar would “fly away” from the 
prison—a form of individual autonomy many of its real-life inhabitants did not 
and do not experience. This description and the statement given by the project’s 
creators demonstrate that Gone Gitmo is something of a paradox, a hybrid space 
that blends different media together to access each term through its opposite: the 
real by way of the virtual, the inaccessible via the open, the gravely serious in the 
space of play. In short, it answers a paradox with a paradox.
Second Life presented a provocative opportunity for this type of project. 
When it first came online in 2002–3, the platform puzzled many people because it 
wasn’t necessarily clear what one was supposed to “do” there. A cross between an 
 open-world or sandbox-style game (where users are allowed to freely explore the 
virtual-game world rather than play through with a specific goal in mind) and a 
collaboratively constructed environment, the platform offers users an  enormous 
degree of freedom to decide how they will spend their time and to discover what 
sorts of spaces and events it might contain. At the height of its popularity, it 
 commanded an enormous amount of creative, critical, and commercial  attention, 
attracting major brands, universities, and artists alike.10 Many imagined it as a 
sort idealized utopia—a space one could inhabit without the limitations that time, 
space, and resources place on us in our offline worlds. A virtual prison, in other 
words, may have been within the bounds of what one could create, but it fell well 
outside the interpretation that many had for the blank canvas that the platform 
presented to users.
The documentary tendency at work in Gone Gitmo is immediately apparent in 
its attempt to point us toward the real, historical world—in opposition to the imag-
ined, fictional world typically on offer in Hollywood cinema. Fundamentally, we 
Figure 4.1. The screenshot depicts the Gone Gitmo space in Second Life. The other image 
shows the actual space. Nonny de la Peña and Peggy Weil relied on satellite imagery of the 
prison to re-create scale and layout, and rare press photographs like this one to fill in the detail 
about construction materials. Photo credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Shane T. McCoy, U.S. Navy.
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think of this connection to reality as a product of film’s ability to faithfully  record 
reality (its cinematic indexicality) and documentary’s visual  representation of 
historical events. But other formal methodologies have also been used to achieve 
this same end, including reenactment, interview, testimony, and even animation. 
Moreover, many of the cinematic conventions that foreground the expressive con-
structedness of the medium—like montage, subtitling, and frame composition—
are components of documentary. Hence, the reality that appears in documentary 
arrives via many fictional routes. While it lacks the optical photographic indexi-
cality of a film, Gone Gitmo seeks to represent reality as faithfully as possible. It 
re-creates the physical materiality of Guantánamo in precise detail, from the size 
and layout of the prison cells, to the details and building materials that are used in 
each of the spaces, to the orange jumpsuits worn by detainees.
Though one might convincingly argue that certain historical epics seek this 
same degree of material precision in order to open onto the most fictional of 
 fantasies (James Cameron’s Titanic [1997] comes stubbornly to mind), comparing 
Gone Gitmo with the rest of Second Life throws the distinction into greater relief. 
If we take the proponents of Second Life’s ability to fulfill one’s physical, material, 
and sexual desires and fantasies at their word, then many of its locations seem to 
mirror the purpose of mainstream fiction film. This starkly contrasts with a space 
like Gone Gitmo. One allows users to escape or alter reality; the other seeks to 
remind them of it.11 If Second Life is a Hollywood-esque space of fantasy and play, 
Gone Gitmo is its “discourse of sobriety.”12
Gone Gitmo further manifests a documentary impulse or tendency through its 
attempt to intervene in issues of social justice. To be sure, plenty of  documentary 
films speak to issues other than those in the political arena, but documentary’s 
 attempt to inform, persuade, and advocate on this front certainly represents one 
of the genre’s major categories.13 Like a traditional political documentary, Gone 
 Gitmo offers us both a specific political position (that Guantánamo should be 
closed) and a defined call to action (with links to write one’s senator and specific 
interest groups to support.)14 Beyond its connection to the real and its political 
sympathies, Gone Gitmo further shares several formal similarities with docu-
mentary form. The first is its ability to pull in multiple forms of media in order to 
marshal its argument and achieve its aims. Similar to a documentary that utilizes 
archival footage, interviews, newspapers, still photographs, sound recordings, 
and reenactment, Gone Gitmo contains elements of all of these things, includ-
ing poetry written by detainees, newspaper headlines (with links to the stories), 
fragments of footage from traditional documentary film (taken from Nonny de 
la Peña’s 2004 Unconstitutional), and reenactment (the hooding of the avatar and 
its placement in a C-17 transport plane when teleporting to the Gone Gitmo site). 
While the question of perspective, point-of-view, and omniscience in relation 
to virtual environments is complex, suffice it to say that Second Life contains its 
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own version of camera angle, depth-of-field, and so on—all roughly analogous 
to the role these qualities play in film language.15
But if Gone Gitmo exhibits these similarities to documentary film, there are also 
a number of points where it expands the limits of documentary. The first is the proj-
ect’s ability to stay current. As mentioned, the project includes a  number of places 
where news feeds and other media sources are pulled in, similar to a Ken Burns–
style pan and scan of these materials in a documentary. Unlike a film,  however, 
which remains tied to a given historical point upon its  completion, Gone Gitmo 
was both updatable and auto-updating. News feeds enabled visitors to be up-to-
the-minute on the information they receive. The space itself was  constructed and 
reconstructed several times to reflect changes in the physical layout of the Guan-
tánamo camp itself, lending its representation a temporal mutability that would 
be impossible in film.16 This gives it a sense of temporal currency that mimics the 
sense of time on the Internet more broadly (a quality that also has drawbacks that 
I’ll discuss below).
The second advantage that Gone Gitmo offers over traditional film lies in its 
predominantly nonindexical form of representation. In spite of the best efforts of 
Linden Labs to make Second Life as photorealistic as possible, one would never 
confuse it with a photographic representation, much less reality itself.17 On one 
hand, this extreme mediation removes us from the real that documentary always 
seeks, and yet it also reminds us of the limits of the experience we are given. We 
never confuse the representation with reality—a clarity that keeps visitors from 
overindulging in a potentially delusional empathy for the victims and focuses de-
bate on the issue itself. One might come away feeling as though one better under-
stood the issues involved, but it seems unlikely that anyone would feel as though 
he or she had experienced what the detainees in Guantánamo have experienced. 
In discussion boards populated by people who have been to the site, it is amazing 
to find very little of the cynicism regarding source material and omission that 
seems to haunt a filmmaker like Michael Moore.18 Instead of debating the accuracy 
of the representation, participants turned to the ethics or efficacy of Guantánamo 
itself. Users seem to have no problem making the jump from the project itself to 
the issue involved, despite the mediated form the representation takes. While this 
doesn’t necessarily promote a more civilized debate (something message boards 
rarely seem to achieve), it does enable the discussion to avoid getting mired in the 
form of the representation and instead engage the substance of the issues that it 
is raising.
The third advantage of Gone Gitmo over a traditional documentary film is the 
spatial access that it offers its users to the space of the camp. Under the veil of se-
curity, Guantánamo has been notoriously off-limits to outside observers from the 
United Nations, human rights groups, and the media.19 In the absence of the ability 
to record the location itself, virtual environments offer an excellent opportunity 
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to open up otherwise invisible spaces. Furthermore, the user control and three-
dimensional rendering offered in such an environment enables visitors to experi-
ence the project at their own pace, allowing them to linger or skip past different 
elements in a nonlinear, undirected order. Moreover, once one becomes used to 
moving around in Second Life, the particular sense of space it offers surpasses 
what we experience through two-dimensional images. An image of something 
like a prison cell can look small; trying to move an avatar inside of one begins to 
feel small. This clearly doesn’t replicate the experience of actually being in the cell 
(with little to no hope of release), but neither does a film.20
As a form of representation, Gone Gitmo is thus a hybrid gesture that extends 
documentary’s activist impulse into a medium that transcends some of its tradi-
tional limits. There are, however, some very clear limitations to working within 
Second Life as a platform, and in virtual environments more broadly. The primary 
drawback concerns the availability and accessibility of the project as compared to 
a film. Any user who wanted to experience Gone Gitmo as it was intended needs 
to have a fairly robust computer, a broadband Internet connection, and enough 
storage space and permission to download and install the Second Life application. 
After this, the user must register for an account (sharing personal data) and spend 
time learning the environment and its navigation tools. Weil and de la Peña were 
able to mitigate some of these factors in museum exhibitions and other venues by 
providing machines or projecting a recorded machinima of another user navigat-
ing the space.21 While these workarounds opened the project to a wider audience, 
they obviously compromised something of the intended experience. Film and 
video certainly suffer from their own accessibility issues, but given their age, many 
of these issues have been addressed.
The availability of the project is, however, another matter. Since it was created 
on a commercial platform, the project had to be actively hosted in order to remain 
available to users. This required ongoing funding to cover the cost of the Second 
Life server space, whatever Linden Labs decided that cost would be. While the 
project received several development grants as well as donated space on different 
“islands” within Second Life (commercial accounts purchased by other groups), 
eventually the project ran out of options and disappeared off of the platform. 
Thankfully, a good deal of documentation remains due to the efforts of journalists 
like Draxtor Despres, but nonetheless the project no longer exists in its original 
format. This of course is a problem with any experimental technology, and cer-
tainly one that has confronted artists and curators working in digital forms like net 
art or CD-ROMs.22 The interdependent framework of a website, dependent upon 
multiple layers of hardware and software from multiple commercial companies, 
has an abundance of failure points that can doom a project to obsolescence. This 
is compounded for projects dependent on a private, closed platform like Second 
Life, where the fate of the work is tied to the success or failure of the company 
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that hosts it. These obsolescence and availability factors make digital art delivered 
through platforms to individual computers at once more available but also more 
fleeting than a traditional film text. Ironically, the virtual Guantánamo closed be-
fore the real one that it was protesting.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of virtual platforms like Second 
Life, we might wonder why Weil and de la Peña chose it over a more traditional, 
established medium. After all, both had extensive experience in film, photography, 
and video, de la Peña as a producer and director of feature-length documentary 
and Weil in different gallery and installation projects. A more straightforward 
documentary would have been well within their grasp. So why choose Second 
Life? Notable in the artists’ statement quoted earlier is the reassurance that they 
will not “torture your avatar,” and in light of the forms of mobility discussed above, 
it is clear that they do not imprison or detain it, either. This is a striking absence, 
given that torture and unlawful detention were the primary purpose of the real 
Guantánamo and the key point of its political controversy. But the reassurance 
speaks to the potentially strong identification that many users have with their ava-
tars. For many, Second Life is manifestly about exploring different identities and 
social positions other than their own—a possibility that was a prominent part of 
the discussion surrounding it in the height of its popularity. And this remains the 
case well into Second Life’s second decade on the Internet.23 For the avid enthu-
siasts on the platform, Gone Gitmo offered a way to understand something of the 
situation confronting the Guantánamo detainees.
We can further see the appropriateness of building a virtual Guantánamo by 
delving into the more perplexing aspects of the real Guantánamo—a place I earlier 
described as a legal and political paradox. Prior to 9/11, many people considered 
state-sanctioned torture and uncharged imprisonment legal, if not logical, impos-
sibilities. And yet, as Giorgio Agamben has argued, such “states of exception” lie at 
the very foundation of political sovereignty in every state, including Western de-
mocracy.24 Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s formulation in Political Theology, Agamben 
argues that the “state of exception” is the political and legal framework, present in 
all democracies, whereby the leaders of the state can nullify the existing constitu-
tion by declaring a form of martial law. This allows them to selectively and capri-
ciously apply existing law and consign any specific group of individuals to what-
ever legal designation they deem politically expedient. (His designation for this is 
the “force of law.”)25 Far from being a simple clause in the constitution that may be 
amended, it is this exception that enables the rule of law itself to exist. Hence the 
paradox. Much of what followed 9/11, from the Patriot Act to Guantánamo and its 
detainees, has provided a textbook example for Agamben of the manner in which 
sovereignty exists simultaneously both inside and outside the law.
Where Agamben’s work takes on a specific significance for the kinds of  virtual 
spaces that Gone Gitmo and the other projects utilize is through his concept of 
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“bare life” and the particular biopolitical turn that he sees at the root of twen-
tieth-century sovereignty. The “homo sacer” is the figure that emerges within 
those populations that sovereignty has excluded from the polis, but over whom 
it continues to exercise political power. Such people, reduced to a form of “bare 
life,” vulnerable and exposed to violence and injury, exist within, and are subject 
to, this barest bodily materiality. Torture, imprisonment, and execution within 
an extrajuridical framework are all legitimated through this particular form 
of sovereign power, which reaches its zenith in spaces like Guantánamo, Abu 
Ghraib, and the other vanishing points of the war on terror. The bodily, mate-
rial reduction to bare life of such spaces presents a provocative, and potentially 
problematic, counterpoint in the virtual worlds and disembodied spaces that 
both Gone Gitmo and America’s Army utilize.
Much of Guantánamo’s paradoxical state rests on extending the political/legal 
incongruity imposed on the bodies of individuals to the geographical spatiality 
Guantánamo occupies. Even its various labels (“prison camp.” “detention facil-
ity,” etc.) point to the indeterminacy of its exact nature. The space this defines has 
been further elaborated by geographers such as Derek Gregory, who draws out the 
particular colonial roots of both spaces like Guantánamo and the production of 
“homo sacer.” For Gregory, such spaces are constituted and legitimated through 
the same tradition that justified settler colonialism and slavery. The “state of excep-
tion” (as well as the “space of exception” that it produces) is the flip side of the logic 
of Euro-American exceptionalism that surfaces when one of these sovereign pow-
ers decides to overstep or ignore the norms of international law that it would oth-
erwise enforce on its neighbors. Rather than a kind of lawless black hole, Gregory 
maintains that these spaces are highly circumscribed and quite closely confined by 
the “ligatures between colonialism, violence and the law.”26
It is tempting to dismiss the euphemistic labels applied to these spaces as  further 
examples of the extreme limits to which political rhetoric was driven  under the 
Bush administration. But as Judith Butler points out in Precarious Life, each of 
these terms is carefully crafted to perform significant political and legal legwork, 
stripping these individuals of not simply their rights but even their status as  human 
beings.27 The refusal to mourn the 9/11 attacks in a way that included a consider-
ation of what caused them forced us to deny any consideration of the position of 
the Other, a refusal that opened the door for such future actions as denying detain-
ees any claim to fundamental legal and human rights. Interestingly, Butler ties self/
Other together in a way that locates responsibility and morality with both sides 
simultaneously, a move that places it in the same sort of liminal position that I’m 
claiming both Guantánamo and the Gone Gitmo project occupy. Part of shaping 
the discourse after 9/11 in a legal and media framework was  deciding whose voice 
would be excluded from the conversation, an exclusion that Gone Gitmo and other 
activist representations seek to redress. The irony of the Bush  administration’s 
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ability to place things rhetorically into simple either/or terms (“You’re either with 
us or against us”) is that its policies proliferated in places and populations that are 
neither/nor any of the established positions. As the case of the Uighurs demon-
strated, every case in relation to Guantánamo offers an exception to the rule, and 
exceptions in turn make the rules themselves entirely untenable and meaning-
less.28 In short, as Agamben says, the exception becomes the rule.
Beyond simply exemplifying the paradoxical nature of political sovereignty, 
Guantánamo’s very existence embodies legal and logical contradictions of its own. 
Consider, for example, that the US military even occupies a base on one of the 
few remaining Communist countries in the world, one that it has virtually locked 
out of any diplomatic connections for much of the last half century. Even as the 
Obama administration began to reestablish diplomatic ties and normalize rela-
tions with Cuba after Fidel Castro (moves the Trump administration has since 
largely reversed), there was very little question that the base would remain in US 
hands, regardless of what its primary purpose was. While the arrangement pre-
dates the Cuban revolution in the 1950s and the political enmity the Castro re-
gime brought with it, the original lease on the land was a product of what Larry 
Birns calls the “19th century gunboat diplomacy practiced by Washington” in the 
wake of the Spanish-American War. Even then debates swirled as to whether the 
base would be covered under US or Cuban constitutional law.29 With the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and the transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, the base 
seemed to have lost any strategic benefit to the United States and was looked at for 
closure several times during Defense Department budget cuts in the 1990s. And 
then came September 11, 2001.
The very same aspects of the base that made Guantánamo such a perplexing 
place before the war on terror in both legal and political terms made it an ideal 
place afterward. This irony was already obvious as early 2003, when feminist schol-
ar Amy Kaplan described Guantánamo in a New York Times op-ed piece as “a ter-
ritory outside U.S sovereignty, held in perpetuity, where the U.S. military rules[.] 
Guantánamo is a chillingly appropriate place for the indefinite detention of un-
named enemies in a perpetual war against terror.”30 Kaplan later demonstrated that 
this same logic of uncertainty suffused the various US Supreme Court opinions 
that dealt with questions around the legal jurisdiction of Guantánamo due to its 
uncertain geopolitical location.31 The only political entity with any claim to sover-
eignty over the base, the Cuban government, was the only one completely lacking 
the political or military resources to exercise it. The precedent for detention facili-
ties there had been in place since the early 1990s, when the base was used to house 
both Haitian immigrants fleeing the fall of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government 
in 1991 and the influx of Cuban refugees captured on the open sea between the 
United States and Cuba seeking asylum. The notorious Camp X-Ray, in fact, had 
been used during this time to house HIV-infected Haitian immigrants who were 
denied asylum in the United States. When the first detainees from the invasion 
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of  Afghanistan began arriving there in 2002, their designation as  illegal enemy 
 combatants rather than as prisoners of war consequently denied them their rights 
under the Geneva Convention. These detainees fell into the same legal limbo that 
the base itself existed under for the last century. In Guantánamo, the US  military had 
essentially secured the perfect place to settle the equally legally dubious  individuals 
who would be brought there.32
The dark genius of Guantánamo’s creation lies in its nature as a hybrid space of 
sorts, one that exclusively fits none of the existing categories and hence one that 
can’t be dealt with according to any of the established laws or guidelines. Such 
hybrid spaces—those that elude a clear classification and are therefore  impervious 
to shifting political climates and overt political action—are only increasingly 
 common in the “state of exception.” It is this relative political uncertainty and 
physical inaccessibility that makes Guantánamo the perfect subject to represent 
with immersive virtual technology. If the strength of Gone Gitmo is that it re-
sponds to a paradox with a paradox, then to a large extent the uncanny uncertainty 
of the virtual world that exists in Second Life provides the appropriate analogue. 
Depending on the source, Second Life is either an experimentally (dis)embodied 
utopia or yesterday’s next big thing. Either way, after exponential growth through 
mid-2007, the online world peaked at about one million regular visitors. In late 
2011, the last period in which traffic was reported for the site, it had approximately 
one million repeat visitors who spent a total of 124 million hours a month col-
lectively exploring it.33 While the figure has declined since, the site still attracts a 
dedicated user base of about eight hundred thousand people every month.
Descriptions of Second Life tend to characterize the environment in two seem-
ingly contradictory fashions. On one hand, its similarities with the real world are 
stressed: people do all of the things “there” that they do “here,” from working and 
shopping to socializing and traveling. On the other hand, it is characterized as 
being nothing like real life: physical constraints such as gravity, hunger, fatigue, 
aging, and illness are all optional indulgences. In short, virtual environments like 
Second Life are paradoxically hybrid places. Similarly, discussions of the “experi-
ence” of Second Life are equally vexed. The philosopher Hubert Dreyfus points 
out that the fundamental deficit in platforms like Second Life is their lack of em-
bodied finitude.34 For Dreyfus, virtual environments predicated on a user con-
sciously controlling the gestures, emotions, and reactions of an avatar treat users 
as mind-centered subjects capable of exchanging one container for another. Thus, 
they succumb to the fallacy of Cartesian mind-body dualism. The technological 
promise of a body without limits is precisely what prevents virtual environments 
like Second Life from delivering much of the physical, emotional, and social sensa-
tion that we draw from embodied experience in real life.35
Taking the opposite tack, many users of Second Life utilize the environment it 
provides to achieve physical experiences that they are prevented from encountering 
in their offline lives. The anthropologist Tom Boellstorff readily admits that virtual 
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embodiment is concomitantly different from real embodiment, but he maintains 
that it nonetheless offers certain users experiences absent from real life.36 Focusing 
on the sociality involved in group interaction, Boellstorff ’s study outlines several 
instances in which the users’ ability to change their bodily appearance in Second 
Life allowed them to experience an identity different from their own based on the 
reactions of others. For Boellstorff, the ability to explore different facets of oneself 
in persona play offered users forms of fantasy, empathy, and self/other exploration 
denied to them in real life, occasionally with lasting results for the physically em-
bodied person at the keyboard.37 The extensive reporting done on Second Life by 
journalists (at its peak the site produced a staggering five hundred news stories a 
day) almost ritually compares the differences between the limitations of users and 
the experiences they play out through their avatars, including basic activities rang-
ing from walking and pregnancy to extensive body modifications.38 Even users 
who don’t engage in these activities feel that their virtual bodies are truer to some 
aspect of their self-perceived selves than their physical bodies.
Neither fully embodied nor disembodied, virtual worlds can place users in a 
zone of indeterminacy that forecloses some experiences while enabling others. For 
the users of these worlds, this is not a drawback. It is precisely this neither/nor 
status that makes Second Life an intriguing medium through which to explore 
the politics of a place like Guantánamo—one that can also extend the limits of a 
medium like documentary film. While virtual environments sever ties with film in 
multiple ways, their remediation ensures that some cinematic aspects remain, in-
cluding point of view, camera angle, depth of field, and so on.39 Moreover, projects 
like Gone Gitmo demonstrate that a documentary impulse not only survives on 
such new media but also is essential to the impact they achieve. Several qualities 
of Gone Gitmo manifest what I am calling the documentary impulse, and in many 
of these ways the project even transcends the limits of documentary.
But beyond offering just some form of empathy and experience in relation to 
Guantánamo, Gone Gitmo is, I claim, perfect for the task, and this is because its 
complexities and contradictions replicate the peculiar political complexities and 
contradictions of the camp itself. Neither fully embodied nor disembodied, nei-
ther real nor fantasy, its users neither empowered agent nor passive spectator, Gone 
Gitmo utilizes this platform to translate the paradoxical limbo that Guantánamo 
inflicts upon its detainees. Returning to the issue that Obama faced throughout 
his presidency—what to do with Guantánamo—we unfortunately find that Gone 
Gitmo offers nothing in the way of a solution, nor perhaps will it be any better at 
convincing those on the opposing side of the merits of its case than the dozens of 
films that have been made on the issue. It offers no technological utopia. But even 
if Guantánamo were closed and bulldozed as Abu Ghraib was before it, the issues 
and victims it contains would simply migrate to new places like Bagram Air Base, 
the “Salt Pit,” or any other of the “black sites” that exist away from the scrutiny of 
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the public. When Gitmo itself is gone, the relevance of a project like Gone Gitmo 
will remain, even if we have to teleport to a new platform in order to see it.40
WAR GAMES
While activists like Weil and de la Peña were utilizing virtual platforms to expose 
the inherent injustice of US government policies around torture and detainment, 
the government began adopting these same technologies to make the detention of 
enemies in the war on terror an irrelevant issue. Almost from the moment of the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the military began developing and utiliz-
ing video games and other virtual simulation technologies to recruit and train 
soldiers, and even more advanced robotic technologies to track and kill its en-
emies on the battlefield. Many of these were of course already in various stages of 
development within the military and its various research agencies before 9/11. But 
as with so many other programs and policies, the attacks provided an occasion 
to accelerate the integration of these tools into mainstream military practice.41 If 
the complexity of battling a stateless terrorist enemy legitimated (in the minds of 
some) the creation of surreal legal and territorial spaces like Guantánamo, these 
places and policies found an intriguing counterpart in the virtual spaces and tools 
the military used in the process.
The military’s new virtual weapons systems challenged easy distinctions be-
tween real and virtual, carving out a complex space of new nonfiction media in the 
process. As the Gone Gitmo project had done, these tools pushed the boundaries 
around embodiment and representation in new ways, creating challenging new 
ethical, physical, and experiential zones for the human bodies on these new battle-
fields. Where Gone Gitmo focused on using the complexity of virtual embodiment 
to approximate the physical and legal precarity of the people subject to US policies 
around detention and interrogation, both America’s Army and its drone program 
used similar technologies to recruit and train the soldiers carrying out these poli-
cies. And, as their forerunners had done with Weil and de la Peña, these new hy-
brid, virtual spaces attracted the attention of activists and artists seeking to coun-
ter and call out the military’s use of these same tools. In the course of modernizing 
its arsenal, the military created a set of paradoxical policies and experiences for 
the soldiers tasked with utilizing these new weapons, as well as a new terrain that 
would allow activists and artists to respond and intervene to disrupt these policies.
The entrance of this new breed of weapons into mainstream military practice 
arrived on a wave of popular culture and entertainment that normalized their 
presence in civilian life.42 This played out as a sort of ubiquity for everyday civilians 
of both military hardware like drones and military practice in visual and digital 
culture across the news, on film and television, and of course in video games. Even 
as they normalize the presence of what Caren Kaplan and Derrick Gregory refer 
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to as “everywhere war” and push these modes of engagement from battlefront to 
home front via policing and the securitizations of everyday life, such forms of 
“militainment” also expose the complexity and contradiction inherent in their 
logic.43 The opening the sequence of the 2012 blockbuster The Bourne Legacy, for 
example, provides an apt illustration of how the types of paradoxical engagement 
that I am exploring played out for ordinary soldiers. The latest installment of the 
series and its most clear attempt to turn the original trilogy into a full-fledged 
franchise, the film introduces Alex Cross, the successor to Matt Damon’s Jason 
Bourne character, via a series of super- or even suprahuman achievements as he 
traverses the Alaskan wilderness. As he fords glacial streams naked, scales craggy 
peaks, and fights off hungry wolves, the sequence sets up a classic man-versus-
nature conflict only to demonstrate repeatedly the inherent superiority of man, or 
at least this particular man.
We eventually discover that this series of trials is a training mission designed 
to test the capabilities of the US government’s newest weapons system: a line of 
chemically and genetically engineered soldiers. When a series of leaks threat-
ens to reveal the program’s existence, the CIA is forced to eliminate it by killing 
off the various members of the program. Given Cross’s remote location, a drone 
strike is ordered to take out the final member of the arsenal. Demonstrating once 
again his cognitive and physical superiority, however, Cross manages to hack the 
tracking-chip technology embedded in his thigh by cutting it out and feeding it 
to the aforementioned wolves, one of whom becomes the unwitting decoy eventu-
ally executed by the drone. The scene offers a series of engaging role reversals in 
the hunter/hunted binary as Cross manages to turn both “predators” against one 
another by playing on their desires and limitations. With the introduction of the 
drone, a third term is inserted into the man/nature binary already established. 
As Cross fends off the instinctive, energetic desire of the animal with superior 
rational planning, he finds himself hunted on the opposite end of the spectrum by 
the calculated, quantitatively precise designs of the machine. Through a uniquely 
human combination of both tendencies, Cross is able to play animal and machine 
against one another.
This scene from an otherwise forgettable movie sets out an apparent conflict at 
the heart of the US military’s application of virtual training and robotic weapons 
systems—one replicated in popular and scholarly discussions on the use of games 
and game technology in the military. On one hand, the military uses gaming and 
simulation technology extensively to train and recruit soldiers, hoping to channel 
the instinctive drives around popular first-person shooters into better-prepared 
soldiers. On the other, it deploys robotic weapons systems like drones that uti-
lize telepresence to project force from the cool, rational space of the screen to the 
battlefield. But are these two forms of screen warfare actually connected? While a 
number of material connections and superficial resemblances present themselves, 
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many soldiers and scholars have argued against simply equating them, a warning 
I echo in the discussion that follows.44
My goal in connecting them here lies in examining the range of nonfiction 
screen technologies deployed in the military’s efforts during this period. While 
video games would seem to fall outside of the realm of nonfiction, I argue that 
their use in training and recruitment places them in a long history of military 
cinema. This placement aligns the cutting-edge efforts in America’s Army with the 
more sedate and straightforward moving images the military produced as far back 
as 1898 and has continued to produce in vast quantities since the Second World 
War.45 Drones, meanwhile, turn on the similar issues of embodied conflict and 
projected force, mediating the point of engagement to the degree that it creates 
a similar paradoxical relationship between the humans at the screen and the hu-
mans “on the ground.” Though not identical, both present an iteration of the body/
technology/space concern that Gone Gitmo manifests, an iteration that demon-
strates bizarre hybrid forms that nonfiction media take on in the war on terror.
The military’s use of games and other virtual technologies is a well-documented 
and discussed topic in game studies scholarship—from landmark texts by lay au-
thors, like Ed Halter’s From Sun Tzu to Xbox, to more-focused articles and chap-
ters by leading scholars in the field such as Ian Bogost and Alex Galloway, not to 
mention anthologies of essays such as Joystick Soldiers.46 As Halter convincingly 
argues, there have been game versions of war like chess for as long as there have 
been both games and war. The interconnections between the two take a significant 
turn in the 1980s when the military begins to express an interest in the nascent 
market of consumer video game technology and its possible use for training and 
recruiting. The starting point for what James Der Derian and Roger Stahl call the 
“military industrial media entertainment” complex or the “militainment” complex 
extends back over thirty years to the US Army’s commission of Atari to modify 
its popular 1980 3-D vector game Battlezone into a training tool for future tank 
commanders.47 The project produced Bradley Trainer, a stand-alone console game 
similar to the commercial version that was also produced, but modified to match 
the equipment profile of Soviet tanks. Though there is no evidence the project was 
ever used, it set an important precedent for the possibility of future collaboration 
between the commercial game industry and the military.48 The military went on to 
sponsor adaptations of other popular games, including a customized modification 
of the game Doom, a popular online multiplayer game that allowed users to create 
custom environments. The military version, Marine Doom, could be unlocked by 
users with a special cheat code. In the late 1990s, the army entered into a partner-
ship with the University of Southern California to form the Institute for Creative 
Technology (ICT). Intended to bring university-level research together with Hol-
lywood creativity and military funding, the group produced Full Spectrum War-
rior, a training tool that was also eventually released as a standalone console game.
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The logic behind the military’s use of commercial games technology appears 
synergistic on multiple levels. As Tim Lenoir and Luke Caldwell demonstrate, the 
combined efforts of the military and the game industry represented more of a 
fluid pool of collaboration and personnel as the institutions jointly conceptualized 
and argued for a radical reworking of the military’s utilization of digital technol-
ogy known as the “revolution in military affairs,” or RMA.49 The RMA was part 
dream, part blueprint, but with the impetus of 9/11 it began to move quickly off of 
the drawing board and into production. Collaboration before and after this tran-
sition offered a level of market-driven efficiency where none previously existed. 
The military could share the research and development cost of games with private 
companies seeking to outdo their competitors and directly monetize their invest-
ments. Second, collaboration enabled the military to benefit from the widespread 
popularity of games. On one hand, this had the effect of normalizing warfare on 
a larger cultural level, but it also lent the military a level of cultural cachet that it 
sorely needed in an era of all-volunteer soldiers. On a final level, the collaboration 
seems to have worked because industry and military interests often align. Both 
were interested in pursuing the most “realistic” simulations possible from both a 
visual and a mechanical perspective: the military, in order to prepare its soldiers 
for combat; and industry, in order to outdo its competitors in the technological 
arms race that defines the medium.
The military’s use of game technology accords with Ian Bogost’s influential argu-
ment about the procedural rhetoric of the game medium.50 By invoking proscribed 
choices and actions on the part of players, games can procedurally persuade play-
ers that a certain idea, ideology, argument, or course of action is the preferred 
method for achieving a specific end. As Bogost demonstrates, the apotheosis of the 
military’s use of game technology is perhaps the army’s enormously successful and 
widely discussed title America’s Army, which debuted as a free download in 2002 
and has generated millions of downloads worldwide. Widely praised at the time 
for its high-resolution graphics and realistic simulation of battle, America’s Army 
went through several other iterations, including the $12 million Army Experience 
Center and a stand-alone arcade game. Unlike the PC version, both of these ver-
sions allowed users to utilize gun-shaped controllers and other props to engage 
in combat.51 The Army Experience Center in particular offered the general public 
a look at the more advanced technology the military had developed to prepare 
soldiers, including resources like the Infantry Immersion Trainer at Camp Pend-
leton, a thirty-two-hundred-square-foot facility that replicates “the sights, sounds 
and smells” of urban combat using a combination of physical settings and virtual 
avatars.52 In this sense, America’s Army is the tip of the spear, so to speak, in the 
military’s strategy to enlist and equip soldiers for the realities of war. It’s the first 
point of contact that many will have with what will eventually be a series of experi-
ences using virtual immersive technology.
Figure 4.2. America’s Army every-
where. The success of America’s Army 
after its debut as a downloadable PC 
game  persuaded the military to of-
fer access to the game in public places 
and arcades. This enabled recruiters to 
approach players of the games directly, 
rather than waiting for them to enter their 
personal information on the website. It is 
worth noting that the arcade game (left) 
 displayed signage that claimed the game 
was “Suitable for all ages.” Photo credit: 
Carrie McLeroy (SMC—Army News 
Service).
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It is worth noting that the military’s extensive investment in and utilization of 
games and virtual environments to recruit, train, and indoctrinate soldiers into 
the ideology and procedures of military life was not its first interaction with me-
dia. For much of its history, the military used nonfiction film as its primary media 
technology for achieving many of these same ends. As Noah Tsika demonstrates, 
the military during and after World War II innovatively utilized documentary in 
a broad array of domains, pushing it formally and conceptually into service as a 
form of “useful cinema” capable of recruiting and training soldiers, documenting 
practices and tactics, and justifying military expansion.53 Douglas Cunningham’s 
work further elaborates the extent to which nonfiction training films within the 
United States Army Air Forces helped establish an esprit de corps within this new 
branch of the military and push the bounds of masculinity within the military 
more generally.54 Even the treatment of psychiatric disorders and battle-related 
trauma or PTSD for returning soldiers fell under the purview of nonfiction film, 
becoming a tool to “recognize, diagnose, and treat the psychological effects of war,” 
as Kaia Scott so brilliantly demonstrates in her history of World War II trauma.55 
As it would with America’s Army during the war on terror, the military during 
previous wars utilized the medium of nonfiction film to round out its soldiers’ 
“circuit” of service: enticing them to enlist, training them to fight, and dealing with 
the traumatic effects after they returned home.
Unlike previous efforts to meld games and military procedure, America’s Army 
was engaging enough to attract a wide audience, while at the same time faithful 
enough to the nature of military conduct to constitute a valid training tool. All 
players have to adhere to the military code of conduct or risk being locked out of 
further play. Moreover, success depends upon cooperating with other players on 
group missions against enemy forces using the stock military equipment the game 
offers—all efforts to make the game as true to the army experience as possible. 
The game also includes a number of other nods toward the real army, including 
profiles of soldiers and stories of their time in combat that are featured on the 
game’s loading screens.56 The game faithfully reflects the larger ideological aims of 
American unilateralism and militarism, in that player/soldiers are constantly be-
ing deployed around the globe in an endless series of missions—a further level of 
verisimilitude between the real army and its virtual representation in the game.57
But even beyond these connections and references to the military, the game’s 
training function further closely resembles the military’s historical use of film 
to prepare its soldiers. A closer look at the format of the training sections of 
America’s Army forcefully demonstrates the game’s resonance with documentary 
practice. From its earliest iterations, America’s Army always featured a notori-
ous, or at the very least, onerous, training component. While most games are 
content to provide the basics of the controls or keyboard commands and assume 
that players will improve as they play, America’s Army treats this instructional 
work as part of the end in itself. Throughout all of its versions, the game requires 
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players to  complete various exercises prior to being eligible to join in the more 
popular, team-based, multiplayer missions. In America’s Army 2: Special Forces, 
for example, the training section includes five different levels. These stretch from 
“Basic Training” through various sections for weapons training, medic training, 
sniper training, and airborne training. In order to access the more advanced 
features of the game (including special weapons, access to certain maps, etc.), 
players are required to complete each of these exercises. At each stage, the game 
imposes a skill threshold that prevents players from progressing until they have 
achieved a specific score or level of competency.
For example, the “Medic Training” section presents several different subsec-
tions, including modules on controlling bleeding, airway management, treating 
shock, and so on. In each, the player appears in a hospital setting, complete with 
a reception counter and two medical staff people chatting about military life. The 
player proceeds to different classrooms that branch off of a central hallway, find-
ing in each a classroom setting, an open seat, and a handout on the table. At the 
front of the room, an instructor stands near a projected PowerPoint presentation 
that leads the class through the given topic. Each lasts between five and ten min-
utes, concluding with a written, multiple-choice test contained in the handout. The 
slides that are used to deliver the content in these courses use photos, illustrations, 
titles, and bullet-pointed lists; in other words, they have all of the trappings of a 
typical slide show. In some of these, photographs of injured soldiers on the screen 
provide a pointed connection with (and contrast to) the forms of violence and 
physical injury that the game enables players to experience virtually. The appear-
ance here of real bodies alongside the virtual or animated bodies of the avatars 
underscores the extent to which these sections of the game push closer to a level of 
reality than the other sections of the game.
While not alone in allowing players the ability to “practice” in order to ad-
vance their skills or in offering “tutorials” that introduce them to the mechanics 
of a specific game, the training sections of America’s Army clearly exceed the 
practical requirements of game play. This is borne out in the falloff between the 
level of detail provided in the training sections and the practical execution and 
utilization of these skills in the mission sections of the game. Players who have 
passed medic training gain the ability to treat injured team members in order to 
bring them back into active play. But after learning in some detail how to treat 
basic wounds and manage a variety of common injuries, the game reduces these 
skills to a single command or click to put them to use. On the PC version of 
America’s Army: Special Forces, players face the injured solider and press “E” for 
a specified period of time. In later iterations of the game, this is augmented with 
an on-screen representation of the avatar pulling out and applying what appears 
to be a roll of gauze. In essence, players are required to sit through nearly thirty 
minutes of training on basic first aid in order to gain the ability to press a single 
key on their keyboards.
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Part of the explanation for the deeper level of engagement in this part of the 
game is of course ideological. The game’s overarching goal is to portray the US 
military in an appealing light to the players who populate its servers. The end-
game for a portion of these players is enlistment in the military, and for the rest 
it is presumably a positive opinion of the American armed forces. Greater detail 
here feeds into the larger world of the military that the game is introducing (or 
perhaps building), allowing players to immerse themselves in multiple dimensions 
of military life.58 Thus, the idle chatter of the two staffers in the hospital hallway, 
the posters on the walls of the classroom, and ultimately the detailed instruction 
of the training tutorials themselves all further enhance what Galloway refers to as 
the game’s “realistic-ness,” if not its realism.59
Nonetheless, the level of information provided exceeds even this ideological, 
world-building demand. Instead, these sections seem intent on actually training 
players in, or at least introducing them to, the topics they present. As Lenoir 
and Caldwell note, the game’s creators were insistent on its capacity to deliver a 
fun experience while at the same faithfully representing the military’s structure, 
rules, and so forth.60 This representation is gestured to throughout the game, but 
it appears most clearly at certain moments like those in the training  sections. 
Here the game occasionally achieves something closer to nonfiction than its 
more action-driven components. While the embodied and affective experience 
of players during one of the game’s combat missions surely departs radically 
from the experience of facing these situations in real life, the same cannot be 
Figure 4.3. The “Medic Training” section in America’s Army, version 2.5. The training 
segments, which last up 10 minutes each, replicate the experience of attending a lecture in a 
hospital, complete with an exam at the end.
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said of the game’s classroom-based training scenarios. I would argue that the 
experience of sitting in front of a computer and watching a lecture on a screen 
in preparation for a test is far closer to the experience one might have in real life 
doing these same things. This is certainly borne out in the complaints that the 
game generated for requiring players to endure these exercises. In this sense it 
would seem that the game is  using the training sections to introduce players not 
only to the types of things they will be trained in should they choose to enlist, 
but also to the discipline of training itself.
The game’s faithful simulation and enactment of a high degree of procedural 
and graphical realism for players does not, of course, obscure its more obvious 
distortions of reality. Some critics point out that the game’s hyperrealistic images 
and soundtrack don’t extend to the less palatable aspects of war, while others such 
as Galloway point out the extent to which the game exists in a sort of apolitical 
realm completely divorced from the social realities in which modern warfare is 
executed.61 Indeed, at a most basic level, the game engages in the same “save-die-
restart” logic that Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter call the “big lie of the 
video game as war” model.62
But there is an even bigger lie at work in the game, or at least a comparable one. 
To what extent does the game actually prepare its players for what is arguably the 
defining psychological reality of warfare: a kill-or-be-killed confrontation with an-
other person? Of course, nothing entirely prepares one for that particular reality, 
which is the prime reason for training and simulation in the first place. Practicing 
“procedure” repeatedly prepares one to act on instinct when the time comes. This 
same logic also justifies the drive toward increasingly immersive environments 
and ever more realistic graphics that seems to characterize the game industry in 
general and its “militainment” branch in particular. It is certainly at work in the 
outsize investment the military makes in creating simulators for high-risk duties 
like flying a plane. The more time one can spend proximally adjacent to war with-
out actually facing its mortal realities, the better. This is why the army apparently 
claimed at the outset of its participation in the ICT, “We want a Holodeck.”63
And yet, as the military continues to modernize its arsenal with the type of 
digitized, networked technologies that brought America’s Army to computers ev-
erywhere and further decreased the distance between simulation and reality, its 
simultaneous deployment of robotic technologies works to erase that distance en-
tirely. The connections between games that simulate war and the robots actually 
used to fight it are both real and imaginary. On a cultural level, popular fictional 
texts that experimented with the possibility of playing a game while actually fight-
ing a war began appearing shortly after the army and Atari teamed up on Battle-
zone. These included books like Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game and films like The 
Last Starfighter, War Games, and Cloak & Dagger.64 In all of these texts, characters 
pursuing mastery of a game eventually learn that they are actually fighting a battle, 
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thereby playing out the possibility that simulators like Bradley Trainer might 
eventually be linked to remote robotic tanks. Ronald Reagan himself prophesied 
that video games would eventually train a generation of soldiers to fight in war 
in “ways that many of us who are older [couldn’t] fully comprehend.”65 As these 
technologies have become a reality, drones in particular and games like  America’s 
Army are routinely linked in press coverage about the emergence of “virtual war.” 
And beyond these cultural expressions, Peter Singer notes that many of the  controls 
for future robotic weapons are prototyped and eventually designed  using hacked 
versions of the physical controllers and graphical user interfaces from console 
systems like the Xbox and PlayStation. This consistency is intended to limit the 
learning curve for the generation of soldiers who grew up playing games, but 
it also contributes to the slippage that exists in the minds of many between the 
games that recruit and train soldiers for war and the weaponized drones that are 
used to fight them.66
Outside of these connections, there is of course one important difference 
 between the game’s simulation and the drone: one is not real and the other is. Sim-
ulations prepare the player for a potential face-to-face violent encounter in their 
future; drones allow the operator to kill another human from a hitherto unimagi-
nable distance. The expansion of this distance, as Gregoire Chamayou argues, is in 
fact the defining feature of the weaponized drone, one that turns it from fighting 
into hunting.67 If games and training simulations are the cinematic equivalent of 
the blockbuster fiction film, then remote robotic warfare like the drone is its doc-
umentary equivalent. The parallels between the two are more than metaphoric. 
Like watching a big-budget action film, part of the pleasure involved in playing a 
typical action game is precisely the fact that it’s not real, allowing one to engage 
in experiences and behaviors one would avoid in one’s everyday life. This is what 
the “media effects” argument about the priming possibility of violent video games 
seems to miss.68 Most people who avidly play first-person shooters do so because 
they aren’t actually killing people. This is perhaps why so many soldiers, including 
drone operators, report playing these types of games in their free time to relax, as 
Peter Asaro notes.69 Fictional games, like fiction films, allow us to experience reali-
ties that are thankfully not our own.
But like a documentary, drone warfare bears a necessary, mediated connection 
to reality. As Lisa Parks argues, the drone itself is a mediating technology that “ex-
ceeds the screen and involves the capacity to register the dynamism of occurrences 
within, on, or in relation to myriad materials, objects, sites, surfaces, or bodies on 
Earth.”70 I am even tempted to say an indexical connection to reality, if we bear 
in mind that one of C. S. Peirce’s original examples of the indexical sign was the 
scar—evidence that signifies a prior wound due to some trauma imparted by the 
real. This index-as-scar is a connection more than borne out by the asymmetrical 
wounds experienced by both the operators and the targets of drone technology. Or 
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perhaps more temporally and spatially accurate, his example of smoke to signify 
a distant fire.71 To paraphrase Bill Nichols, no matter how realistic, games and fic-
tion films will offer us only “a world”—as opposed to the world.72 In the same way 
that viewers of a documentary are constantly aware that what took place before 
the camera bears a connection with the real, historical world, so the pilot of the 
aerial drone knows that when he pulls the trigger, an action and effect are carried 
out in the world.
Beyond the presence or absence of a direct connection to reality, there are other 
parallels between these forms of media. Like state-of-the-art special effects in fic-
tion films, games and simulations utilize cutting-edge technology to achieve pho-
torealistic visual imagery. By comparison, the typical camera image available to 
the drone pilot can have the feel of a low-res, low-budget documentary shot on 
consumer-grade home video. Even as camera technology and bandwidth have ex-
panded to include infrared, higher-resolution imagery and multiple simultaneous 
angles (the “gorgon stare” model can track twelve independent locations and quilt 
these together in a single, unified field of view), these tools are aimed at revealing 
rather than simulating reality.73 As opposed to the constant action of a game or 
simulation that allows one to skip to the “good parts” of the text, one of the prime 
problems confronting drone pilots is the boredom induced by extended hours of 
inactive screen time—a fear not uncommon to film majors taking their mandatory 
documentary course.74
Considering drone warfare in the context of documentary further alerts us to 
the heavily mediated nature of the reality experienced by the drone pilot, as well 
as the clear benefits and drawbacks of experiencing reality from a “safe” distance. 
As has been well publicized, drone pilots often act on less-than-sufficient informa-
tion, resulting in tragic civilian deaths.75 Derek Gregory’s description of the “kill 
chain” demonstrates that pilots and sensor operators are just two of the dozens of 
people involved in a typical mission. This group communicates across a variety 
of locations and through multiple channels including voice, IRC (internet relay 
chat), and in person—a sociotechnical assemblage of humans, information, and 
communication channels that presents multiple failure points.76 Many estimates 
put the number of civilian deaths as compared to combatant deaths well into the 
double digits, meaning dozens of innocent people die for each individual targeted 
by this class of “precision” weapons.77
Even the pilot and sensor operator, though admittedly removed from the direct 
encounter of the battlefield, are hardly out of harm’s way entirely. Making life-and-
death decisions from an air base thousands of miles away in northern Nevada 
or Virginia and then driving home to the suburbs when a shift is over has been 
blamed for causing PTSD in drone pilots at a rate comparable to that of front-line 
soldiers. Even soldiers who don’t experience the acute symptoms of PTSD suffer 
from a high rate of burnout, owing to an overwhelming set of labor conditions.78 
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While higher-resolution optics and more-precise strike capabilities are being 
planned to alleviate the problem of mistakes, such measures would seem only to 
exacerbate the circumstances that give rise to the psychological conflict associated 
with PTSD. Pilots and sensor operators report that watching the same person for 
an extended period of time only increases the guilt and anxiety that arise when 
they eventually kill him or her.79 As in documentary film, no particular optic or 
recording technology can reconcile one to the larger moral and ethical “truth” of 
what one is seeing or doing.
Most importantly, however, comparing the military use of virtual and robotic 
technologies to fiction and nonfiction films throws into relief the connected but 
different nature of these mediated forms of fighting. Like fiction and documen-
tary, games and robotic warfare exist on the same spectrum of representation but 
cannot be conflated. Moreover, comparing the experience of drone pilots with the 
promise offered by something like America’s Army clarifies the bait-and-switch 
effect at work in the military’s deployment of virtual technology to recruit and 
train soldiers to fight its wars. Whereas the game offers players an enhanced sense 
of agency, excitement, and immortality, war as experienced by drone pilots seems 
to entail guilt and boredom—experiences that are absolutely anathema to the feel-
ings that commercial gaming, and by extension America’s Army, are supposed to 
evoke. It is war fought from the safety of one’s home, but it turns that home into 
a battlefield where the “combatants” have to balance soccer practice and family 
dinner with killing people. Indeed, such distinctions (between civilian and soldier, 
battlefield and home front), always tenuous at best, are only increasingly difficult 
to separate in the particular conflation of space that drone warfare invites. To re-
turn to the example of Alex Cross in The Bourne Legacy, the military wants to place 
modern soldiers somewhere between the instinctive, hedonistic experience it uses 
to entice and train them and the sanitized, strategic space of surgical, robotic com-
bat. And just as Cross’s superiors do in the film, it has forgotten to take account of 
the human in the middle.
But if the military has opened up a curious new “front” in combat through 
drones and the bending of space that they enable and has further sought to colo-
nize virtual technologies and the spaces they create in order to recruit and train 
the bodies it sends to fight the war on terror, it has also opened up a space of re-
sistance that artists and activists have worked to engage. While my focus here has 
been on considering the military’s use of both drones and games vis-à-vis the sol-
diers it engages through each, I would like to briefly consider a few of the particu-
lar interventions that have sought to counter the military’s particular applications 
of both technologies. The artist Joe DeLappe in particular has worked across many 
of these same spaces with projects that, as the curator Christiane Paul puts it, “ex-
panded, challenged, or even redefined concepts of what constitutes public space, 
the public domain and public art.”80 In Second Life, DeLappe adapted a tread-
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mill to work as an interface control and modified his avatar to resemble  Mahatma 
Gandhi, walking across the virtual landscape as a reenactment of Gandhi’s “Salt 
March.”81 In 2006, DeLappe decided to engage the America’s Army platform by 
 utilizing the game space as a site through which to memorialize the real soldiers 
who had died fighting in the war in Iraq. The Dead in Iraq project consisted of 
logging in via his screen name (“dead-in-iraq”) and then dropping his weapon 
once the game commenced and using the game’s chat function to manually type 
the name, age, service branch, and date of death of each service person who had 
died to date. Eventually, often quickly, his character would be killed, and the other 
players would respond to the intervention. Over the course of five years, DeLappe 
logged in hundreds of times, finally completing the list of all 4,484 names in 2011 
after the US Army had officially withdrawn from Iraq. Many of the chat transcripts 
from these sessions reveal a mixture of reactions, ranging from sympathy and sad-
ness for the soldiers who passed away to anger and annoyance that he was confus-
ing a game with reality, or spoiling the fun.82 Conceived of as a “fleeting memorial” 
for these deaths, their names populate the fictional space that was created in order 
to recruit and train their successors.
In 2014 DeLappe began a series of projects intended to challenge the space that 
drones occupy within spatial imaginaries of the countries that most often deploy 
them. DeLappe’s drone work ran across a heterogeneous array of spaces and inter-
ventions, stretching from the “personal drones” that he created for individuals to 
wear as headbands to the “In Drones We Trust” stamp that he created for users to 
stamp the back of US currency with a small image of an MQ-1 Predator, thereby 
placing the drone’s silhouette over some of the most celebrated American land-
marks. Other interventions include placing scale-model drones in public spaces 
and modifying existing paintings with a drone image similar to the one that now 
populates an unknown number of bills. Connecting the projects is an impulse to 
counter the drone’s tendency to populate the periphery of our minds, drawing it 
from the extraterritorial “borderlands” where it terrorizes people in our names 
and allowing its shadow to be cast on the minds of a population all too willing and 
all too able to forget about it.
C ONCLUSION
Side by side, little separates the form and methodology of America’s Army from 
Gone Gitmo. Aesthetically, they operate within the same register: a virtual land-
scape or object on one platform looks as “real” as a similar object or landscape on 
the other. While both trail behind the most cutting-edge virtual representations 
available, they both nonetheless achieve sufficient verisimilitude that we recognize 
objects and places for those they are supposed to represent. A fence is quite obvi-
ously a fence. Both also utilize these virtual environments to offer users a sense 
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of what it would be like to inhabit a real space quite different from their own. 
Where Gone Gitmo seeks to offer visitors to the virtual Guantánamo a sense of 
the physical environment and the political and legal issues facing the detainees, 
America’s Army wants to prepare future recruits for possible events they might face 
as soldiers engaged in combat. Both also draw upon traditional photographs and 
video footage as ancillary materials to point users back to this reality in a similar 
fashion—Gone Gitmo through the video testimony that it includes from detainees 
and America’s Army through its “Real Heroes in Action” profiles, segments on the 
game site that feature profiles of decorated soldiers.83 Following from these formal 
similarities, both have recourse to one of the defining features of persuasive rhe-
torical media, documentary film included: the presence of a clearly defined call to 
action that structures the text. Gone Gitmo aims to stimulate debate and protest 
around the ongoing imprisonment of the individuals detained at Guantánamo. 
America’s Army, on the other hand, primarily hopes to persuade young people to 
enlist in the US armed services and, more indirectly, to shift general opinions of 
the military more broadly.
And yet in spite of these similarities, the above reading demonstrates that one 
sits closer to activist documentary while the other lies closer to fiction film. The 
spatial metaphor is important here, as distinctions between fiction and  nonfiction, 
real and virtual, are better understood by degrees of separation and resemblance 
than by categorical distinctions. The comparison between these forms of media 
illuminates the importance of holding on to the (admittedly slippery)  categories 
of fiction and nonfiction even as the technological ground shifts away from 
 optical recording technology. Just as optical indexicality never guaranteed docu-
mentary film’s relationship to truth, nothing in the graphical resolution or three- 
dimensional rendering technology itself guarantees any closer or more complete 
relationship with the events that each seeks to represent.
Nor does the distinction between the two texts rest on their differing political 
orientations (one apparently opposing the official status quo of military policy, the 
other supporting it). While America’s Army has been dismissed by its detractors 
as propaganda for the military, the designation mischaracterizes the relationship 
between a politically persuasive text and a propagandistic one. This is of course 
a vexed issue, and any working hierarchy between the two reveals more about a 
given value system than it does about either form’s relationship to reality. We tend 
to believe in truth claims that support our individual ideological frame and dis-
miss those that contradict it. “They” make propaganda; “we” speak the truth. Real-
ity always suffers any number of distortions when forced into particular narrative 
frames. Gaps and omissions are the rule for both what we dismiss as propaganda 
and what we deem “true” to reality.
The tipping point between fiction and nonfiction in traditional and virtual 
documentary lies in what these gaps and omissions exclude or include, and the 
extent to which we deem these choices to be critical to the project’s larger truth 
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claims. Gone Gitmo excludes abstract or embodied experiences like indefinite 
detention and torture, both of which might be considered “unrepresentable” in 
a broad sense. Indeed, both are practical impossibilities given the nature of the 
chosen medium; thus the project invites participants to reflect on such realities by 
way of their obvious omission. In America’s Army, the gap in the text is instead the 
defining feature of the chosen medium. That is, the first-person shooter is arguably 
defined as a forum in which the player is able to engage in consequence-less killing 
firsthand, with no corporal, legal, or ethical jeopardy at stake. Warfare, on the oth-
er hand, is the exact opposite. Gone Gitmo chooses not to represent these things, 
but to instead play on their absence. America’s Army utilizes this representational 
distance to make killing ubiquitous and individual death a mere inconvenience. 
(One has to start the game over.) This distinction makes one a documentary and 
the other a fiction.
The fictional status of America’s Army is further underscored by the mediated 
experiences of drone pilots—soldiers who actually fight in combat situations but 
do so through a gamelike interface. Unlike virtual representations, the video and 
data feeds that confront pilots don’t point toward reality; they emanate directly 
from it. This is still reality represented, but done so without an author, seeking 
not a broader “call to action” but instead a stimulus/response from the soldiers 
who jointly monitor its various feeds and collectively weave together the bizarre 
text of a drone mission. The attendant feelings of stress and guilt that such experi-
ence seems to evoke for many of these individuals further highlights the lack of 
stakes in the game version of virtual war, which allows and even rewards higher 
body counts. While the experience of remote, telepresent combat that the drone 
interface provides offers important parallels to documentary representation, there 
are clear distinctions that make a direct connection between them problematic.
In its efforts to curb the incidence of PTSD for drone pilots, the military be-
gan investigating technology to give the computer systems that pilots and sensor 
operators interact with more personality.84 The thought is that sharing the guilt 
with a “third party” would lessen the burden shouldered by the individuals pull-
ing the trigger. Depending upon the level of automation the military eventually 
achieves, a fully automated drone fleet might alleviate the need for human opera-
tors entirely. While this would further obscure the visibility of the program from 
the public in whose name this warfare is waged, it would also necessitate the use of 
new technologies by activists like Weil and de la Peña seeking to make its absent 
reality more tangible to everyday citizens, even if only through virtual means.
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5
Technology, Transparency, and the 
 Digital Presidency
Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant.
—Louis J. Brandeis, Other People’s Money
Science and art have in common intense seeing, the wide-eyed observing that 
generates empirical information. [It] is about how seeing turns into showing, 
how empirical observations turn into explanations and evidence.
—Edward Tufte, Beautiful Evidence
On March 28, 2011, a group of representatives from five different government 
watchdog groups met at the White House to present President Barack Obama with 
an award in recognition of his efforts toward creating greater government trans-
parency.1 The presentation was intended to coincide with an annual event known 
as Sunshine Week, which has, since 2002, sought to raise awareness about greater 
access to and oversight of the government by the press and individual citizens.2 In 
an odd public-relations gaffe, however, the White House chose not to make the 
presentation an official press event and consequently held the meeting in private. 
As perhaps should have been expected, the press immediately jumped on the irony 
of the situation, and for the next twenty-four hours, headlines like “Obama Ac-
cepts Transparency Award . . . in Private!” appeared across the media. While the 
award’s presenters were critical of the discrepancy between the event and its public 
profile, they nonetheless reiterated their praise of the president’s efforts to make 
the federal government more open, and pushed him to continue in his pledge to 
make his presidency the most transparent in history.
In spite of the absurdity of recognizing openness in private, however, a  deeper 
irony underscoring the award seems to have gone unnoticed by all involved. 
In the spring of 2011, the US government was perhaps more open than at any 
point in its history, but it wasn’t just Obama who deserved the credit. Although 
his  administration strove to overhaul policies and procedures in order to push 
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 mountains of data into the public domain, its efforts were overshadowed by a  series 
of high- profile unofficial leaks by the organization WikiLeaks. Combined, the 
2011 WikiLeaks releases placed more than a million previously secret documents 
online. Alongside the surveillance programs uncovered by Edward Snowden in 
2013, the leaks opened up a heated debate about the need for secrecy as well as 
transparency in public life. While Obama’s policies were meant to signal a shift 
from the secrecy that had characterized his predecessor’s administration, the 
WikiLeaks scandal forced the administration to admit that there were limits to the 
degree of openness it was comfortable with.
This chapter explores the threads of openness and transparency as they are 
 woven into debates around the high-profile “data dumps” (both official and un-
official) that emerged from US government archives during the first years of the 
Obama administration. Although government transparency has long been con-
sidered an ideal within democratic politics, different forms of media—from news-
papers and photographs to film and television—have been celebrated as the best 
means of achieving this goal at various points. It was clear from the start that 
for the Obama administration, transparency and digital technology went hand in 
hand. Out of this marriage, data visualization emerged as the favored medium to 
carry out the administration’s ambitious proposals, creating a new form of digi-
tally driven documentary media in the process. WikiLeaks shared Obama’s belief 
in transparency and his faith in technology as the means to achieve it, but from an 
anarchic, oppositional position. Given the size and scope of its releases, journalists 
and amateurs alike also turned to new graphical tools like data visualization in 
order to mine and display the WikiLeaks data.
Long used to represent scientific and financial data, data visualization, with 
its ability to represent vast quantities of information at a glance, offered an ideal 
medium to capture the government’s complex inner workings in a legible way for 
the general public. While it may seem that data visualization subverts the repre-
sentational and indexical media that previous chapters considered, image-based 
media continue to reassert their importance and influence. Not only do still and 
moving images continue to appear alongside data visualization’s interactive charts 
and graphs on government websites, but, as its evolution will demonstrate, data 
visualization’s claim to representing reality rests on the same “seeing is believing” 
foundation that photographic media first established. Data visualization is an out-
growth and inheritor of the same documentary impulse that has for many decades 
fueled the production of nonfiction film and television in general.
While the US government and WikiLeaks were at odds over the nature and 
purpose of releasing information to the public, both were nonetheless part of a 
larger historical debate over the definitions of “open” and “transparent”—one 
geared toward expanding notions of publicity and public space. Echoing  Louis 
Brandeis and other Progressive Era reformers from a century earlier, these 
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new champions of transparency and government accountability believed that 
“ sunlight is the best disinfectant” for clearing away the miasma of government 
corruption and public distrust. Unlike their forerunners, this new generation of 
transparency advocates believed that the best technology of visibility was not 
the camera or the muckraking exposé, but instead the networked computer—a 
tool capable of visualizing and distributing the vast amounts of data being made 
 public through official and unofficial channels. Combined with a Depression-era 
belief in the power of documentary evidence to inform the public, groups on 
both sides of the law worked to usher in an era of transparency and  accountability 
akin to early- and mid-twentieth-century efforts, but this time with a distinctly 
twenty-first-century twist.3
DATA VISUALIZ ATION:  THE RO OT S OF  
A REVOLUTION
The use of data visualization by both the Obama administration and WikiLeaks 
to make their transparency efforts legible to the public should perhaps come as no 
surprise. Data visualization as a medium is currently in the midst of an immense 
level of popularity and prominence across contemporary visual culture. Examples 
can be found everywhere, from advertising (IBM’s “Smarter Planet” campaign)4 to 
journalism (CNN’s “Magic Wall” and NYTimes.com’s interactive infographics)5 to 
academia (the journal Nature and others, as well as the burgeoning field of analyt-
ics). Visualization is celebrated on blogs like informationisbeautiful.net and visu-
alisingdata.com and made available to the masses via tools like Wordle, Tableau, 
and Many Eyes. Even as they struggle for added revenue amid falling circulation 
rates, newspapers like the New York Times and The Guardian have invested heavily 
in the medium. They regularly offer online features and interactive visualizations 
not possible in print editions, fostering the new field of “data journalism” in the 
process.6 Visualizations are so ubiquitous that as early as 1982, in a pre-Internet era 
of publishing, Edward Tufte was able to claim, “Each year, the world over, some-
where between 900 billion (9 X 1011) and 2 trillion (2 X 1012) images of statistical 
graphics are printed.”7 This staggering figure might still be rivaled by the number 
of photographic images captured every year by the increasingly ubiquitous cam-
era-enabled smartphone, but it’s the contention of this chapter that the two should 
be thought of as being in the same category of media.
As a contemporary phenomenon, the recent explosion of data visualization re-
lies on a range of newly emergent technologies, from the widespread deployment 
of inexpensive sensors to collect data, to advancements in cloud computing and 
commodity-level clusters for processing and analyzing this data, to high-resolution 
displays and increased graphics processing for rendering it visible.8 But in spite 
of its recent popularity in contemporary media and its reliance on cutting-edge 
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technology, data visualization broadly conceived (the impulse to collect information 
about the world and display it visually) is among the oldest of pursuits.
EARLY HISTORY AND “GOLDEN AGE”
The current renaissance of computationally produced data visualization is only the 
latest iteration of an aesthetic form that stretches as far back as the first  scientific 
tools and earliest forms of human writing.9 Many contemporary data scientists 
and visualization researchers chart the roots of their work as far back as 6200 BC, 
to early maps found in Konya, Turkey, that demonstrate the desire to  graphically 
depict the physical world.10 This same impulse continues through Ptolemy’s 
 Geographia in AD 150 and reappears in various scientific and technical represen-
tations throughout the Renaissance, extending into William Playfair’s experimen-
tation with line charts and bar graphs in the early 1800s. Playfair’s work stands 
at the beginning of what historian Michael Friendly refers to as the “golden age” 
of data visualization—a period during the second half of the nineteenth century 
when simultaneous developments in a range of fields fostered an explosive period 
of innovation and a volume of output rivaled only in the last fifteen years.11 For 
Friendly, this period “deserves to be recognized—even revered—for the contribu-
tions that it made to statistical thought and practice in that time and for the legacy 
that it provides today.”12 As with our contemporary moment, these innovations 
touched on each phase of the transformation from data to graphics, including data 
collection (improvements in scientific measurement, instrumentation, and car-
tography), analysis (developments in the fields of statistics and demographics), 
and display (the invention of processes like lithography to print and distribute 
full-color graphics on a mass scale).
This golden age of infographics stems from a larger nineteenth-century revolu-
tion in science and mathematics, one in which new ways of observing the world 
were developed alongside new forms of processing and understanding those ob-
servations. The nineteenth century, as Ian Hacking argues, was bookended by the 
determinist models of Newtonian mechanics on one end and the open-ended in-
determinacy of quantum mechanics on the other. Through this metamorphosis, 
the natural world came to seem “regular and yet not subject to the universal laws of 
nature.”13 Statistics, through the development of probability theory and what Hack-
ing memorably describes as the “taming of chance,” gained the ability to describe 
the world in regular, repeatable patterns. As in our current moment, data began 
to penetrate and influence the inner workings of social and political life in a way 
that it hadn’t previously, touching on everything from medicine to policing to ag-
riculture. Through the work of figures like Adolphe Quetelet and Charles Babbage, 
Joseph Fourier and Frédéric Villot, Charles Dupin and others, detailed records for 
virtually every aspect of the modern nation-state were recorded,  tabulated, and of 
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course graphically represented for the first time.14 The rise of probability theory in 
statistics as a scientific model went hand in hand with the sorts of vast data collec-
tion and visualization that Friendly celebrates, resulting in what Hacking refers to 
as an “avalanche” of printed numbers. This avalanche provided the foundation for 
and entrenchment of the modern bureaucratic state, interpolating in the process a 
new view of the public that “has affected not only the ways in which we conceive 
of a society, but the ways in which we describe our neighbor.”15
For Michel Foucault—pointing out as he did that “statistics is knowledge of the 
state, of the forces and resources that characterize a state”—the nineteenth century 
bound modern statecraft to statistics even more directly. Part of governing a popu-
lation, then, relied upon the collection and administration of “its quantity, mortal-
ity, natality; reckoning of the different categories of individuals in a state and of 
their wealth; assessment of the potential wealth available to the state, mines and 
forests, etc.; assessment of the wealth in circulation, of the balance of trade, and 
measure of the effects of taxes and duties, all of this data, and more besides, now 
constitute the essential content of the knowledge of the sovereign.”16 Indeed, the 
rise of what Foucault has called “the sciences of man” (and the statistical models 
and visualization tools they utilize) plays an essential role in the state’s administra-
tion of its power. Numbers, and their visual forms, enable states to control and 
regulate the flow of people and resources within and through their borders. As we 
will see when we turn to more-contemporary examples of data visualization and 
their role in the transparency debates surrounding the Obama administration, the 
flow of the “knowledge of the state”—who is allowed access, who is subject to 
it—remains at stake.
Statistical data collection and graphical representation thus moved from de-
scribing natural phenomena in the physical world (e.g., Galileo’s records of the 
movements of heavenly bodies) to describing, and eventually influencing, the 
nature of the social and political worlds (e.g., Minard’s celebrated map of Napo-
leon’s ill-fated march into Russia). This shift signaled not only an aesthetic change 
in how data was processed and displayed, but also a conceptual shift about what 
types of phenomena could produce data and to what uses the information could 
be put. This move from representing the physical to the social world is perhaps the 
most important legacy our current moment inherits from its nineteenth-century 
roots. It is also one that places techniques of data visualization in league with two 
other modes of representation—namely, photography and film.
PHOTO GR APHY AND DATA VISUALIZ ATION:  
T WIN HISTORIES
The formal and procedural similarities between contemporary data visualiza-
tion and photographic media being outlined here trace their roots back to the 
 historical coincidence of the emergence of both forms. About the same time that 
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William Playfair and others were pioneering the techniques and models that 
would  initiate Friendly’s “golden age” of data visualization, Nicéphore Niépce 
and Louis Daguerre were beginning the collaboration that would produce the 
first reliable method for chemically recording and reproducing images captured 
in a camera obscura–style device.17 By the time François Arago arose in the 
French Chamber of Deputies to formally announce the procedure perfected by 
Niépce and  Daguerre in 1839, its benefit to scientific practice as a “valuable aid” 
of  calculation and observation in fields as far-ranging as astronomy, microscopy, 
and anthropology were already clear.18
In claiming photography as a scientific tool, Arago was arguing one side in the 
debate that seems to have dogged photography from its earliest uses: whether it 
constituted a genuine art form or merely a mode of technological  reproduction. 
Notably, it seems to have gone unquestioned that photography was always, at least, 
a tool for science and scientific observation. The automatic reproduction of real-
ity without the mediating hand of the artist or scientist rendered photography 
both suspect as an art form and ultimately useful to scientists. Photography be-
came both a symbol of the standard of scientific objectivity as a whole and one 
of the tools by which individual scientific results were documented. Through its 
use in the laboratory, a certain “facticity of the photograph” was secured through 
“a distinct form of scientific comportment that harnessed photography to rigid 
protocols,” as Robin Kelsey and Blake Stimson put it.19 In tones reminiscent of 
contemporary accounts of the importance of data visualization for generating in-
sight, scientists utilizing early forms of photography to stop motion and freeze 
time hailed it as capable of offering humans a power of observation their eyes did 
not have. Its incorporation into the laboratory setting spurred a shift in scientific 
observation and documentation, bringing with it a standard of what Lorraine Das-
ton and Peter Galison refer to as “mechanical objectivity”.20 As data visualization 
would a century later, photography seemed to cast light on an aspect of the world 
otherwise hidden from human observation.21
In the late nineteenth century, the world was becoming representable and 
represented, not simply calculable but increasingly quantified and measured, in 
means beyond the written word and the painted image. Photographic media (both 
moving and still) and data visualization were the means through which this trans-
formation occurred. As a medium emerging in and among the same social and 
scientific changes that gave rise to the “taming of chance” and the establishment 
of the world as statistically calculable, photography was energetically identified as 
one of the forces of modernity shaping social life. Oliver Wendell Holmes’s much 
cited celebration of stereoscopic photography placed the automatic reproduction 
of images alongside the railway and the telegraph as an invention whose “signifi-
cance forces itself upon us daily.”22 For Holmes, the exchangeability of the image 
for the referent and its freedom to circulate made it capable of “annihilating time 
and space—a potential many would later grant to film as well. Holmes’s prediction 
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of a time “when a man who wishes to see any object, natural or artificial, will go 
to the . . . stereographic library and call for its form” evinces the same desire for 
ubiquitous documentation of the world that drove the “avalanche of numbers” 
that Hacking and Friendly credit with the birth of data visualization during the 
same period.23
Given the close connection between scientific observation of the world and 
photographic documentation, it is unsurprising that the first steps on the path 
from still photography to motion pictures were undertaken by scientists  seeking 
to perfect the still image as a means of observation. Étienne-Jules Marey and 
Edward Muybridge, the standard figures cited in histories of cinema, both 
 stumbled on motion pictures while doing “other” scientific work. For Marey at 
least, it seems that motion reproduction, in the cinematic sense, was the least 
 relevant by- product of his photographic work.24 While he would later lament that 
the moving image’s ability to capture “simply what the eye can see” rendered it use-
less as a tool of scientific observation, film’s ability to accurately and automatically 
document the world cemented its place in the popular imagination as a substitute 
for physical presence in a given place.25
Almost from the moment they appeared, nonfiction moving images were deemed 
capable of documenting, preserving, and revealing the world. While documentary 
film in the standard definition of the genre wouldn’t appear until the mid-1920s, 
from the Lumière brothers on, the impulse to document the world and consume the 
resulting footage has persisted in a variety of forms over the last century. Many of 
the same tropes from these early actualities reappear in the latest cell-phone footage 
on YouTube, including individual records like home movies as well as social/histori-
cal records like network news coverage of important events. As a tool, nonfiction 
moving images have always been utilized in the way scientists and data journalists 
utilize visualization today: to document and reveal the world to others.
Of course, like early forms of data visualization and the political and social 
frameworks they supported, photography and film have both been criticized for 
mediating and shaping the historical world as much as they record and reproduce 
it. Much of the critical work undertaken in the last fifty years has gone toward 
pointing out the lie behind photographic indexicality’s seemingly untroubled 
connection with the physical world. A photograph is now thought to reveal as 
much about the photographer as it does about the subject—a by-product Kelsey 
and Stimson call its “double indexicality.”26 Moreover, as the work of John Tagg 
makes clear, photography itself was as much a part of the rise of the bureaucratic 
state and the normalizing of everyday life as was the data collection and statistical 
representation of the late nineteenth century. From the use of photography as a 
means of surveillance by police to the documentation of slums by governments 
seeking to rid society of their social ills, photography has played part in the power 
of the state equal to its more numerically driven counterparts: statistics and data 
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 visualization.27 If we add to this tools such as closed-circuit television, satellite 
imagery, and other optical forms of state surveillance—tools that have created a 
panopticon of power within modern social life that affects everything from urban 
planning to individual behavior—then moving images require as much scrutiny as 
tools of state power as their still forerunners.28
PHOTO GR APHY AND DATA VISUALIZ ATION:  
DISTINCT MEDIUMS
In spite of their shared histories and the similar roles they have played in scien-
tific, social, and political contexts, photographic media and data visualization are 
nonetheless distinct media that offer starkly different modes of representation. The 
differences between the two become apparent by considering the role that each has 
played in relation to the transparency movement. Although photographic media 
have been used as tools of the state in its administration of power, it would obvi-
ously be misleading to conclude that photographic images have benefited or been 
utilized by just the government. As an optical medium, photography was a natural 
fit for those who wished to keep an eye on the state and reveal its misdeeds to 
others. Data and data visualization, on the other hand, have until quite recently 
remained the province of the state. One characteristic of the modern transparency 
movement is its clear desire to make data visualization as accessible as photogra-
phy has been for the past century.
A long tradition of social-issue photography exists in the United States, stretch-
ing as far back as Jacob Riis’s documentation of New York slums in the 1890s and 
continuing through the work of Lewis Hine, Dorothea Lange, Margaret Bourke-
White, and Walker Evans in the early twentieth century and extending on through 
the work of photojournalists like Kevin Carter, James Mollison, and others today.29 
While charges of exploitation and patronizing paternalism have always been lev-
ied against such work, the connections between the photographic representation 
of social issues and the healthy functioning of representative democracy continue 
to inform the impulse to visually document and distribute certain images as a tool 
for social justice.30
The work of Lewis Hine, for example, is often considered to have played a major 
role in the implementation of child-labor laws in the early twentieth century and 
in the rise of labor rights more generally throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In words 
reminiscent of Tufte’s ambitious claims for data visualization, Hine often claimed a 
utopian strength for the power of documentary photography. He wrote:
The picture is the language of all nationalities and all ages. The increase, during 
 recent years, of illustrations in newspapers, books, exhibits and the like gives ample 
evidence of this.
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The photograph has an added realism of its own; it has an inherent  attraction 
not found in other forms of illustration. For this reason the average person be-
lieves  implicitly that the photograph cannot falsify. Of course, you and I know that 
this unbounded faith in the integrity of the photograph is often rudely  shaken, 
for, while photographs may not lie, liars may photograph. It becomes necessary, 
then, in our revelation of the truth, to see to it that the camera we depend upon 
contracts no bad habits. . . . The dictum, then, of the social worker is “Let there be 
light”; and in this campaign for light we have our advance agent the light writer—
the photograph.31
Hine calls here on the full weight of long-standing Enlightenment connections 
between truth and social justice, drawing metaphorical and physical connections 
to the process of photographic exposure. In doing so, he tacitly channels the deep-
seated liberal faith in the connection between the presence of information about 
a problem and resulting action toward social justice. This faith—that exposing a 
problem will result in its elimination—is one that runs throughout work on gov-
ernment transparency and political accountability, regardless of which medium is 
acting as the channel of transmission.
As Jonathan Kahana points out, much of the history of political documentary 
film in the United States rests on the notion that moving images can be used to 
achieve social change, whether this change is political accountability for those in 
power or greater justice for those without it.32 Kahana covers a range of formal 
practices from the Depression era through the social crises of the 1960s and up 
to contemporary political work. He writes, “In an emancipatory gesture that [we] 
find repeated over and over . . . each style of documentary claims in its way to lib-
erate its viewers from ignorance, prejudice, false consciousness, or illusion.”33 In-
deed, much of the moving-image work considered in each of the previous chapters 
echoes this same gesture. From the overt skepticism of Errol Morris through the 
straightforward polemics of Robert Greenwald and on through the virtual walls of 
Gone Gitmo’s Guantánamo Bay, each of the works considered uses a variety of for-
mal approaches, but all share the basic aim of educating viewers on a set of issues. 
As a medium built on the same physical and photochemical principles utilized in 
still photography, political and social-issue documentary have inherited this faith 
in the connection between the light that exposes the film and the light that can 
expose social injustices—a spirit Hine so clearly articulated.
Turning to data visualization and the history of government transparency, we 
find a somewhat different history—one, in fact, that is far shorter. While notions 
of openness and transparency have been an ideal of democratic states from their 
earliest instantiations, the usual organ for achieving these goals has been the ex-
istence of the principle of freedom of the press. Access to government meetings 
and records at all levels by the press has been a consistent source of conflict, one in 
which degrees of access and publicity have varied throughout different countries 
and time periods. During the Progressive Era, for example, reformers like Louis 
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Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson called for greater information sharing on the part 
of the government in order to counteract the perceived corruption of politics by 
business interests. Brandeis’s notion of “publicity” drew on his belief in the ability 
of the public gaze to root out corruption if given proper access to the informa-
tion. Thus, one of the clear goals of Brandeis and others was making information 
known to the government available to the public as well.34 Indeed, his well-worn 
observation that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” evokes metaphors 
similar to Hine’s and directly connects access to information with optical visibility 
as a means to expose truth.
These early parallels notwithstanding, something like a comprehensive or even 
limited collection of information or records from and about the government that 
could be subject to analysis by independent groups and visualized for the public 
has emerged only within the last few years. This is in part the result of two factors 
that we have already seen in the history and development of data visualization. 
The first is that for much of its history as it relates to social and political life, data 
visualization has been a tool for the state to more effectively administer power. 
To be carried out, large-scale data collection and record keeping often required 
the resources of the state, and such records, moreover, were often kept secret by 
governments.35 For example, one of the first uses of the early data-sorting machine 
that Herman Hollerith designed was in tabulating the 1890 and 1900 censuses for 
the US government, one of the only potential customers with a need and a budget 
to support the new technology.36 Even as Hollerith’s machine became the center-
piece of IBM and was eventually surpassed by digital mainframes and cloud com-
puting, the company continued to rely heavily on sovereign governments around 
the world as the main customers for its cutting-edge computing technology. States 
were the only entities that had both the resources to purchase these technologies 
and sufficient quantities of data to justify them. But by the next centennial census, 
in 2000, technology like the Google MapReduce framework had made large-scale 
computing a commodity open to anyone capable of networking two or more com-
puters together, and the ubiquitous presence of computers for the previous fifty 
years had created mountains of data that were increasingly available to anyone 
with an Internet connection.
The second change that enabled the current explosion of transparency-related 
activity was a further redefinition of what counts as data, and thus what can be 
visualized. In the same way that the golden age of data visualization was fueled 
in part by expanding the notion of data to include certain measures of social and 
political life, the current resurgence of the field is similarly expanding the idea 
of what falls within its purview. Part of the recent revolution in the field of data 
visualization, for example, has been the development of a related field known as 
natural-language data processing (NLDP for short). NLDP analyzes written texts 
and categorizes them according to various criteria, thereby generating data about 
them and hence the ability to visualize this material. Unlike conducting a census, 
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where data must be collected and classified, NLDP allows one to turn any written 
material into a data source (not just books, but e-mail, websites, tweets, etc.). In 
political circles, the same army of bureaucrats it takes to conduct a national census 
also produces an overwhelming archive of written material in the process of every-
day governance. Even though reforms in the United States like the 1966 Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) and the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (passed in 
response to the Watergate scandal) have long given citizens access to this informa-
tion, until recently such records had been made available only in printed form, 
thus requiring an equally sized army of individuals to sort and make sense of such 
information. The advent of digital record keeping and NLDP makes this archive a 
viable source of data that can be analyzed and visualized by anyone with relatively 
little computing power.
Though photographic media and access to government data have both been 
invoked utilizing Enlightenment metaphors of light, optics, and vision as a direct 
access to truth and justice, it is only in the last decade that information visualiza-
tion became a widely available form of visual media. Photography has enjoyed this 
status since the early twentieth century thanks to consumer-grade equipment like 
the Kodak Brownie. Until recently, free access to information as an avenue toward 
government transparency typically meant access to printed records in a specific 
government agency during prescribed hours. Any public insight into what such 
records contained was usually provided via written reports from the press or a spe-
cific watchdog group. Once these records become digital, however, they become 
open to investigation by a much wider segment of the population using a broader 
array of tools for summarizing and accessing their contents.
THE REBIRTH OF DATA VISUALIZ ATION
The current body of practitioners, theorists, and researchers working on data visu-
alization maintain a curious relationship with the medium’s past. On one hand, the 
field demonstrates a clear awareness of its own history. Textbooks on visualization 
often begin with an introductory snapshot of successful examples and important 
milestones, each perhaps covering different periods but all invariably highlight-
ing a fairly consistent canon of work. And yet, despite this historical awareness, 
the claim is often made that what unites all of these materials is a kind of time-
less, universal aesthetic that appeals to an innate, almost biological aptitude for 
this particular mode of representation. As Edward Tufte puts it, “The principles 
of analytical design are universal—like mathematics, the laws of Nature, the deep 
structure of language—and are not tied to any particular language, culture, style, 
century, gender, or technology of information display.”37 Data visualization has a 
history, but it is simultaneously and consequently thought of as timeless.
At the heart of what connects early diagrams in Euclidean geometry with com-
putationally rendered scientific charts and graphs in the latest issue of Nature is a 
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long-held faith, in Western culture, in the apparent connection between vision and 
human cognition. As Martin Jay, W. J. T. Mitchell, and others working on visual cul-
ture have argued, the connections between seeing as one of the human senses and 
cognitive concepts like understanding, knowing, and believing run deep. The cor-
relation between vision and our formulation of abstract concepts of reality, truth, 
and rationality dates back to the ancient Greeks and persists in varying degrees to 
the present day.38 Regardless of whether this connection is culturally/historically 
determined or more biologically based (and Jay, for example, has shown that there 
are certainly cases to be made for both), for current visualization researchers it is 
embraced as a foundational principle for their research.39 In this sense, visualiza-
tions of phenomena become models capable of both defining and communicating 
knowledge about the world in a process that Ben Shneiderman calls both “external 
cognition” and “expanded intelligence.”40 Visualizations, in other words, help sci-
entists think about the phenomena they study and reveal truths that would remain 
hidden in the data itself, at least according to the scientists who work in visualiza-
tion research. For Shneiderman, diagrams, charts, maps, and any number of other 
visual displays are tools that represent our observations of the world and enable us 
to discover new forms of knowledge about it.
If the renaissance in data visualization has a modern birthplace, it is arguably 
the Human–Computer Interaction Lab at the University of Maryland, which 
Shneiderman founded in 1983. The lab focuses on developing new tools and forms 
for visualizing large-scale data sets.41 In a series of textbooks for the field, Shnei-
derman and his colleagues stake an intellectual ground and a scientific importance 
for contemporary data visualization that even echo intellectual histories in the 
field of visual culture. Readings in Information Visualization, which bears the sub-
title Using Vision to Think, begins:
To understand something is called “seeing” it. We try to make our ideas “clear,” to 
bring them into “focus,” to “arrange” our thoughts. The ubiquity of visual metaphors 
in describing cognitive processes hints at a nexus of relationships between what we 
see and what we think. . . .
The interweaving of interior mental action and external perception (and manipu-
lation) is no accident. It is how we achieve expanded intelligence.42
For Shneiderman and others working in the field, there is a clear belief in the un-
troubled connection between seeing, thinking, investigating, and  communicating. 
This degree of faith in visualization’s capability to record and reveal the world 
not only echoes adherents of the documentary image but also pushed the 
medium to prominence at a critical historical junction in the contemporary 
transparency debates.
Outside of academia, this same faith in the connection between vision, visual-
ization, and insight is further echoed by the person commonly thought of as the 
popular-culture guru of the field of data visualization: Edward Tufte. Trained as 
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a political scientist, Tufte began looking at the power of data graphics when he 
 cotaught a seminar on statistics to a group of journalists alongside the famed Princ-
eton statistician and graphics pioneer John Tukey. After completing a manuscript 
on the subject, Tufte became frustrated when an academic press refused to print 
his book to the exacting standards he maintained the subject matter  demanded: 
high-resolution graphics, archival paper, reader-friendly formatting. He took out 
a second mortgage on his home to self-publish the book, which became The  Visual 
Display of Quantitative Information in 1983. Instantly a runaway success, the book 
is now hailed as one of the touchstones in the field of data  visualization, and his 
follow-up texts Beautiful Evidence and others continue in the same vein. Tufte 
 retired from Yale in 1999 and now tours the world giving one-day seminars on 
data visualization to sold-out crowds of academics, graphic designers, software 
developers, and product managers.43
Considering his presence both inside and outside the academy (in addition 
to the seminars Tufte gives, he has consulted with dozens of private companies), 
Tufte’s influence on the contemporary field of data visualization is difficult to over-
state. And Tufte, in turn, stakes the greatest social and intellectual claims for it. 
Indeed, the opening lines of Beautiful Evidence might almost be the governing 
ethos of the field as a whole:
Evidence is evidence, whether words, numbers, images, diagrams, still or  moving. 
The intellectual tasks remain constant regardless of the mode of evidence: to 
 understand and to reason about the materials at hand, and to appraise their quality, 
relevance, and integrity. Science and art have in common intense seeing, the wide-
eyed observing that generates empirical information. Beautiful Evidence is about 
how seeing turns into showing, how empirical observations turn into explanations 
and evidence.44
The connections he makes between empirical observation, explanation, and 
evidence demonstrate that through data visualization what might otherwise be 
simple facts or observations about the world are transformed into narratives that 
account for a particular mode of existence. Given the potential for such evidence 
to mislead, he calls the creation and consumption of evidence presentations 
a “moral act” in which presenter and audience are tasked to hold one another 
 ethically,  intellectually, and factually accountable. While such claims might easily 
be  dismissed as mere hyperbole, Tufte provides evidence of the mortal  importance 
of the particular form in which we choose to present information. In his  essay 
“ Cognitive Style of PowerPoint,” Tufte analyzes Boeing’s use of the popular 
 presentation software to present its analysis of damage to the space shuttle Columbia 
during its launch in 2003. He convincingly argues that the default hierarchical 
format of the software program was partially responsible for NASA’s inability to 
isolate the problem that eventually led to the shuttle’s destruction upon reentry.45 
While many have derided PowerPoint for its facile display of information, few 
have argued that it could also be a matter of life and death.
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Given Tufte’s focus on the practical implications and limitations of the data vi-
sualization, it is clearly no coincidence that he started his work in the field as a po-
litical scientist teaching the craft of visualization to aspiring journalists. Whereas 
Shneiderman and other computer scientists champion data visualization’s ability 
to produce new cognitive insights, Tufte’s background seems to temper his enthu-
siasm, forcing him to consider the uses and misuses of visualization in a wider 
social and political context. Beyond seeing data visualization as a tool for scien-
tists to better understand their observations about the world, Tufte recognizes its 
impact on the realm of social and political discourse. Instead of straightforwardly 
representing “what” is in the world, he notes the extent to which data visualiza-
tions are further called upon to narrate “why” a given situation exists and dictate 
“how” an audience should respond.
What further separates Tufte from the more classically trained scientists cur-
rently working in the field is his emphasis on the decisive role that aesthetic form 
plays in this process. Significantly, he relies on photographic metaphors as mea-
sures of the relative merit of a given technique or form. Visualizations are evalu-
ated on their “resolution,” which for Tufte refers not to the pixel density of a pho-
tographic image, but rather to the amount of data contained within a given visual 
space. High-resolution graphics like the sparkline can present thousands of points 
of data in a space no bigger than the average printed word, while low-resolution 
formats like PowerPoint slides contain no more than a few dozen. Visualizations 
are further gauged on their “clarity,” which refers not to photographic depth of 
field or focus but instead to the extent that essential information is brought to the 
fore and extraneous details are excluded. Entire chapters of his book are devoted 
to detailing the dangers of what he calls “chart-junk” and “PowerPoint Phluff ”—
extraneous formal features added to low-resolution graphics to hide their inad-
equacies. Throughout his work, data visualization is for Tufte an aesthetic form in 
which every choice should be made with an eye toward maximizing the amount of 
relevant data that can be represented by a given visual feature.
Tufte’s prominence in the field of visualization was recognized in late 2008 
when he was called to Washington to use his data visualization skills to help his 
fellow citizens understand one of the greatest challenges it had faced in nearly cen-
tury: the rapid collapse of many of the country’s largest financial institutions. The 
person issuing the call was a young, newly elected president seeking to make good 
on many of his ambitious campaign promises: Barack Obama.
OBAMA’S OPEN GOVERNMENT
With his election to the White House in November of 2008, then president-elect 
Barack Obama immediately set to work fulfilling what had been his campaign’s 
most amorphous and perhaps most compelling promise: change. Capitalizing on 
voter dissatisfaction over the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
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increasing anxiety over the global economic downturn, Obama’s promise of change 
stretched from the specific (closing Guantánamo within a year) to the  general 
(bridging the polarized, winner-take-all politics of the previous eight years). 
Attempting to demonstrate his intention to make good on these promises, his 
transition team established the change.gov website to outline and track progress 
on many of his administration’s nascent policies. Although some of these long-
term ideas would prove to be, like most campaign promises, overly ambitious, his 
administration’s use of digital technology as a channel of open communication 
was a change in and of itself. Signaling an immediate break from the perception 
of secrecy and dissimulation that had for many characterized George W. Bush’s 
White House, the transition team’s early utilization of web technology for public 
communication became a hallmark of Obama’s approach to governing.
While this embrace of technology marked a clear policy departure from his 
predecessor, for both Obama and the left it was simply an extension of both his 
campaign and the eight years of progressive opposition that delivered him to the 
White House. His candidacy had been characterized by its utilization of the net-
roots strategies of organizing and fund-raising that had become a pillar of progres-
sive activism during the Bush era. From his move to post the president’s traditional 
weekly radio address on YouTube to his very public desire to hold on to his Black-
Berry while in office, Obama signaled early on that he intended to incorporate 
technology into every aspect of the new administration.46 Just as George Bush had 
styled himself the first “CEO president,” Obama clearly wanted to claim the title of 
the first online or digital president.47
Nowhere was the embrace of technology more apparent than in the new presi-
dent’s approach to government transparency. On January 21, 2009, on his first full 
day in office, Obama issued a presidential memorandum with the subject heading 
“Transparency and Open Government.” Part of a move advocated by several gov-
ernment watchdog groups to embrace “openness on day one,” the initiative out-
lined in the memo described his administration’s approach to sharing information 
about the government and directed various individuals to coordinate an “Open 
Government Directive,” which would revise standards for releasing information 
to the public.48 Reminiscent of the idealism surrounding his campaign and echo-
ing the heady optimism surrounding Web 2.0 initiatives that had launched nearly 
a decade earlier, the memo outlines three general principles to be followed by all 
federal agencies: (1) government should be transparent; (2) government should be 
participatory; and (3) government should be collaborative.
Along with moves to declassify documents and speed up the response to 
FOIA requests, these new policies were roundly applauded by the coalition of 
groups that made up what was by then becoming known as the transparency 
or “sunshine” movement.49 Along with other moves by his administration over 
the next eight years, they placed the Obama presidency in line with a series of 
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efforts by democracies around the world to reinvent or refocus government and 
democratic participation using digital tools and open-data frameworks. Eventu-
ally, these would include the Public Sector Information Directive in Europe in 
2008, the Open Government Partnership in 2011, and the G8 Open Data Charter 
in 2013, among many others.50 Many of these public open-data initiatives were 
justly criticized for further institutionalizing a neoliberal framework of privatiz-
ing public infrastructure (in the form of data) and normalizing competition as 
equivalent to efficiency.51 However, the general ethos of releasing public data for 
the public good would eventually prove to be quite fragile once Obama left office 
and a new administration sought to alter the relationship between openness and 
government data.
The influence of entrepreneurial webspeak on the presidential memo turned 
out to be more than superficial. In the years that followed, the Obama administra-
tion instituted a range of new IT-driven policies and transparency initiatives—
from websites and dashboards to blogs and data feeds—under the direction of the 
government’s newly created chief information officer, Vivek Kundra.52 Kundra had 
made a name for himself in the public sector by spearheading a number of open-
government initiatives in Washington, D.C., under the reformist mayor Adrian 
Fenty, many of which would eventually come to characterize the federal govern-
ment’s approach to technological transparency. For example, one of Kundra’s proj-
ects collected and published data, on a webpage called the “D.C. Data Catalog,” 
that the city routinely collected.53 It included access to everything from crime 
statistics and arrests to applications for building permits and city maintenance 
requests. Kundra realized that all of this data was both public information and 
potentially useful to citizens but that there was currently no way to connect the au-
dience with its source. To address that problem, he borrowed what was quickly be-
coming a well-established model from the business world and held a contest that 
challenged people to come up with apps that would make the data more useful. 
The result of these efforts was a portal of tools and information that Kundra and 
the city hoped would be “a catalyst ensuring agencies operate as more responsive, 
better performing organizations.”54 Significantly, the page also included links and 
tools that would “allow users to create and share a variety of data visualizations” 
and informed each user that “you can create your own visualization using already 
uploaded datasets or slice and dice data the way no one has before.”55 The site was 
so successful that it eventually won the Harvard Kennedy School’s Innovations in 
American Government Award in Urban Policy.56
After the 2008 election, Kundra was appointed to the transition team as a tech-
nology adviser, and part of his charge was to replicate the success he had had 
in Washington at the federal level. The result was the Open Government Initia-
tive, which undertook a range of projects to push government transparency 
onto the web using a variety of tools. These included everything from sites like 
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 USASpending.gov, a dashboard intended to track and streamline spending on 
government projects, to the OpenGov dashboard, a metachart tracking progress 
toward transparency across several dozen federal agencies. Among all of these ini-
tiatives, the two that best exemplify the government’s current approach to trans-
parency are the data.gov and recovery.gov projects that launched early in Obama’s 
first term. Together, they illustrate the potentials and the pitfalls the government 
faces as it seeks to make itself more open to its citizens.
REC OVERY.GOV
Roughly one month after taking office, Obama signed into law the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (known eventually as the “stimulus package” or 
the “recovery act”), which appropriated $787 billion of tax relief and government 
spending to counteract the effects of the ongoing global economic downturn. Two 
days later, on February 19, 2009, the website recovery.gov went live, welcoming 
visitors with the following message:
Recovery.gov is a website that lets you, the taxpayer, figure out where the money 
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act is going. There are going to 
be a few different ways to search for information. The money is being distributed 
by Federal agencies, and soon you’ll be able to see where it’s going—to which 
states, to which congressional districts, even to which Federal contractors. As 
soon as we are able to, we’ll display that information visually in maps, charts, 
and graphics.57
This initial page also featured a video of Obama explaining that the unprecedented 
size and scale of the recovery act demanded new methods of transparency and 
oversight to “root out waste, inefficiency and unnecessary spending.”58 Toward the 
bottom of the page was a simple bar chart breaking out the amounts dedicated 
to different spending projects. In spite of its rather limited initial offerings, the 
original home page for the site already contained all of the elements that would 
be essential to later versions. The site was a first step in what was intended to be 
a complete overhaul of the federal information infrastructure, a test case for his 
administration’s transparency agenda.
After two years of updates, the site eventually became populated with a 
great deal of the information it initially promised. It became possible to search 
through hundreds of thousands of projects by size, geographic location, federal 
agency, or subcontractor. A number of different tools made this information 
available via charts, graphs, maps, and other visualization tools that allow one to 
analyze and interpret the data. The “video center” on the site listed over thirty 
clips (totaling just over three and a half hours of running time), each of which 
explained how to navigate the site and its overall mission. As an information 
source, recovery.gov represented an ambitious attempt to document and display 
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the flow of  federal  revenue, dollar by dollar, from the Treasury into the multitude 
of projects it supported and the jobs it created—a virtual showcase of the recent-
ly reembraced Keynesian economic principles. But as an object of visual culture, 
the site was perhaps even more groundbreaking. In the economy of  information 
it utilized to document the impact of the stimulus package, recovery.gov rep-
resented a clear faith in the ability of quantitative information to sufficiently 
represent reality, and thus signals the partial advent of a postphotographic form 
of the documentary impulse.
Placing a nonfiction, multimedia text like recovery.gov in the same  conversation 
as documentary film is not without precedent. As Tom Gunning has convinc-
ingly argued, illustrated lectures and narrated slideshows by social reformers like 
 Jacob Riis place early documentary still photography in the pre-evolution of later 
Figure 5.1. The initial recovery.gov home page.
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forms of voyeuristic, observational ethnography.59 In this formulation, a series 
of still images narrated by the speaker provides the same format (photographic 
evidence, timed delivery, narrative progression) that would later be united in the 
form of the sound documentary film. Similarly, the combination of evidence, ar-
gument, and political narrative that recovery.gov offered might be seen as a third 
iteration of the form—one in which all elements sit side by side rather than being 
delivered sequentially.
The purpose of the site, moreover, was one that places it squarely within the 
documentary tradition, or at least that part of the tradition populated by state-
sponsored films that effortlessly (if overtly) conjoin civic edification with political 
persuasion. On an explicit level, the site’s goal of openness and transparency might 
be read as providing information and issuing a call to action—both common items 
Figure 5.2. Recovery.gov circa 2011, after a great deal of the data about the stimulus package 
had been generated and visualized.
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on the documentary agenda. Indeed, the ominous presence of a large red button 
that adorned the top of every page that asks visitors to “report waste, fraud and 
abuse” simultaneously notifies them that they can take action while assuring them 
that action is being taken. Beyond its stated aims, the site also narrates for visitors, 
in basic beginning-middle-end structure, the story of how the stimulus package 
moved from being a piece of legislation in Washington to a series of concrete proj-
ects carried out in the real world.
The metanarrative at work here delivers the implicit political message that such 
spending works, and works for “real Americans.” Part of a series of massive gov-
ernment spending measures intended to safeguard the economy from slipping 
into a depression, the stimulus package took its place alongside the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program and the auto-industry bailouts, which together set aside nearly $2 
trillion to address the state of the economy. Of these, the stimulus package was 
the only clear example of a classic Keynesian stimulus investment by the public 
sector. While the other programs may have prevented the collapse of such iconic 
names in American business as General Motors and Bank of America, the stimu-
lus package stood apart in that it was designed to inject new capital into the mar-
ket. Within the Keynesian model, this public spending will then cascade across 
the economy as people paid by the government spend their paychecks on other 
goods and services, which income is then spent on other goods and services, and 
so on. The site’s invitation to “track the money” is thus an invitation to witness 
what economists call the multiplier effect in action. Recovery.gov thus seeks not 
only to persuade skeptical conservatives that the historic spending levels were ef-
fective and necessary, but also to reassure taxpayers that they, too, would be the 
beneficiaries of the government’s largesse.
Contrary to the fervor of the debate that surrounded it at the time, the size 
and scale of both the stimulus package and the economic threat it was meant to 
address were not unprecedented. The similarities between the Great Depression 
of the 1930s and what was quickly dubbed the “great recession” were widely dis-
cussed, and many parallels were drawn between the policy responses of Obama 
and of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Indeed, these policy parallels might also be 
suggestively extended to the media that both administrations created in support 
of them.60 After all, in attempting to carry out the controversial resettlement of 
destitute farmers and migrant laborers, Roosevelt’s Resettlement Administra-
tion (RA) sponsored what eventually would become the era’s most iconic and 
influential media representations. In addition to the well-known and widely 
distributed photographic work of Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, and Gordon 
Parks, the RA also produced two thirty-minute documentary films meant to 
educate the public: The Plow That Broke the Plains (1936) and The River (1938), 
both directed by Pare Lorentz.
The River, in particular, offers both formal and rhetorical features that make 
its comparison to recovery.gov particularly productive. The film focuses on the 
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 mismanagement of the Mississippi River watershed over the previous century as 
the nation pushed westward and documents the ecological and social destruc-
tion that resulted. Using a mix of statistics, maps, and images tied together with 
voiceover narration, the film argues for the need to control the river and restore 
the damage, both of which would involve the large public-works projects that 
have come to be associated with the New Deal. As Paul Arthur has argued, the 
film directly positions new forms of technology as the solution to bridging the 
existing conflict between man and nature but presents these solutions in a poetic, 
lyrical style that blunts the heavy-handed role government would necessarily play 
in  carrying them out.61 In rhetorical terms, while the film does contain sufficient 
logos-driven data to convince the audience of the size and scale of the problem 
(acres of farmland flooded, percentages of deforestation, tons of topsoil erosion, 
etc.), its primary appeals are the pathos-laden images of the destruction itself and 
of the people whose lives have been ruined.62
Returning to recovery.gov, we find a similar mix of elements with a decidedly 
different sense of proportion and emphasis. Whereas films like The River utilize 
data and statistics to support an overarching framework of photographic  images, 
recovery.gov utilizes images to support what is otherwise intended as a data- 
delivery system. Rather than using a map to demonstrate the context and scale of 
the subject as The River does, the maps on recovery.gov instead become naviga-
tional tools through which specific data points may be accessed. While both texts 
seek to document specific flows and the impact they have on people’s lives, for one 
this flow is the photogenic tempest of the nation’s largest waterway, and for the 
other it is the flow of capital for the nation’s largest fiscal outlay. In spite of histori-
cally similar origins and an overall shared political purpose, the two objects thus 
utilize radically different media to achieve their aims.
A great deal of this difference can be explained by the technological and 
 social contexts in which they emerged. For the average audience member of the 
1930s, moving images were the primary portal to the wider world. For the govern-
ments and institutions that sponsored them, documentary was seen as the best 
means of  edifying and persuading the mass publics who gathered to see them. Like 
the  hydroelectric dams that The River promoted, sound documentary films like it 
represented some of the most cutting-edge mass-media technologies of the time. 
Seventy years later, this slot has been filled by the Internet. While the information 
agnosticism of the Internet’s design stipulates no difference between the types of 
data it carries—all packets are created equal—in the information economy of re-
covery.gov, data as data takes precedent over image as data. The site certainly does 
contain images both still and moving, but these clearly play a supporting role in 
relation to the data visualizations that are its main focus. The vast majority of the 
site’s three and a half hours of video, for example, are dedicated to tutorials on 
using the site’s data interface. Hence, most of the images the website presents are, 
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Figure 5.3. Data visual-
ization in The River and on 
recovery.gov.
ironically,  images of the website itself: screen captures, frame grabs, and so on. 
Both texts seek to “show” people what the government is doing to address their 
problems. But in earlier era, this meant photographic evidence. In the contemporary 
era, it means empirical evidence.
If data thus provides the core of the evidentiary claims that support the larger 
political argument the site levies, it also embodies the specific elements that form 
its basic narrative structure. Rather than the textual narration of the voiceover 
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heard on The River’s recorded soundtrack (groundbreaking technology itself at 
the time), recovery.gov’s temporal beginning, middle, and end are laid out on the 
horizontal time axis of the charts and graphs detailing the allotment of funds and 
the completion of projects. While this varies depending on the particular statisti-
cal lens one chooses to use, the site’s focus on procedures like funding allotment 
and project tracking means that one nearly always encounters graphs trending in 
an upward direction as they move toward completion, subtly implying notions of 
uplift and progress as time moves forward. This impression is both reinforced and 
potentially predetermined by the framing the site’s title provides. “Recovery” in a 
general sense refers to a process of moving from a diminished state to an improved 
state one had previously inhabited; but used in its noun form in this context, it also 
implies that this process is an object that might be purchased and put on display. 
While a given chart might be labeled “Funds Allocated by the Department of Edu-
cation,” the larger channel of transmission continually reminds its audience that 
what they are seeing is the recovery of the US economy from one of the greatest 
economic threats it has ever faced.
The site’s “Lights-On Map” in particular demonstrates the combination of 
ethos, pathos, and logos at work in the broader rhetorical framework of recov-
ery.gov as a documentary corpus. Created by Edward Tufte as part of his role on 
the advisory board for Obama’s data and transparency initiatives, the piece was 
a map-based visualization covering the disbursement of funds allocated through 
the spending program. The map itself depicts the outline of the continental Unit-
ed States, with Alaska and Hawaii in an unscaled inset below the southwestern 
border. Dark, neon-blue land masses are set against a black background, evoking 
well-known satellite images of the earth at night. This impression is reinforced as 
a series of over 150,000 tungsten-yellow points begin to slowly illuminate different 
areas on the map, each corresponding to a disbursement of funds for one of the re-
covery projects. As they appear, the visualization strongly conveys the impression 
of city lights coming on, illuminating the darkness cast across nation. Two insets 
further illuminate the map’s scope and purpose. The first is a text box over the 
northern border that describes what the map depicts; the second is a small chart 
that indicates spending dates and dollar totals for those dates, the total trending in 
an upward direction. The entire animation lasts less than a minute, even though 
final version spans four years and tracks $285 billion in funding.
Although largely respected within the design community, Tufte’s map was 
greeted with muted enthusiasm in professional design circles.63 Many thought he 
had overly simplified the information by making every point of light equal one 
award (regardless of its size) and missed a huge opportunity to make the graphic 
interactive with the mountain of data underlying it. It had, in other words, em-
phasized style over substance, committing in the process a number of the errors 
that Tufte himself so often decried in his many books and lectures on good design.
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While not inaccurate, these critiques miss the larger rhetorical and historical 
work the map’s aesthetic features reveal. The overt connection between spend-
ing money and bringing illumination to a space of darkness connects Keynes-
ian economics with Enlightenment rationality and visual transparency. It further 
draws in metaphorical connections between the phrase “keeping the lights on,” 
with its colloquial meaning of supporting struggling businesses, and the govern-
ment’s support of local economies and projects through the stimulus spending. As 
the animation progresses and the entire United States is illuminated, it draws on 
historical connections with the New Deal projects that The River had evangelized, 
including the Public Works Administration (which supported the construction 
of public infrastructure projects to generate electricity, among other things) and 
the Rural Electrification Administration (which supported extending electrical 
service to remote areas). Tufte’s “Lights-On Map” might not have been the most 
data rich or interactive of the visualizations that appeared in the “Map Gallery” on 
recovery.gov, but it did aesthetically connect the policies behind the site’s creation 
with the most ambitious efforts of Roosevelt’s New Deal.
Beyond its evidentiary and narrative capacities, the overall site’s transparency 
purposes bear out the extent of the government’s faith in data’s documentary ca-
pabilities. In addition to convincing people of the effectiveness of the program, the 
site also seeks to enlist the public’s help in safeguarding these funds. By exposing 
the data to public scrutiny, any instances of “waste, fraud and abuse” will be high-
lighted and addressed. This implies a one-to-one correspondence between what’s 
represented in the data and what’s taking place in reality. This is a far more ambi-
tious claim to transparency than the one advanced by the champions of film and 
Figure 5.4. Edward Tufte’s “Lights-On Map.”
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photography. Certainly a film might succeed in uncovering some level of malfea-
sance or graft via hidden-camera techniques of the sort pioneered by filmmakers 
like Nick Broomfield. But a project like recovery.gov claims to have already sup-
plied all the relevant information. Wrongdoing in one instance must be captured; 
in the other, it need only be uncovered. It is only through the sort of totalizing 
archive of documentation that such claims might be made.
One final note worth mentioning on the documentary efforts of recovery.gov 
relates to the appropriateness of selecting data visualization as medium to ex-
plore this particular subject. The 2008 financial crisis revealed the nature of post-
Fordist capitalism for ordinary observers. Starting with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and continuing on through the collapse of the US housing market, the 
“credit crunch” faced by major US banks, and various other  cascading factors 
and effects, what slowly became apparent was the completely intangible nature 
of money and wealth in the modern global economy. While money itself has 
always been an abstraction of sorts based on various forms of value created 
through labor and the exchange of goods and services, this abstraction took on 
an extreme form in the various exotic financial instruments that were partially 
blamed with causing the crisis in the first place. In an odd way, this level of ab-
straction found its perfect corollary in the data visualizations on recovery.gov. 
Though intended to document the process of repairing the damage to people’s 
jobs and lives, quantitative visual media of this sort also ideally reflect the intan-
gible nature of the information-based economy that caused the damage itself. 
While this data was intended to be a gateway to the multitude of real-world 
projects on which the money was spent, viewed cynically, it might appear to of-
fer data as the solution itself.
DATA.GOV
Launched several months after recovery.gov, on May 21, 2009, data.gov was in-
tended to be a clearinghouse for all of the government data sets already being 
collected by the different agencies that make up the federal government. Unlike 
the event-driven nature of recovery.gov, data.gov was intended to provide a per-
manent access point for the release of US government data, and hence remains 
online nearly a decade after its launch. Prior to its creation, the default approach 
to information sharing by federal agencies was typically to err on the side of se-
crecy, owing either to legitimate concerns over national security and individual 
privacy or to a more general fear that such information could lead to criticism or 
embarrassment by the agency that collected it.64 As the White House’s own blog 
described the situation: “For years, agencies have collected data in support of their 
particular missions. But before the ubiquitous use of technology, data often sat in 
filing cabinets and agency basements.”65 Even when agencies did release informa-
tion, it often took the form of reports published in PDF format or as charts and 
graphs without any of the underlying data exposed, neither of which could be read 
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by computers and other programs that might put the data to use. While this may 
have given agencies the sense that they were being open with their data, from a 
technological perspective it was no different than if they had been sitting in a base-
ment or filing cabinet.
Responding to the president’s memorandum on transparency, the release of 
the Open Government Directive in December of 2009 put in place official poli-
cies dictating how agencies should handle their existing data. Agencies were not 
only reminded of the three principles set out by the president (“transparency, par-
ticipation and collaboration”) but were also given a primer on the value of these 
principles, with details like: “Transparency promotes accountability by providing 
the public with information about what the Government is doing.”66 In addition 
to setting forth these general principles, the document sought to change the very 
culture of each agency, claiming:
To increase accountability, promote informed participation by the public, and cre-
ate economic opportunity, each agency shall take prompt steps to expand access to 
information by making it available online in open formats. With respect to informa-
tion, the presumption shall be in favor of openness (to the extent permitted by law 
and subject to valid privacy, confidentiality, security, or other restrictions).67
The document also put in place specific deadlines each agency had to meet in  order 
to be considered “in compliance” with the directive. These included  milestones 
like placing three high-value data sets online within three months (which would 
then link back up to the data.gov site), as well as goals for targeting and publishing 
all of the data an agency collected. In order to hold the agencies accountable, the 
Open Government Initiative set up a dashboard measuring each agency on ten 
different benchmarks.68
The idea of creating a specific goal tied to a transparent progress report seems 
to have worked. When Data.gov launched prior to the directive, it featured just 47 
different data sets. On its one-year anniversary, this number had grown to 250,028, 
and by the end of two years it was well over 379,000.69 The site as it currently stands 
is a teeming mass of information, featuring lists of everything from the “Failed 
Bank List” published by the FDIC to the “Farmer’s Market GEODATA” list put 
out by the Department of Agriculture. Although the updates in the site’s various 
sections are admittedly uneven (the “Climate” section, for example, has had no 
updates since 2015, reflecting the priorities of the Trump administration EPA), 
many agencies are still publishing data on the site long after Obama has left office. 
Alongside all of the data sets are tools for viewing the data in different visualiza-
tions (charts, graphs, maps, timelines) as well as options for downloading the raw 
data in machine-readable formats (.csv and .xls). Beyond this, an “Applications” 
section featuring a number of ready-made tools and visualizations enables visitors 
to utilize the data and share their interpretations with one another, and a “Com-
munity” forum allows people to provide help to one another on using the site and 
feedback to the agencies for improvement.70
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At first glance, it’s difficult to see what use all of this data might be put to. In 
essence, this is part of data.gov’s strategy. Rather than trying to anticipate what 
might be useful for people, the site is designed to give users complete access and 
allow them the freedom to create new views on the data by filtering and combining 
data sets to reveal insights. Responding to criticism that the site was too intimidat-
ing for average users (as one gender-biased review put it, it failed the “mom test”), 
visualization tools were added so that users could interact with the data right in 
their browsers and then save and share their visualizations with other users.71 To 
further the aim of innovation and accessibility, agencies were required to create 
apps that visitors could use to navigate the data in meaningful ways, and sever-
al contests have been held by outside groups seeking to test the site’s usefulness. 
Sunlight Labs, a project of the Sunlight Foundation, for example, held an “Apps 
for America” contest, which solicited projects from the community and awarded 
prizes for the best submissions.
Early on, the data.gov website had some high-profile successes—both in a gen-
eral, public way and behind the scenes. Some apps, like Airport Status Service, 
enabled travelers to determine in real time whether a particular airport was ex-
periencing delays, providing small conveniences to citizens. Others, like Hospital 
Report Card, enabled them to make important health-care-related decisions and 
push hospitals to improve their levels of care.72 Behind the scenes, as agencies be-
gan standardizing and sharing data, some unexpected conveniences also emerged. 
The Department of Education (DOE) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for 
example, found that by sharing data they could allow users to prepopulate the 
DOE’s FAFSA (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) with information from 
their electronically filed income-tax returns.73 Such things have the potential to 
be of enormous benefit to citizens simply by making data the government already 
has available to the public. All of these tools are designed to make the data that 
Foucault once deemed an essential tool of the nineteenth-century sovereign open 
to the twenty-first-century citizen.
For the most part, however, data.gov remains more of a potential benefit to citi-
zens than an actual one. While it is still relatively new, the site has generated two 
well-placed criticisms that raise significant transparency issues. The first of these is 
the basic trade-off in the flexibility of completely unformatted data (what’s referred 
to as wholesale data) and the more user-friendly but less flexible prepackaged data 
(retail data). Given varying levels of technological fluency, raw data will be unus-
able for most people. Put another way, it remains opaque rather than transparent. 
But retail data in the form of user-friendly charts and graphs flies in the face of the 
entire ethos of open-government initiatives by creating a layer of mediation be-
tween the information and its audience.74 This conundrum between direct access 
to unfiltered material and legibility for the average user is the same one confronted 
by advocates of the Direct Cinema school in the United States. Eschewing 
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manipulative intervention in favor of “fly on the wall” filmmaking without inter-
views, voiceover, or expository intertitles, figures like Frederick Wiseman none-
theless implicitly rely heavily on skillful editing and camerawork to shape their 
material into a comprehensible form. While the trade-off achieved a certain level 
of formal purity, it opened its adherents to charges of duplicity nonetheless.75
While proponents of transparency and open government tend to favor some 
combination of both methods (which data.gov offers), allowing a completely free 
and open interpretation of the data runs a significant risk of error and misinforma-
tion. Even supposedly user-friendly applications that make use of data.gov, such as 
datamasher.org, require a basic understanding of the way statistics work. The site, 
which won the Sunlight Labs “Apps for America” contest and is often held up as an 
example of the power that data.gov opens up, allows users to combine any two data 
sets, such as poverty levels and high school graduation rates, on a national map to 
reveal correlations between different facets of social life in the United States.76 But 
the potential for misapplication of the tool’s parameters and hence misinterpreta-
tion of the data is readily apparent. To use our previous examples, consider a map 
that correlates the location of local farmers’ markets with failed banks, claiming to 
demonstrate some relationship between the two. While a numerical relationship 
between the data would be easy to map using the tools the app provides, it would 
be difficult to claim that any causal connection had been revealed. The simplicity 
with which these visualizations can be created, and their connections to supposed 
“facts” about the world, mask a complexity in the science underlying the meaning-
ful information we always hope such things will provide.
Moreover, as these tools and visualizations migrate off of the data.gov website 
and into the blogs and forums where political discourse increasingly takes place, it 
becomes conceivable that numbers might be found to support any range of politi-
cally loaded interpretations. Kundra once claimed that he aspired to make data.
gov so easy to use and share that it would play a role on blogs the way YouTube 
does, implicitly equating data evidence with moving-image evidence.77 The open-
source ethos Kundra brought to the project holds that any egregious misuse of 
information will be spotted and quickly corrected as it is in the Wikipedia model, 
where users act as editors and fact checkers for one another. But in the paranoid 
and relatively polarized atmosphere of online political discourse, it is equally plau-
sible that such corrections will themselves be quickly dismissed. While the poten-
tial for misuse certainly isn’t a reason to avoid providing the information in the 
first place, it is a cause to question the utopian aims to which the site aspires.
The second, equally serious criticism that data.gov faces deals with data that 
doesn’t appear on the site. Many open-government proponents question the ex-
tent to which relatively useless data is giving the government the appearance of 
transparency even as the material most important for fostering greater account-
ability is left off of the site. This problem became an acute reality when the Trump 
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administration took office. Transparency watchdogs were concerned about his ap-
parent indifference to open-government initiatives more broadly and his outright 
hostility to specific factual data (like climate data) that conflicted with his policies. 
Sounding the alarm, many began archiving data before it disappeared from federal 
websites. While the widespread fears of “Trump’s War on Data” did not come to 
pass in the manner that many feared, the anxiety created revealed the underlying 
fragility of the framework itself.78 Data may not have been removed, but many of 
the sections within Data.gov haven’t been updated since 2015, and there is nothing 
to prevent their future removal. As noted in the discussion of Second Life in the 
previous chapter, the Internet and digital platforms provide an effective means of 
making things instantly available to a widespread portion of the public, but the 
trade-off is what Wendy Chun refers to as an “enduring ephemerality.”79 Digital 
objects online can be available to everyone in one instant but gone forever in the 
next.
The inherent problem with gauging progress toward transparency is that most 
citizens and independent groups don’t know the extent of the government’s infor-
mation holdings to begin with. As Ellen Miller of Sunlight Labs put it, “We don’t 
like high-value data that involves [things like] wild horse counts. . . . We suspect 
they have data that would be of more interest to citizens.”80 As Aliya Sternstein 
points out, this might include information like which sections of private industry 
had been cited by the government for failing to meet public safety standards.81 
The paradox that all open-government initiatives quickly hit upon is that without 
complete and total transparency, it is difficult to gauge just how transparent the 
government is actually being. And yet, issues like national security and individual 
privacy do dictate the need for some “defense of secrecy,” even if such concerns are 
often overblown.82
The Obama administration proved itself open to the criticism surroundings 
its new initiatives and capable of responding, when it decided to act, with at least 
a version of the “change” it promised. For example, after an extensive audit of 
open-data programs timed to coincide with the celebration of “Sunshine Week” 
in March of 2010, the National Security Archive’s executive director, Tom Blanton, 
stated, “The Obama Administration deserves an ‘A’ for effort but an ‘Incomplete’ 
for results.”83 Sensitive to the criticism, the administration quickly announced on 
its blog a redoubling of its efforts, providing a “Tour of the Horizon,” which reiter-
ated that “transparency is one of the core principles of democracy.”84 The result was 
the launch of 2.0 versions for many of its sites that addressed the concerns brought 
by the administration’s critics. But in an odd twist of irony, the technology-driven 
principles of transparency would be quickly put to the test by another open-gov-
ernment initiative, one operating outside of the Washington, D.C., beltway and 
headed not by an Obama appointee but instead by self-appointed activist-anar-
chist Julian Assange.
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WIKILEAKS
The months following Sunshine Week 2010 would indeed be, as the White House 
blog predicted, “chock full of examples of concrete efforts—not lip service—to 
making open government happen.”85 However, these efforts were in large part the 
result of a collaboration between Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning to release 
several hundred thousand classified documents and other media from the US gov-
ernment’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or SIPRNet.86 As if heeding 
Obama’s call for transparency, collaboration, and participation, the government’s 
open data was at once hit upon by a number of groups utilizing a range of new 
techniques to analyze, visualize, and make sense of the avalanche of information. 
As the ensuing drama and debate over WikiLeaks played out, a number of the 
groups that supported the Obama administration’s initial open-government ef-
forts once again stepped up to support the new poster child of transparency, in the 
process creating an uneasy juxtaposition between idealistic government bureau-
crats on one hand and renegade anarchist whistle-blowers on the other. In spite of 
clear legal and procedural differences, however, the two groups shared a belief in 
the need for governmental transparency and a clear faith in technology as the best 
means of achieving this.
Any discussion of WikiLeaks and its role in the transparency movement con-
fronts several potential problems. The first is the overidentification of the organi-
zation with its complicated and controversial founder, Julian Assange. Even his 
most ardent defenders and allies admit that Assange is an overbearing, attention-
seeking figure prone to taking credit for the entire transparency movement. As 
accounts like Daniel Domscheit-Berg’s Inside WikiLeaks make clear, both the or-
ganization and Assange himself benefited from a broad array of actors working to-
ward the same ends.87 The second problem is the overidentification of WikiLeaks 
with the series of massive data leaks that have come to characterize the era of 
big data itself. These include incidents across a broad spectrum, from Edward 
Snowden’s shocking revelation that the National Security Agency was spying on 
US citizens to the incompetent release of personal credit information by Equifax 
in 2016. While WikiLeaks played an important role early on, as I will demonstrate 
here, not all leaks are politically, ethically, and materially equal, nor are they all 
the result of WikiLeaks . And finally, WikiLeaks itself has shifted radically from its 
early politically ambivalent anarchist stance to one more directly focused on shap-
ing existing government structures through election influencing.88 While I believe 
WikiLeaks deserves a great deal of credit for pushing the transparency debate in 
2010, I would also caution against a simple celebration of the impact that it has had 
on democratic governance over the past decade.
Although WikiLeaks had been on the fringes of the activist and hacker com-
munities for several years prior to 2010, its largest leaks had focused on fraud in 
private entities like the European banking giant Julius Baer and on political cor-
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ruption in places like Kenya and Peru.89 The organization had attained a reputation 
among hackers and transparency advocates for creating technology that would al-
low anyone to securely and anonymously upload large caches of previously secret 
data for publication on its servers. Its early successes also earned it the attention 
and appreciation of both the media and the nonprofit sectors, which recognized its 
positive disruptive potential for information freedom and social justice.
Throughout this early phase, WikiLeaks seems to have largely positioned itself 
as a basic conduit for information, publishing any and all contributions it deemed 
authentic and leaving the interpretation and investigation of the material up to 
journalists and activists. The site attempted to bring principles from the open-
source software movement like community collaboration (memorably expressed 
in Linus Torvalds’s “with enough eyes, all bugs are shallow”) and open information 
exchange (Stewart Brand’s equally memorable “information wants to be free”) to 
the practice of whistle-blowing and investigative journalism. In April 2010, how-
ever, WikiLeaks began a series of high-profile leaks that would eventually earn it 
intense international legal and media scrutiny. The leaks, taken from classified US 
government databases, related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and US diplo-
macy around the globe. Sensational as these releases were, the subsequent treat-
ment of the source material itself reveals a great deal about the peril and promise 
of total informational freedom. While WikiLeaks and the trials of its controversial 
founder, Julian Assange, became a model for lofty goals like freedom of speech and 
governmental transparency in the age of the Internet, the migration of the leaked 
material across the media forced these ideals to confront reality.
C OLL ATER AL MURDER
The first of its high-profile leaks—the Collateral Murder video—was released by 
WikiLeaks on April 5, 2010, on the site’s main page and on a connected site set 
up by WikiLeaks (http://www.collateralmurder.com). Both sites featured a set of 
videos drawn from an encrypted video file the site had received several months 
earlier captured by a camera mounted on the gunsight of an Apache helicopter 
in Iraq. The footage shows the helicopter shooting and killing eighteen people, 
including two Reuters journalists, and wounding two young children.90 After vet-
ting the footage to ensure its authenticity and sending people to Iraq to conduct 
interviews and notify relatives of the victims, WikiLeaks broke the footage into 
several versions. Among these was the original thirty-eight minutes of almost un-
edited material and a second, shorter version that excerpted relevant portions of 
the film and included both a prologue and an epilogue to the footage to provide 
context. In a possibly prescient move, this shorter version also solicited donations 
for the organization itself. Both films are accompanied by radio transmissions 
between the crew of the helicopter and soldiers on the ground. Although not 
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exactly graphic, the footage is nonetheless horrifying to watch and troubling on 
a multitude of  levels—not least because of the fact that, regardless of the context, 
it depicts violent death on a scale and in a manner that few Americans are ever 
forced to confront.
As an example of the WikiLeaks style of technological transparency, the Collat-
eral Murder footage is something of an anomaly. In spite of the attention the film 
generated with its release in April of 2010, it seems to have been virtually forgot-
ten in the wake of other subsequent high-profile leaks. These included the Iraq 
and Afghanistan war diaries and, of course, the now infamous “Cablegate” release, 
which exposed the dirty laundry of the State Department in a cache of diplomatic 
cables sent back and forth between various embassies and Washington. In all of 
the press surrounding the US diplomatic cables, the Collateral Murder film barely 
rates a mention except as part of the “other material” allegedly released by US 
Army Private Chelsea Manning through her access to the government’s SIPRNet. 
Moreover, its status as video footage taken from a single incident sets it apart from 
the other WikiLeaks releases, which have almost exclusively consisted of docu-
ment collections spanning broader time frames. And yet, there is a great deal this 
film and its treatment reveal, not only about the status of visual media and visible 
evidence in the information age, but also about the value of information more gen-
erally for citizens in the democracy where the political debates around WikiLeaks 
played out.
As was noted at the time, the shortened version of the film represented some-
thing of a departure for WikiLeaks. Until this point, WikiLeaks had contented 
itself with summarizing and contextualizing the information it released but left 
the material itself entirely unaltered. With Collateral Murder, however, the released 
version of the film approached something closer to an analysis of the raw footage, 
thereby partially editorializing a particular interpretation. The move was criticized 
on two fronts. One set of critics felt WikiLeaks hadn’t simply contextualized and 
interpreted the shooting, but rather had misrepresented it entirely by leaving out 
certain mitigating details, including the possession of weapons by several members 
of the group fired upon by the helicopter.91 A second set of critics felt WikiLeaks 
had overstepped its role as a self-branded leaker of information and had become 
something more akin to a news organization rather than a simple conduit con-
necting sources of information with the public. Even Steven Colbert, in a rare 
moment of seriousness, confronted Assange on the issue, stating: “You have edited 
this tape, and you have given it a title called Collateral Murder. That’s not leaking, 
that’s a pure editorial.”92 Assange, both here and elsewhere, justified the move by 
stating that part of WikiLeaks’s promise to its sources included generating what 
he called “maximum political impact” with the information it released—an aim 
echoed in statements by other members of the organization.93 While this usually 
meant partnering with journalists at major news organizations like the New York 
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Times, Der Spiegel, The Guardian, and others, in this case WikiLeaks took on the 
job itself. In doing so, WikiLeaks wasn’t playing the role of editor or journalist, but 
rather the role of filmmaker. In doing so, what it created was a documentary.
The case for claiming Collateral Murder as a documentary is a fairly straight-
forward one. Whether we take John Grierson’s oft-repeated if equally contested 
definition of documentary as “the creative treatment of actuality”94 or Bill Nich-
ols’s more recent reworking that it “tell[s] stories with evidence and argument,” 
documentary is generally accepted to consist, in varying degrees, of a creative or 
critical interpretation of events in the historical world, often with the intent of 
convincing viewers to accept this particular version of events as “true”—loaded as 
that last term may be. Regardless of the degree of nuance these definitions leave 
out, or the expansive domains into which documentary scholars and practitioners 
have recently pushed the canon, Collateral Murder clearly fits comfortably within 
these boundaries.
As evidence of this, consider the film’s opening intertitles, which situate the 
footage historically and cast it within a particular critical frame. After a quote by 
George Orwell about the speciousness of political language,95 we’re given a brief 
synopsis of the event and informed that two of the men killed, Saeed Chmagh 
and Namir Noor-Eldeen, were Reuters news reporters, and we’re shown images 
of both. We’re then told that Reuters petitioned the US government to release the 
video under the Freedom of Information Act, and the ominous final title declares, 
“[T]his video has not been released . . . until now.”
In documentary terms, this opening segment is clearly doing a great deal of 
work, or what we might call, after Jonathan Kahana, intelligence work.96 It or-
ganizes the field of knowledge by orienting it both specifically—this particular 
event, these individuals—and generally, via the Orwell quote, as part of the larger 
struggle between truth and lies in political discourse. The pathos-laden back-
ground information on the reporters—that both were respected, talented, and, 
in Chmagh’s case, survived by a wife and children—cements the event’s status as 
a genuine tragedy. Indeed, this implicit emotional framework becomes explicit in 
the first still image we see of Chmagh, an image itself framed in the grief of the son 
who clutches it to his chest. Lest we miss the point, the film’s very title has already 
rendered judgment on the event by declaring it not simply a tragedy but one in-
volving murder—an overt allegation calling for a judicial response that would hold 
those responsible for the killing accountable for their actions.
Outside of the prologue and the title, the film goes on to annotate and edit its 
source material in a variety of ways, including cutting out nearly half of the video’s 
original length, enlarging the image at specific points to highlight specific details, 
and supplementing its on-screen information with labels and arrows that identify 
certain figures and details in the frame even as the filmmakers, controversially, 
ignore others. These alterations and annotations further cement the piece’s status 
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as a documentary. Most of the footage left out of the shortened version of the film 
contains a second offensive by the helicopter crew some twenty minutes later in 
which three missiles are fired into a building believed to contain enemy fighters 
and weapons. As Raffi Katchadourian reported in the New Yorker, this second at-
tack was arguably the bigger story, and a more open-and-shut violation of the 
“rules of engagement” followed by the US military.97 While WikiLeaks may have 
passed up the opportunity for a second “smoking gun,” the omission yields a more 
coherent “beginning, middle, and end” structure that works in the service of—to 
return to the definition of documentary—telling a story with evidence and argu-
ment. Simply put, this is what separates the document of the raw footage from the 
documentary nature of Collateral Murder.
These alterations of the footage also evince a need to clarify for the viewer de-
tails that would not otherwise be evident—a need that points to a curious indexi-
cal duality inherent in the source footage itself. In terms of rendering the event vis-
ible for its viewers, the source footage offers both too much and too little. On one 
hand, its original purpose has endowed the footage with a wealth of informational 
artifacts visible on-screen: the camera’s position in space, its angle relative to the 
horizon, the exact center of the frame, the time of day, and so forth. And yet, for 
us as viewers, all of this information is relatively meaningless. On the other hand, 
the resolution of the image is far too poor to yield the relevant details that we care 
about in our attempts to understand what is happening. As evidence of the foot-
age’s insufficiency, we might consider the failure of both the pilot and the gunner 
to distinguish between a weapon and a camera, both of which were actually pres-
ent on the scene. The disturbing nature of the footage comes not from the images 
themselves, but rather from our secondary knowledge about what they depict. 
Ironically, the maximum political impact that WikiLeaks sought comes almost 
entirely from the context surrounding the leaked material, of which the material 
itself is a fairly faint signifier.
If Collateral Murder is operating here as a documentary film, one with a clear 
political position and a set interpretation of events, Colbert was right to distin-
guish between what he called “leaking” and the “straight editorial” of the film. 
The editorial section has of course traditionally been that portion of the broadcast 
where the unreachable ideal of objectivity is momentarily cast aside and the sourc-
es of the text are able to voice their particular opinions. As a contrast, for example, 
more traditionally objective treatments of the material were offered by every major 
news outlet, from Al Jazeera to Democracy Now!’s Amy Goodman.98
What seems less obvious, however, is why this additional layer of mediation 
was needed at all. Journalism’s traditional role within a liberal democracy is put-
ting eyes and ears on the ground where citizens can’t be to provide them with 
the information they will need to make informed choices. As Ulrich Keller has 
demonstrated, it was at the exact moment in the nineteenth century when war 
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was no longer waged as public spectacle that the war correspondent was born.99 If, 
as the rhetoric surrounding it claims, WikiLeaks can “transparently” connect the 
“source” of the information with the public, why has the middle man persisted?100
On one level, the answer is obvious and borne out readily enough in Collat-
eral Murder. As the film demonstrates, the raw information itself is anything but 
readily intelligible. And if the average viewer can’t understand what’s going on 
in forty minutes of video footage without help, then she or he stands even less 
chance when the object of consideration is vastly more complex—say, a cache 
of ninety thousand documents. This is what makes the Collateral Murder video 
emblematic of the problems posed by the larger WikiLeaks project. Even with 
direct access to a visual recording of a single event, the need for interpretation, 
and hence mediation, is immediately apparent. In this sense, the public relies 
on journalists and filmmakers to process the information so that it can be made 
accessible to a general audience. By offering multiple versions, WikiLeaks is just 
fulfilling its desire to create what it calls “scientific journalism” by placing the 
original evidence alongside the analysis so that viewers might consult it to arrive 
at their own conclusions. But on another level, we might wonder if this leaves us 
any better off than we were before.
At the heart of what WikiLeaks offers is the belief that contained somewhere 
within organizational and institutional archives is information that can and 
should be made public, with the promise of justice, accountability, and, ulti-
mately, truth on the other side. Steeped in the Enlightenment faith of reason’s 
ability to deliver one to the truth and reminiscent of the eighteenth-century de-
bate on the freedom of the press, it should come as no surprise that this promise 
is at once alluring and controversial.101 Indeed, the term “scientific journalism” 
itself belies an uncritical faith that, simply provided with the evidence, all ratio-
nal individuals might arrive at the same conclusions. Both sides of the transpar-
ency debate are in agreement on this connection between evidence and universal 
truth. Their disagreement stems from one side’s belief that the public has a right 
to access the information and the other side’s willingness to accept government 
secrecy as a valid trade-off for some other good—presumably, security. Whether 
the release of information is seen as liberating or threatening, however, the belief 
in the “truth” of the leaks persists.
This same logic even extends to the radical left, where Slavoj Žižek claimed, in 
what can only be read as a parody of Donald Rumsfeld: “The real disturbance [of 
WikiLeaks’s release] was at the level of appearances: we can no longer pretend we 
don’t know what everyone knows we know.”102 For Žižek, the truth contained in 
the disclosures isn’t the mundane truth that this or that injustice occurred in the 
midst of war, which is already known even without direct evidence. Rather, Žižek’s 
interest lies in what he refers to as the true face of the power wielded over us by the 
state: the power to commit murder or wage war and lie about it. This is a truth that 
is “made more shameful by being publicized.”103
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Indeed, the same sentiments were echoed with another high-profile release of 
secret materials from an unlocked archive—in this case, the Abu Ghraib images 
that emerged from the cameras of Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman in 2006. 
In relation to those images, Judith Butler argued that they, and the illicit manner 
in which they escaped, were a striking counterexample to the ongoing battle by the 
state to regulate the field of intelligibility for the public through its policies of em-
bedded reporting.104 For Butler, the problem of embedded journalism was the clear 
possibility that the journalist, the supposed objective party, would simply adopt 
the ideological viewpoint of the individual units or soldiers whose actions they 
were supposed to be covering.105 And this possibility has been borne out by several 
recent analyses of the practice.106 But alongside the high-profile role of reporters 
embedded within different units of the military there has also been a contingent 
of unilateral reporters covering the conflicts. Left on their own to cover the war as 
they see fit, these reporters are neither protected by the military nor subject to the 
subtle indoctrination this situation may create. Indeed, Chmagh and Noor-Eldeen 
were both operating unilaterally when they were killed, apparently attempting to 
cover events beyond the perspective, and hence the safety, of troop units mov-
ing through the area. Despite the long history of comparisons made between the 
camera and the gun, never has the connection between the two been so direct, so 
mistaken, and so tragic.
The irony, however, is that for all of the debate surrounding the role of both 
embedded and unilateral reporters covering wars, some of the most high-profile 
events have been the leaks themselves, from Abu Ghraib to WikiLeaks. If the re-
cent war in Iraq is, indeed, the “most covered war in history,”107 then the distinc-
tion owes as much to Julian Assange and Charles Graner as it does to journalists. 
And while Collateral Murder highlights the dangerous roles of both embedded 
and unilateral reporters on the ground, the next two WikiLeaks releases would 
bring a third type of journalist to prominence: the data journalist.
THE WAR LO GS:  IR AQ AND AFGHANISTAN
In spite of the attention Collateral Murder received, WikiLeaks was apparently just 
getting started. Over the course of the next few months, the video would be joined 
by several subsequent leaks of classified material, including what became known 
as “the Afghan War Diary” and “the Iraq War Logs” on July 25 and October 22, 
2010, respectively—collectively known as “the War Logs”—and a final release of 
US diplomatic cables on November 29, 2010. While each of these collections is 
unique and offers interesting points in its own right, I focus here on the War Logs 
collection for the contrasts it offers to both Collateral Murder and the US govern-
ment’s official transparency projects.108
Unlike its handling of Collateral Murder, WikiLeaks decided early on to partner 
with major news organizations for the War Logs, both to increase the impact of the 
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releases and to outsource the work involved in identifying the relevant information 
contained in the masses of data they offered. Shortly after the release of Collateral 
Murder, WikiLeaks contacted both The Guardian and Der Spiegel, offering them a 
scoop on the next set of data in exchange for a simultaneous publication date. (The 
Guardian eventually brought in the New York Times.) All three news organizations 
spent about a month decoding the cryptic terminology of the reports, verifying 
the data against other sources, and determining what material would be of public 
interest. On the day that WikiLeaks released the full dataset online, all three news 
sources went public with the reporting they had prepared over the prior month.
Looking at the data, what stands out immediately is the extent to which a pro-
fessional, third-party source is needed to interpret its contents and make it leg-
ible to a wider pubic. While the term “transparency” implies an unobstructed or 
unmediated connection between observer and subject, the War Logs demonstrate 
the necessity of several layers of mediation between the two. If the optical trans-
parency of Collateral Murder required basic identifying labels and arrows to clarify 
its contents, then the War Logs would need an outright translation. Of the approx-
imately ninety thousand documents it obtained, for example, the New York Times 
identified and published on its website a selection of the most relevant material 
(about two dozen documents, in total). A typical line from one of the documents 
reads:
JCC REPORTS THAT IP REPORTED THE IED STRIKE ON CF CIV VIC MB 
4265 9065. IP CLAIM THAT 1X LN AMBULANCE DRIVER WAS KILLED BY 
UNCONTROLLED SMALL ARMS FIRING BY THE CF CIV CONVOY AFTER 
THE IED STRIKE (SEE ASSOCIATIONS FOR DETAILS OF IED STRIKE). JCC 
NOTIFIED 4/101AA AND REQUESTED THAT THE CF PATROL AT THE SITE 
INVESTIGATE.109
Needless to say, this is hardly material that’s clear to anyone outside of the military 
communication channels in which this particular terminology is used. In addition 
to the necessity of decoding the terse acronyms and obscure identifiers (e.g., MB 
4265 9065), there is also the need to identify what of the underlying information 
is actually new. Both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were extensively covered by 
news media around the world with whatever degree of bias. This daily reporting 
had covered many of the daily events that the War Logs recapitulated. Much of the 
leaked information was, in other words, old news. Given the scale of the leaks and 
the quantity of outside information against which it could be cross-checked, it is 
no surprise that all three news organizations turned to “database experts” in order 
to “mine the data.”110 Thus, whatever level of truth these reports contained, it would 
apparently need to be unearthed by specialized machinery.
What was unearthed, it turns out, was at once surprising and unsurprising, 
at least in terms of the news media and its relation to the official and unofficial 
information coming from the government. The unsurprising aspect of both leaks 
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was the largely sensationless nature of the information they offered. Overall, the 
assessment of the three news organizations seems to be that the actual conflict was 
less promising than the official government assessment (“bleaker” in The Guard-
ian’s terms, “more grim” in the New York Times’s). Aside from several specific rev-
elations (e.g., that the Taliban likely used a surface-to-air missile rather than a 
rocket-propelled grenade in bringing down a US helicopter), the logs themselves 
reveal no smoking gun. In a post-Watergate, post–Iran-Contra era, this sort of 
official spin seemed to shock few. Ironically, the leak itself ultimately became the 
biggest story.
More surprising than the actual information contained in the War Logs was the 
coverage it received by the news organizations that had early access to it. Simply 
reading the headlines published by the three primary outlets, one would get the 
impression that the War Logs had unearthed the truth of combat itself. The Guard-
ian’s website, for example, claims in headlines that the War Logs offer “the un-
varnished picture” and “expose[s] the real war.”111 The New York Times’s coverage 
claims that the documents take us “Inside the Fog of War” and offer a “real-time 
history” of the conflict.112 On closer inspection, however, all three of the outlets 
carefully qualified and circumscribed the information contained in the reports. 
Der Spiegel, for example, included an FAQ section on its website, detailing all of 
the qualifiers that should be taken into account when going through the docu-
ments (level of classification, source, etc.). The New York Times, the most circum-
spect of the three, notes:
It is sometimes unclear whether a particular incident report is based on firsthand 
observation, on the account of an intelligence source regarded as reliable, on less 
trustworthy sources or on speculation by the writer. It is also not known what may 
be missing from the material, either because it is in a more restrictive category of 
classification or for some other reason.113
In short, the War Logs offer another account of the wars but not the account.
While the prospect of any definitive account is an impossibility, the cautious 
approach of the New York Times to the unofficially released official material is re-
flective of the uncertain nature of government transparency in general. So long as 
some information remains secret, a necessity argued for by all but the most radical 
advocates of transparency, there will always be the suspicion that true “truth” lies 
at an even deeper, more classified level. This sentiment echoes the concerns voiced 
by Ellen Miller of Sunlight Labs over data.gov cited earlier (“We suspect they have 
data that might be of more interest to citizens”). While any information may be 
potentially useful, the invisible information casts a shadow on the visible.
Outside of their narrative coverage of the War Logs’ material, both The Guard-
ian and the New York Times also put together interactive visualizations of the data 
they contained. Of these, The Guardian’s “IED” (short for “improvised explosive 
device”) visualization stands out as an excellent example of visualizations gener-
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ated from the War Logs’ data. Using data from the release of the Afghan War Di-
ary, The Guardian sifted out reports of IED attacks in the country and used the 
embedded dates and GPS information to place them on a time-layered map of 
Afghanistan. Different targets and casualties were represented using both size and 
color codes (red for civilians, blue for coalition troops; the smallest dot for zero to 
five casualties, the largest for twenty or more, etc.). Viewed on a website, the re-
sulting visualization can be played like a streaming video. Over the course of a few 
minutes, a map of Afghanistan is slowly dotted to reveal the number and location 
of IED attacks in a given time period.
In its own right, the visualization certainly opens up an interesting and other-
wise unseen aspect of the conflict. The dots, starting slowly at first and building to 
a sustained crescendo, reveal in their concentrated location and apparent simulta-
neity both the contested regions of the war (primarily the beltway between Kabul 
and Kandahar) and the coordinated efforts of the Taliban insurgents. Even to a 
relatively attentive viewer of the news from the period, these aspects of the conflict 
become clear through the visualization in a way that they had not been previously. 
Figure 5.5. Interactive IED visualization tool on The Guardian’s website. In a  multidimensional 
visualization like this, time and map location are overlaid with dots representing different 
attacks, with size representing the number of casualties and color representing the largest 
 classification of those injured or killed (civilians, soldiers, etc.).
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Seen thus, a surprising quantity of information is condensed and made accessible 
in a relatively short time frame.
But beyond this initial impression, the insight such visualizations offer doesn’t 
appear to penetrate very deeply. In other words, in spite of the quantity of informa-
tion it provides (this would qualify in Tufte’s terms as a “high resolution” graphic), 
such views of the event are hardly sufficient to understand the nature and meaning 
of the conflict itself outside of additional context. While one can certainly see that 
the number of IED attacks rises and falls at certain specific points, without ad-
ditional sources of information it becomes difficult to ascertain the importance of 
any particular development. Seen through the lens of visualization, the War Logs 
reveal another account of these two wars, but it is very far indeed from revealing 
a definitive or total account. Even transparency, it seems, threatens to further ob-
scure our view.
What remains most striking about the assertion of truth contained in the 
WikiLeaks material (both the video and the data) is the amazing capacity of the 
existing ideological frameworks to absorb this additional information as further 
evidence of their beliefs and move on. The left claimed that this material was evi-
dence of the injustice of these wars, while the right claimed that it was a regrettable 
consequence of them. The extreme left saw evidence of a larger ideology of Ameri-
can empire, and the extreme right saw an instance of justice served. In spite of the 
millions of points of data added by the releases, the discursive framework around 
the events they record hardly changed at all.
Lest it seem that I’m sliding the debate over into the realm of an all too easy 
postmodern relativism, let me stress that I’m not claiming that all of these posi-
tions are factually or ethically equivalent, but rather that, despite their mutually 
irreconcilable positions, they remained unchanged in the face of new informa-
tion. Nor am I claiming that transparency projects serve no purpose. As Micah 
Sifry points out, many such projects have achieved incremental improvements 
in government accountability.114 But while the transparency movement may un-
cover cases of overt corruption and political manipulation, its potential for radical 
change against dominant ideology seems fairly limited. We certainly know more 
after WikiLeaks, but it seems we don’t know any differently. In providing everyone 
direct access to the “truth,” it seems, everyone’s preexisting truths just become a 
little truer.
C ONCLUSION
Writing on his blog “net critique,” theorist, commentator, and sometimes agitator 
Geert Lovink published with Patrice Riemens what they called “Ten Theses on 
WikiLeaks.”115 Taken together, their observations amounted to an initial attempt to 
understand what WikiLeaks was by sidestepping the ongoing debate about wheth-
er or not WikiLeaks should be at all. The post contains a number of interesting 
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points, concluding that WikiLeaks (and organizations like it) amount to pilot proj-
ects in what will be an ongoing process of greater information overload. Insightful 
in their own right, their observations stand out even further in this context for 
the insight they offer on the US government’s transparency as well as the work of 
WikiLeaks. In their third thesis, for example, Lovink and Riemens point out that 
while WikiLeaks deserves credit for opening up US government archives, its ef-
forts cannot be seen as ushering in the “age of global transparency” that many have 
claimed, given the extent to which other equally large players (China and Rus-
sia, to name only two) remain beyond the grasp of whistle-blowing prowess. The 
same might easily be said of Obama’s open-government projects, which do a great 
deal to open up what is arguably already the world’s most scrutinized government. 
Important though these transparency initiatives are, they hardly lay out a map 
that other governments will follow. Lovink and Riemens’s point that WikiLeaks 
is a classic single-person organization (SPO), and hence rises and falls with the 
fortunes of its founder, might be translated with a few caveats to Obama himself. 
While data.gov survived into the Trump administration, nothing guarantees that 
a future administration will not summarily pull the plug in the name of security 
or cost-cutting or both.
While Assange and Obama are obviously not interchangeable, a closer inspec-
tion of both reveals the extent to which their efforts utilize surprisingly similar 
rhetoric to justify parallel projects that face identical challenges. Both official and 
unofficial transparency projects saw themselves as part of a larger open-source 
hacker ethos, working to provide raw material to the public to make whatever use 
of it they see fit. Both further neglect the essential role that the traditional appa-
ratus of investigative journalism must play in achieving any real insight from the 
information provided.116
The move to data transparency hence necessitates the embrace (or the reem-
brace) of visualization techniques to render and make sense of it. This move from 
image-based media (film and television) to data-based media (online databases, 
the Internet) represents a regime change of sorts that has been in the making for 
much of the last two centuries. Thus, much as François Arago and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes were establishing photographic images as the gold standard of objective 
observation and documentation in the mid–nineteenth century, quantitative data 
and their visual display were busy opening up this other window on the world 
more recently. Over the last century, the two fields have continued to develop 
alongside one another. The widespread diffusion of camera technology promises a 
panoramic if not panoptoconic view of the world as developments in digital tech-
nology continue to generate an exponentially expanding quantity of data about it.
Even as digital technology has continued to erode a faith in photography’s 
ability to unproblematically represent reality, a faith that was itself never entirely 
unquestioned, it has increased the role that data plays within it. Consider, for 
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 example, the extent to which debates about individual privacy have migrated from 
the fear that someone might optically witness and record one’s physical actions to 
the fear that someone might access the information these actions inadvertently left 
behind: credit-card transactions, health records, and so on. If Lovink and  Riemens 
are right in concluding that WikiLeaks is “a ‘pilot’ phase in an evolution towards a 
far more generalized culture of anarchic exposure, beyond the traditional  politics 
of openness and transparency,”117 then data visualization is the only means by 




Conspiracy Media and the Specter of “Fake News”
After the midterm elections in 2014, as the Obama administration’s second term 
wound down, the electoral calendar began looking ahead to the next election. 
Over the next two years one of the more remarkable presidential races in US 
history began to unfold, culminating on election night in November 2016 when 
something like a bomb went off in the American political system. Regardless of 
how one voted or which of the two major candidates one supported (if either), 
few anticipated that Donald Trump would win.1 As the professional political 
class, the news media, and the general public all scrambled to understand “What 
Happened”—to borrow Hillary Clinton’s phrase—multiple interpretations 
emerged to contextualize the implications of a Trump presidency and forecast its 
impact.2 For many, it seemed to signify a radical break from the semiprogressive 
policies and cultural shifts around greater health-care coverage, environmental 
regulation, and inclusive policies and protections for the LGBTQ community. For 
others, it was a backlash against these same policies and a widespread reaction to 
the growing political clout of groups such as Black Lives Matter—confirmation 
that America’s colonialist history of slavery and segregation was not as far in the 
past as many had thought.3 For still others, it signified the emergence of a new 
form of ethno-economic nationalism, confirmation that the further entrenchment 
of economic inequality was taking root around questions of race and citizenship.4 
Regardless, virtually everyone agreed that something new had surfaced in  American 
politics. With the surprise victory of President Trump to the White House, many felt 
that all of the accustomed frameworks and systems (journalism, democracy) were 
broken. Even “truth” was suspected to be in play.5
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Of course, the full historical implications of this event will take many years 
to play out and touch on many different dimensions of American political and 
cultural life. Seen in the context of the preceding chapters, however, the Trump 
victory functions more like the fulfillment or perhaps the culmination of the larger 
trends around digital culture, independent media production, and mainstream 
politics that began in the period after 9/11. This concluding chapter will situate 
the 2016 election within the larger narrative threads that this book has explored. 
In what follows, I will examine how the Trump presidency and the shift in politi-
cal culture that it signifies figure within an account of the evolution of nonfiction 
media as it evolved to incorporate and be subsumed by digital technology.
As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, post-9/11 political media and 
independent documentary both embraced digital technology in an attempt to find 
some novel form of expression capable of overcoming the discursive stalemate 
that set in with the ensuing war on terror. Be it the pervasive logic of computation 
in prominent documentary films (chapter 2) or the use of digital networks to fa-
cilitate film production and distribution (chapter 3), documentary filmmakers and 
their work seemed to be following a pattern that had historically played out several 
times before (chapter 1), even as this digital iteration led them to tools beyond the 
camera to produce nonindexical forms like video games, virtual environments, 
and data visualization (chapters 4 and 5). This period marked the moment when 
documentary became digital—not simply because of a material shift in produc-
tion or distribution but because of a wider cultural shift in the world that these 
artists and activists were documenting. As early adopters who explored the limits 
and the capabilities of these newly emergent technologies, these media makers’ 
digital documentaries prefigured and shaped some of the more emblematic quali-
ties of digital culture, including a faith in data and the rapid, widespread adoption 
of social media.
Thus far the narrative has pursued two primary, interrelated threads. The first 
largely focused on the efforts of progressive activists on the left seeking to counter 
the apparent ascendancy of the conservative right. The second chronicled the ex-
tent to which digital technology eclipsed and enveloped virtually every other form 
of media. For some observers, these developments were necessarily connected, 
and President Obama’s 2012 reelection seemed to signal a decisive victory on both 
fronts. It was seen by many of his supporters as proof that his first election hadn’t 
been merely the result of an aberrant reaction to the 2008 financial crisis and was 
instead evidence of a larger shift toward a more progressive political environment 
on issues of race, foreign relations, and the role of the federal government. For oth-
ers, the account of how he won was equally important evidence of the superiority 
of a newly decentralized and digitized approach to using data for campaigning and 
governing.6 Among those digital utopians inclined to interpret the material base 
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of digital technology as a progressive, liberating force of individual empowerment 
and democratizing potential, 2012 was a victory not just for the president but for 
technology itself.7
Of course, this was only half of the story, and the 2016 election demonstrates 
just how mistaken, or perhaps premature, these conclusions were. The ascendancy 
of digital technology owes as much to outside historical forces as it does to any 
particular political philosophy. And the marginalized role of the progressive left 
in the aftermath of 9/11 explains its prominent position in several of the preceding 
chapters. Political documentary has always been a tool of the opposition, whether 
it was opposing fascism (as it was in the ’30s and ’40s) or heavy-handed institu-
tional narratives (as it was in the 1960s), championing the rise of AIDS activism 
in the face of official silence (the 1980s), or questioning the US government’s re-
sponse to an unfathomable terrorist attack after 9/11. In all of these moments, the 
opposition looked to new technology—be it sound, handheld cameras, video, or 
digital technology—as a way to revitalize the medium of documentary and coun-
ter the dominant discourse.
Rather than being an exclusive tool of the progressive left, however, digital 
technology and the documentary rhetoric of truth proved themselves, in 2016, 
to be open to any who cared to utilize them, regardless of their political leanings. 
Rather than a democratizing force capable of harnessing truth, digital technology 
proved to be a medium like any other. The demonstration of digital documentary 
as a medium capable of both truth and lies represents the point at which it became 
fully integrated within the documentary landscape. While it may have shattered 
the utopian hopes of some, in the context of this discussion Trump’s victory com-
pletes and, in many ways, reinforces the processes that we have been following 
throughout. The events of 2016 are thus an important part of this story.
The problem, however, in confronting any narrative of the 2016 presidential 
election is that the narrative is one of multiple truths—not in a real sense, but 
as perceived in the minds of the electorate and expressed in the various media 
sources that attempted to inform and persuade it. That is, the “true” story is the 
presence of multiple stories, multiple levels of truth, and conflicting, contradictory 
versions of events. This fragmentation stems from two interlocking developments 
that connect to the larger ideas this book has been exploring. The first is the rise 
of conspiracy theory, and what I’ll refer to as “conspiracy media,” throughout the 
early 2000s. While conspiracy theorizing itself is nothing new, and not necessar-
ily something negative, the post-9/11 period accelerated conspiracy thinking in a 
manner that illuminates an interesting dimension of post-9/11 political organizing, 
and nonfiction media more generally. This trend culminated in the election of a 
candidate who first gained political prominence by promoting a conspiracy theory 
about the legitimacy of the sitting president (Barack Obama) and his birth nation. 
While “birtherism” was roundly rejected in the mainstream media, Donald Trump 
used his notoriety as a reality television star to promote the fringe belief, thereby 
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gaining entree to the political media and establishing a prominent brand of sen-
sational notoriety that would eventually help him (in part) win the presidency. 
Conspiracy media within this environment benefited from and fostered greater 
legitimacy for themselves through the same cultural, political, and technological 
shifts—discussed in the preceding chapters—that benefited independent docu-
mentary. As independent media that levy strong truth claims, critique existing 
institutional and political power, and seek to inform and persuade their audiences, 
conspiracy media occupy an important (if idiosyncratic) part of the spectrum of 
documentary media more broadly.
The second thread this chapter will explore is the emergence in 2016 of a new 
species of media outlet, one that I will refer to as a “midstream media outlet.” Us-
ing 2016 as a snapshot, I will explore the developments in the media landscape 
that produced one of the signature phrases of the 2016 election—“fake news”—and 
its origins in a more decentralized media landscape. Critiquing the mainstream 
news is, like conspiracy thinking and conspiracy media, nothing necessarily new. 
As chapter 3 demonstrated, the critique of Fox News was a pivotal issue in the 
hybrid experiments of left-wing groups like MoveOn, and Fox itself often posi-
tions its own approach as a remedy to what it calls the “biased” coverage on other 
networks. But in 2016, the topic became a central issue in the election. Indeed, cri-
tiquing the mainstream news became one of the signature moves of the midstream 
media outlets, a generation of news outlets that emerged online in the Obama 
years and that include names like Vox, FiveThirtyEight, Breitbart, and The Inter-
cept. Positioned between mainstream news media and more extreme outlets on 
the fringe, these midsize outlets gained a prominent visibility in the 2016 election. 
As with conspiracy thinking, their emergence upends a great deal of the estab-
lished thinking about the role of the news media and politics. Even in the context 
of digital media’s disruptive rise across all segments of contemporary culture, news 
media and the nature of the industry that provides it have been radically impacted. 
Outlets that had existed for the better part of a century disappeared, giving way to 
powerful new competitors barely a few years old.
As one of the “discourses of sobriety” that Bill Nichols aligns with indepen-
dent documentary film production, journalism represents a large portion of the 
landscape within nonfiction media more generally. Where chapter 3 was focused 
on questions of documentary film production and the use of digital media as a 
critique of right-wing news sources, and chapter 5 discussed the use of data-
journalism techniques, the focus in this concluding chapter is on journalism 
from a more industrial, structural perspective: the nature of the news as a busi-
ness and the manner in which it articulates and fulfils a role for itself within 
society. The rise of the midstream media outlets, and the political polarization of 
mainstream media more generally, have produced a new definition of what “real 
news” looks like—one that’s increasingly influenced by the role of independent 
political documentary.
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Individually, these two information flows appear to be polar opposites. Con-
spiracy theories are, almost by definition, ideas or interpretations held by a rela-
tively limited number of people. Their proponents seek to expose what others have 
kept hidden from the public. News media, on other hand, at least nominally work 
only from what can be demonstrably proven. Journalists seek to establish a shared 
basis of information in the public interest, always in search of the elusive goal of 
“objectivity.” Where the more extreme examples of conspiracy theory might be 
dismissed as the mistaken fantasies of lone individuals, professional journalists 
aim for and usually receive a wide degree of public trust. But despite the radically 
different positionality of these two forms of information (one on the fringe the 
other in the center), they have a remarkable amount in common. For example, 
both conspiracy theorists and news journalists regard themselves for the most part 
as public servants, or at least as working in the public interest. Both also regard 
their work as a necessary check on the state or other powerful institutional forces 
in public life and seek a wide audience for the information that they provide. Fi-
nally, both to some extent regard themselves as the arbiters or at least sources of 
the truth about events and institutions in the world. While conspiracy media may 
not rise to the level of consensus media, or enjoy the same level of trust, its emer-
gence within this same time frame illustrates and responds to the same dissatisfac-
tion with the consensus provided by mainstream media. The formal structures in 
which these shifts play out—newly deployed digital tools and platforms—are the 
very technologies that this book has been exploring thus far.
The fates of these information sources are tied up in one another even as they 
reflect differing movements throughout the post-9/11 period. The fringe began 
moving to the center and the center began working, in some way, more toward 
the fringe. The space between the fringe and the center is in many ways the exact 
space occupied by independent documentary media, sporadically supported on 
one side by the larger media industry (e.g., Errol Morris and Sony Pictures) and in 
conversation with fringe individuals and outlaws on the other (e.g., Julian Assange 
and Edward Snowden). It is difficult to overstate the extent to which I do not mean 
these terms as some sort of judgment on the quality of either form of information. 
My goal here is to demonstrate the way that their mutual movement was a result 
of the particular political climate playing out in a continuously evolving media 
landscape shaped and reshaped by emergent technology.
C ONSPIR ACY MEDIA:  A THOUSAND  
THEORIES BLO OM
Given the tendency that Donald Trump the candidate demonstrated for associ-
ating himself with various conspiracy theories and figures like Alex Jones who 
propagate them, it should perhaps come as no surprise that his election generated 
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an immediate explosion of conspiracy theorizing about the forces that put him 
there.8 As news emerged that Macedonian teenagers were fabricating news sto-
ries to generate web traffic, that a group in Russia had run political ads on social 
media sites promoting various fringe beliefs, that Cambridge Analytica (Trump’s 
campaign consultant) had dubiously obtained access to profile data about mil-
lions of Facebook users, various theories began circulating that Trump’s victory 
was the product of a conspiracy of unseen forces.9 A full accounting of either the 
theories that Trump himself has flirted with or those that have circled around him 
is well beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter, but their sheer proliferation 
across the political spectrum is enough to demonstrate that conspiracy thinking 
had come to dominate a significant portion of the political conversation. But as 
with so many features of the 2016 election, the prominent role conspiracy thinking 
played was less a new development than the culmination of trends that had been 
in place since 9/11.
Conspiracy theories have long been an object of fascination both inside and 
outside of the circles who subscribe to them. Scholars working in fields as diverse 
as political theory, philosophy, cognitive psychology, sociology, and cultural stud-
ies have all considered different aspects of the phenomenon.10 Alongside this aca-
demic work exists a widespread market for popular catalogs and encyclopedias 
that describe the different conspiracy theories that exist—a depth and breadth 
of interest best exemplified by the publication in 2008 of Conspiracy Theory for 
Dummies.11 Despite, or perhaps because of, this widespread interest, the topic is 
one of fierce debate. The ability of individuals to formulate and hold beliefs that 
run counter to verifiable evidence or group consensus, the epistemological foun-
dations and origins of such beliefs, and the relative threat to the existing status 
quo—or the promise that such beliefs pose for it—has led to multiple divergent 
interpretations. Theories about conspiracy theories seem to multiply and diverge 
at a pace equal to the theories themselves.12
There are, however, several points from these debates that can help orient our 
understanding of the prominent role that conspiracy theories played in 2016. 
Much of the interest in philosophy connects back to Karl Popper’s contention 
that conspiratorial thinking runs afoul of the unintended-consequences fallacy.13 
That is, conspiracy theorists mistakenly assume that political and historical events 
are always the outcome of conscious choices. Major events that seem to have no 
obvious explanation or motivation must therefore be the work of powerful un-
seen forces. As Popper points out, however, outcomes often run counter to the 
expectations of those who orchestrate their causes. While Popper’s argument is 
cogent, and well taken among scholars who work in this area, it nonetheless fails 
to account for the broad variety of circumstances that seem to produce conspiracy 
theories. As Charles Pigden and others have pointed out, many such events are the 
result of intentional actions (e.g., assassinations, bombings, etc.), but the larger 
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 motivations or causal connections remain unknown or unspecified, and thus leave 
open a space for conspiracy theories to flourish.14 This thread within analytic phi-
losophy has produced a helpful framework for categorizing and evaluating the 
epistemic basis for different theories and the larger logical conclusions they invite. 
As David Coady demonstrates, conspiracy theories can be logically justified or un-
justified and factually correct or incorrect—an important distinction given the po-
litical manner in which the term “conspiracy theory” is often applied.15 As Coady 
and others are quick to point out, not all conspiracy theories prove to be incorrect 
(Watergate and the Iran/Contra affair, for example), and many that remain neither 
proven nor disproven may still be justified given other evidence (e.g., theories that 
the Bush administration intentionally fabricated evidence of weapons of mass de-
struction as a pretext for invading Iraq).
While this view offers a useful corrective to the traditional tendency to dismiss 
all conspiracy theorists as “kooks” or “weirdos,” the logical and political implica-
tions of conspiracy theorizing must nonetheless be approached with care. In a 
foundational article from 1999, Brian Keeley claimed that conspiratorial thinking 
may be typically justified, and its theories are often correct, but that admitting 
the logical ground on which some theories are based opens the door to a corro-
sive chain of conclusions that make it difficult to believe anything.16 Concluding 
that the government has the capacity to plan, execute, and then cover up massive 
events like the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Holocaust, the AIDS virus, and 
so forth is to imagine a set of capabilities so vast that it becomes difficult to stake 
out a ground beyond its control. How are we, as citizens, capable of countering this 
level of power? This further places these types of theories in an epistemological 
bind: evidence that counters the theory can simply be dismissed as further evi-
dence of the cover-up, evidence that supports it must have somehow escaped the 
vast powers of the conspirators, but evaluating the difference remains a fraught 
endeavor. Finding a logical basis to support any beliefs or perceptions in this envi-
ronment, much less resist the level of control and manipulation this presupposes, 
places one in an untenable position.
While such frameworks provide a logical basis on which to individually evalu-
ate the vast and expanding universe of conspiracy theory, they do not account for 
why they have become so prevalent, nor can they demonstrate how any particular 
theory fits within a larger political or cultural framework. These questions have 
been taken up in the social sciences and humanities, starting most infamously 
with the historian Richard Hofstadter’s polemical essay (and later book) that first 
appeared in the pages of Harper’s in 1964: “The Paranoid Style in American Poli-
tics.” Hofstadter’s use of the term “paranoid” as well as the psychoanalytically in-
fluenced style of his own midcentury writing created something of a backlash by 
later scholars, who criticized his attempts at “diagnosing” and pathologizing those 
who engaged in conspiracy theories.17 It did, however, offer enough of a history 
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of conspiracy theories as well as an account of their narrative form and rhetori-
cal style to inspire a broad body of work in response. Mark Fenster’s more recent 
and more comprehensive analysis in Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in 
American Politics positions conspiracy theorizing as an outgrowth of both a well-
justified cynicism toward power and an enjoyable form of interpretive, narrative 
analysis by the population.18 The populist thread of many conspiracy theories can 
veer into fanatical and problematic territory, but it nonetheless remains a founda-
tional element in American politics rather than a fringe reaction (as Hofstadter 
had positioned it). In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson has examined the emer-
gence and presence of conspiracy logics in other mainstream cultural texts includ-
ing films and television shows as a symptom of (and attempt to grapple with) the 
pervasive but invisible cage of late capitalist totality.19 The tendency to question 
the official narrative accounts provided by the government and other institution-
al powers was clearly a well-established force within American culture (popular 
and marginal, fictional and nonfictional) long before the 2016 election. It is also, 
of course, a tendency shared by many independent political documentary films, 
which have a long tradition of challenging official narratives and providing alter-
native points of view.
What remains less clear is the role that media play within the formulation and 
spread of conspiracy theory—a class of media that, as I mentioned earlier, I will 
to refer to as “conspiracy media.” Conspiracy media comprise the various forms 
of evidentiary media (including government reports, documents, audio and video 
recordings, photographs, and other items) that connect the cultural and political 
impulses behind conspiracy theories with the logical frameworks in which alter-
native narratives are assembled and tested. They provide a nucleus around which 
different conspiracy communities coalesce, and function as key points of exchange 
between the official or consensus understanding of an event and the alternative 
accounts that conspiracy theorists put forth. The legitimacy of conspiracy media 
(authentic or fabricated, relevant or extraneous, transparent or obscure) forms the 
ground on which the competing realities they represent are weighed and tested. 
And perhaps most importantly, their presence testifies to the absent or unseen 
forces that by definition separate the conspiracy theory from the official or con-
sensus narrative. Looking at these conspiracy media—what forms they take, where 
they originate, what they respond to, how they are interpreted—reveals the chang-
ing nature of media and the particular media environments that foster them at a 
given historical moment.
The essential role of conspiracy media for conspiracy theory can perhaps best 
be exemplified by the archetypical conspiracy case of the Kennedy assassination 
and its relationship to what is known as the Zapruder film.20 Abraham Zapruder 
was a Dallas businessman who happened to have brought his new 8mm cam-
era with him to Dealey Plaza on the day of the assassination and was filming the 
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 presidential motorcade when the shooting occurred. His footage provided a seem-
ingly essential visual record for the investigation, and worked in a broader way to 
cement the assassination within the public imagination and the expanding visual 
culture of the time. Unfortunately, as a piece of visible evidence, the footage left 
a good deal open to interpretation. Within Kennedy-assassination theories the 
Zapruder footage forms a foundational ground from which nearly every narra-
tive account of the assassination works, and this includes the official report the 
Warren Commission produced. By capturing the moment of the assassination, 
this piece of footage should theoretically provide a degree of clarity or consensus 
around what took place, but it has had an opposite effect. Everyone believes that 
this piece of moving-image media is evidence, but “Evidence of what?” remains 
the question. As Stella Bruzzi convincingly argues, its meaning is ambiguous at 
best.21 Without the Zapruder footage, and indeed without the myriad history of 
its ownership—who had it and when, who was allowed to see it, what they may 
or may not have done with it while they had it—assassination conspiracy would 
still undoubtedly exist, but it is unlikely to have occupied the prominent status in 
American culture that it has for much of the past sixty years.
The role of the Zapruder film as conspiracy media in the Kennedy assassina-
tion offers a number of points of correspondence with 9/11 conspiracy theory. As a 
germinal historical event for conspiracy thinking, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 are 
often characterized as the twenty-first-century equivalent of the JFK assassination. 
Both events were theorized as traumatic national events that signaled the end of 
a state of perceived innocence on the part of the American public, or American 
culture more broadly. Both also spawned official inquiries (the 9/11 Commission 
and the Warren Commission, respectively—the former of which, Fenster points 
out, was directly modeled on its predecessor).22
But if both events resemble one another in their cultural and historical sig-
nificance and the official and unofficial responses that they generated, the media 
environments that surrounded them were drastically different. Media coverage, 
both amateur and official, of course exploded over the forty years that separated 
them. Instead of the “twenty-six seconds in Dallas” that Zapruder’s film commit-
ted to historical memory, events on September 11 played out over several hours. 
Rather than a single piece of amateur 8mm color film, many of the key moments 
in the 9/11 attacks were recorded live on television and through countless ama-
teur recordings, particularly in lower Manhattan. Where the events in Dealey 
Plaza had fewer than a hundred eyewitnesses, viewers from around the globe 
spent most the day on September 11 in front of their televisions watching. To 
borrow Mary Anne Doane’s well-known framework, we might observe that the 
JFK assassination as represented in the Zapruder film exists within the temporal 
framework of the  catastrophe, whereas 9/11 unfolded in the space of the crisis.23 
Paradoxically, however, this quantity of evidence did not make it any easier to 
comprehend or arrive at consensus on the nature of either event. Rather than 
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clarifying or  generating consensus about 9/11, the pervasive ubiquity of media 
coverage and visible  evidence did nothing to eliminate the spread of conspiracy 
theory around the event.
Taken together, these two events and their attendant media coverage dem-
onstrate a few essential features of what I am referring to as “conspiracy me-
dia.” The first dimension of conspiracy media that these examples reveal is their 
productive capacity to generate further media. If conspiracy theorizing is an 
attempt to assemble an alternative narrative account of events or institutional in-
frastructures within political, social, or historical contexts, then conspiracy me-
dia are in part the sources of the information and evidence they utilize to achieve 
this, and in part the eventual media they create to encapsulate and express these 
theories.24 As the various histories of conspiracy theory demonstrate, conspiracy 
theorists have always produced different forms of media (books, films, radio and 
television broadcasts) to make the case for their theories. This was particularly 
true with 9/11 conspiracy theory as it emerged and evolved in the accelerated 
information environment of the Internet and wider participatory culture of Web 
2.0.25 The widely viewed documentary Loose Change, for example, was released 
online in 2005 and then reedited and rereleased in several different versions not 
only as its theories developed but also as the film garnered more attention and a 
larger production budget. Of course, almost any form of media (e.g., a popular 
film or television show) produces other media that comment upon it, which 
may in turn produce further media still. As scholars of participatory culture 
have demonstrated, fan communities have an incredibly productive capacity to 
expand the media universe of a given text.26 But conspiracy communities are 
fundamentally different from fan communities.
This difference introduces the second quality of conspiracy media, which is 
the oppositional, antithetical relationship they have with one another. As compet-
ing interpretations of the existing evidence, conspiracy media discount or dismiss 
other accounts, including of course whatever official narrative or record about a 
given event exists. These aren’t just differences of opinion; they are competing in-
terpretations of reality, alternative “truths” put forward that claim to be the de-
finitive account of significant historical events. If The 9/11 Commission Report is 
true, then Loose Change must be false, and vice versa. This extends further to the 
various competing factions within the community that produce conspiracy media. 
The adversarial nature of conspiracy media thus feeds into their tendency to ob-
scure rather than clarify the events they describe, which in turn generates the need 
to create further responses that refute the others, and so on. Fueled by the general 
skepticism and suspicion that characterize the conspiratorial mind-set and enact-
ing the iterative, interpretive impulse that this suspicion generates, conspiracy me-
dia are the metastatic output of the larger conspiracy culture that produces them.
The final quality of conspiracy media that we can see at work in both of our 
primary examples above is that conspiracy media, unlike media in other contexts, 
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tend to obscure rather than reveal the events they represent on a wider cultural or 
social level. This is the logical result of the first two qualities of conspiracy media 
outlined above: that they proliferate and replicate, and that their various iterations 
tend to be contradictory or mutually exclusive. Put differently, one of the funda-
mental qualities of conspiracy media is that they confuse rather than clarify the 
subjects they represent. Like the spread of doubt about the existence of climate 
change, the introduction of competing narrative accounts into the discussion of 
9/11 or the Kennedy assassination seems to produce a broader confusion around 
the nature of these historical events.27 This seed of doubt seems to originate in the 
initial evidentiary media itself and regardless of its quantity. That is, like the Za-
pruder film, footage of the Twin Towers collapsing reveals one reality for a partic-
ular conspiracy community, and another for those outside of that community. To 
some extent, this greater quantity of evidence seems to have further destabilized 
consensus, allowing an ever greater proliferation of various accounts, both official 
and alternative, about what transpired and why. Although the degree of immedi-
ate versus delayed public suspicion differs between the two, both frequently stand 
out as among the most “popular” (that is, believed by the widest percentage of the 
population) conspiracy events.28
But if conspiracy media proliferate according to a perverse logic of their own 
and serve to further spread confusion, they contradict a certain logical suppo-
sition of conspiracy communities more generally: that they fundamentally lack 
critical information. When there is disagreement about some fundamental event 
or circumstance, it is logical to conclude that more information is needed. And 
where critical information is lacking, speculation will emerge. As Cass Sunstein 
and Adrian Vermeule argue in an influential if flawed article on conspiracy com-
munities, many are the product of what they call “crippled epistemologies”— 
intellectual frameworks where certain people “know very few things and what 
they know is wrong.”29 In some ways this seems obvious. A greater quantity of 
evidentiary pieces (i.e., conspiracy media) will yield a greater number of potential 
combinations, and hence a greater number differing narrative frames in which to 
assemble them. Like cryptographic-key strength, an added number of variables 
or a longer key length makes finding the one “correct” combination more difficult 
among the increased number of incorrect competitors. In this sense, it is more 
accurate to claim that communities in the thrall of conspiracy theorizing know 
a great many things, even if what they collectively know is (by definition) mostly 
incorrect. Conspiracy communities do not suffer from a lack of information but 
instead from an abundance of it.
But the nature of this formulation should still trouble us. This simply isn’t how 
information is (or at least was) supposed to work. Throughout the historical mo-
ment that witnessed 9/11 and during which the war on terror was taking shape, an 
alternative narrative for the role of media and information and its relationship to 
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truth was also taking shape. The widespread ubiquity of digital media fostered an 
expansion of the forms of amateur media production. Originally grouped under 
the heading of Web 2.0, these technologies, operating under the banner of partici-
patory media, user-generated content, and eventually just social media, were ush-
ered in on a wave of cyberutopianism steeped in an Enlightenment, positivist faith 
in the power of information and collective participation to root out misinforma-
tion and distortion.30 This ethos is expressed not only in the much-hyped business 
manifestos and public-relations messaging that fueled Silicon Valley, but also in 
the critical reflections of, to varying degrees, figures like Pierre Levy, Chris Kelty, 
Clay Shirky, and Yochai Benkler.31 “With enough eyes,” Linus Torvalds assures us, 
“all bugs are shallow.” To be fair, there are a multitude of examples where collective 
effort produces substantive results (Linux and other open-source projects) and 
even reasonable informational accuracy (Wikipedia being the standard example 
cited by more-utopian scholars). The validity of these cases notwithstanding, how-
ever, conspiracy media offer an insistent and instructive counterexample.
If conspiracy media’s abundance simply runs counter to otherwise valid models 
for participatory culture, so be it. However, it also seems to contradict the informa-
tion/truth coupling of conspiracy theorists and their critics. As Sunstein and Ver-
meule contend, conspiracy theorists suffer from crippled epistemologies, which 
they define as “a sharply limited number of (relevant) informational sources.” The 
cure, or perhaps the prosthesis, they offer for this condition is more information. 
In an unfortunate turn of phrase, one seemingly designed to stoke the nightmares 
of their conspiracy-minded subjects, the authors describe providing this cure as 
a type of “cognitive infiltration.”32 This is a process whereby better, more accurate 
information is made available in order to counter the misinformation that is feed-
ing the conspiracy theories. While most conspiracy theorists would presumably 
resist the idea of being cognitively infiltrated, most would also agree that more 
information is needed for the truth to be known. Conspiracy media, as I’ve applied 
the term here, provides a peek into the conspiracy, but it also implies that the true 
nature of the event remains hidden from view, contained in information invisible 
to the public: the hidden images, classified documents, or other media that could 
narrate the whole story, or reveal the whole picture. This unseen evidence is the 
structuring absence of conspiracy, an absence that can be addressed only by more 
information. Thus, for both conspiracy theorists and their critics, the answer to the 
problem of misinformation is more information.
Returning to Donald Trump and the wave of conspiracy media that accompa-
nied his rise to power (both the conspiracies he put forth and those that his critics 
circulated about his election), we can see that their emergence is the fulfilment of 
a longer trend. Conspiracy theories and the production of conspiracy media were 
already on the rise in the 1990s, well before the tragedy of 9/11. Oliver Stone’s JFK 
in 1991 and the Mel Gibson–starring thriller Conspiracy Theory in 1997 adequately 
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bookend a decade marked by the initiation of the various Clinton conspiracies that 
would follow the couple through to Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful candidacies in 
2008 and 2016. The more general and ubiquitous emergence of digital media in the 
2000s accelerated their spread. Given the paradoxical cycle that  conspiracy 
media feeds into and off of, it is easy to see how these circumstances arose, 
although less so to forecast how they might subside. In a functioning democratic 
society, the  traditional mediator between a skeptical public and its government 
is the  journalist—an independent, professional watchdog tasked with holding 
the  government accountable and informing the public. Unfortunately for anyone 
tuning in to find answers, however, the news was experiencing a crisis of its own, 
one complicated by the president’s repeated charge that it was “fake.”
MIDSTREAM MEDIA AND FAKE NEWS
With the rise of Donald Trump within Republican politics, fake news became a 
topic in the news. The evolution of its prolonged news cycle unfolded in several 
stages, not unlike the various stages of grief popularly associated with a traumatic 
loss of some sort. The concept first emerged (or reemerged) on November 3, 2016, 
just days before the election, when Craig Silverman and Lawrence Alexander re-
ported the somewhat shocking news in BuzzFeed that Macedonian websites were 
publishing false stories about the various presidential candidates in order to gen-
erate web traffic and hence Google ad revenue for their creators.33 Trump himself 
then used the term in December of that year to refute claims that he would remain 
on as executive producer of Celebrity Apprentice during his presidency. In the first 
year of his presidency, he went on to use the phrase “fake news” in over 150 differ-
ent tweets, although, as Steve Coll points out, the designation unsurprisingly has 
very little relationship to the veracity of the news story to which he attached it.34 
This, along with Kellyanne Conway’s use of the phrase “alternative facts,” ushered 
in a wave of scandalized outrage and denunciation, before moving on to a fur-
ther chapter of grief and mourning. This stage was marked by ponderous hand-
wringing over the end of truth as a category of human knowledge, and was of 
course accompanied by a related process of pointing fingers and assigning blame.35 
As this “new normal” settled in, we entered the last stage, acceptance, which was 
characterized by a repeated assertion that “fake news” is old news, and has a long 
history that dates back, in some formulations, to Plato’s Republic, and at least as 
far back as the widespread emergence of print news in the nineteenth century.36 
As long as there has been nonfiction media, it seems, there has been a means of 
fabricating this nonfiction as well as a degree of concern over our collective ability 
to decipher the difference.
Fake news may indeed be very old, but it can nonetheless point us to what’s new 
in the new media landscape in which it is has most recently taken root. Within 
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the debates over the role of “fake news,” stories also began circulating about vari-
ous tools and software programs capable of easily manipulating live video and 
audio footage. Dubbed the “next frontier in fake news,” tools such as Retiming 
and Lyrebird seem to have replicated the crisis of confidence that still photography 
experienced with the advent of programs like Photoshop several decades ago.37 
While there is undoubtedly a technological component of fake news, most of the 
examples discussed above (from the Macedonian stories on through those labeled 
by Trump) were relatively low-tech, pointing to the primarily cultural component 
of the problem. However misplaced, such anxieties do reveal a surprising degree 
of ongoing faith in the power of optical media to transparently and objectively re-
cord events before the lens of a camera. Simply put, the possibility of faked footage 
implies the possibility of real or objective footage from which it deviates, a poten-
tial long debunked by scholars of the documentary image. Moreover, the emphasis 
on the truth or falsity of visible evidence itself overlooks the extent to which even 
unaltered or “raw” footage arrives heavily mediated by virtue of the source that 
produced it and its motivations for doing so. These factors may enable  tenuous 
distinctions between categories like news and advertising, documentary and 
propaganda, but often remain invisible under the transparent glare of moving-
image evidence.
Part of what the fear over fake news activates is a deeper fear of or mistrust in 
the influence of media to direct public opinion. As students of media studies will 
immediately recognize, however, these fears are long-standing, and in fact his-
torically synonymous with the emergence of media itself. Indeed, the rise of mass 
broadcast technology in the early twentieth century coincided with deep fears 
about its use to promote what was then being newly referred to as propaganda. As 
Mark Crispin Miller points out, the term “propaganda” etymologically takes on its 
current political and social connotations in the aftermath of World War I, when it 
was revealed that public opinion on the Prussian aggression of the so-called Huns 
leading up to and during the war was a result of specific interventions by the US 
and British information offices. In essence, people felt they had been brainwashed 
into the war by the government. By World War II, however, this fear had been re-
directed toward the German use of media production as part of what was increas-
ingly characterized as a technological “war machine.”
One of the supreme examples that illustrates this political polarization can be 
found in Frank Capra’s 1940 film series Why We Fight. This series of information 
films was intended to inform soldiers, and eventually the general public, about the 
nature of the Axis war machine. While Capra made sure to include plenty of im-
ages of marching soldiers and powerful munitions, one of the primary tools that 
formed the enemy arsenal in his depiction was its use of broadcast technology to 
spread misinformation. This fear of Nazi media found ready purchase because 
a widespread popular perception had emerged over the prior two decades that 
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broadcast media such as radio and multimedia forms like film (which combined 
sound and image) were capable of manipulating the public and brainwashing 
them through the use of invisible radio waves and provocative, agitational moving 
images. This popular paranoia functioned as a mode of what Charles Acland refers 
to as vernacular critique.38 But in Capra’s conception, this fear around the power 
of technology was reshaped to focus on a fear of what political ends it was applied 
to. Its ability to manipulate the public wasn’t disputed. What separated lies from 
truth wasn’t to be found in the medium itself but instead in the politics that drove 
it. Like the Soviet montage theorists Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein, the pow-
erful impact of media on the audience was a feature, not a bug. What separated 
good media from mere propaganda was a question of one’s political position, and 
the designation thus became a label that was used to differentiate the enemy’s use 
of the media from one’s own.39
These traditional nonfiction categories (news, propaganda, documentary) have 
become increasingly complicated in the flattened digital-media landscape that 
has emerged online over the past two decades, reaching an acute crisis point in 
the fake-news debates of 2016–17. Rather than an alteration in the materiality of 
moving-image technology from analog to digital technology, this crisis originates 
in the uncertainty generated by the shifting political economy of the media market 
enabled by digital technology. Two particular manifestations of this evolution can 
help illuminate what is ultimately a broader shift. The first is the general democ-
ratization and widespread adoption of the tools of news manipulation—a prac-
tice commonly referred to as “public relations.” The second is the emergence of 
independent, midsize news outlets like Glenn Greenwald’s The Intercept or Nate 
Silver’s datacentric FiveThirtyEight, among others. While these outlets offer a use-
ful corrective to the corporate-dominated univocality of the “mainstream” news, 
their emergence over the last several years overturns several of the commonly held 
critiques of the mainstream media that have guided media studies scholars for the 
past several decades. They also, in part, feed the adversarial environment in which 
the suspicions around “fake news” were able to take hold.
News and documentary film both traditionally occupy adjacent positions on 
one part of the nonfiction landscape—a landscape that, as scholars of documenta-
ry have long pointed out, stretches across an amazingly wide variety of forms, con-
texts, and creators. It includes the types of amateur media production with limited 
distribution that we more commonly refer to as home movies and family-photo 
albums, as well as the vast swath of zero-degree video recording used for simple ar-
chival and broadcast purposes.40 Here I’m referring to things like TED talks, uni-
versity lectures, training videos, industrial films, and so forth—texts that are “true” 
simply because they offer an approximate record of an event. It stretches, further, 
to institutional contexts like surveillance videos and photos, mug shots, the ID 
photos on things like passports and driver’s licenses—records that are “true” in an 
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institutional regime of governmentality because the facsimile of people and events 
furthers and enables a level of control and regulation, as loaded and biased as these 
supposedly objective records might appear.
Within this spectrum of nonfiction material, the lines within and between these 
various forms of journalism and documentary and related fields like advertising 
and public relations are fuzzy.41 In a sense, journalism, documentary, and adver-
tising all attempt to use the media to alert the public to events or information in 
their interest. All of them are true in a loose way, but we divide them into different 
categories for good reason. The makers of a given product believe, to some extent, 
in the claims they make for it, even if the wider public may not be convinced, and 
an established set of laws and standards holds them to account for the claims they 
make. In the formulation of scholars like Roland Marchand, advertising is an at-
tempt to persuade the public to take a specific action (buy this product), whereas 
news is (at least traditionally) intended to inform the public about a given set of 
issues that may have many different possible interpretations or observations.42 
Documentary, in most theorizations, sits somewhere in the middle, advocating 
for a specific position or course of action but not necessarily directly tied to a com-
mercial outcome in the same way that advertising is.
Within this same landscape sits the field of public relations, or PR, as it is more 
commonly referred to. Public relations is the attempt to transform advertising into 
a form of news, or to steer the public discussion and perception of an industry or 
product toward a particular position or opinion. Like journalists, early pioneers in 
the field claimed that their work was performing a valuable public service: alert-
ing individuals within the community to new products, services, or community 
developments that they might have otherwise missed. As Stuart Ewen describes 
in his monumental history of the field, “The rise of public relations is testimony to 
the ways that institutions of vested power, over the course of the twentieth century, 
have been compelled to justify and package their interests in terms of the common 
good”—even if this common good was not at first apparent to the public itself.43 In 
orchestrating the alchemy that might transform advertising into news, PR inher-
ently destabilizes already porous categories, thereby creating suspicion around the 
role that news plays for its audience.
The man considered by many to be the “one of the most influential pioneers of 
American public relations” was, of course, Edward Bernays.44 Bernays, who passed 
away in 1995 at the age of 103, was a distant relative of Sigmund Freud—a relation-
ship he seems to have implicitly put to good purpose in his own work. Begin-
ning in the 1920s, he pioneered the practice of framing corporate goals and sales 
targets as events of public interest, finding connections between the two in order 
to garner free publicity for his clients. As the title of Crystalizing Public Opinion 
subtly implies, Bernays saw his own work as an instrumental corrective to the sort 
of intellectual labor and propaganda that Walter Lippmann had  theorized was so 
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 essential and so corrosive to the working of a democracy in his own Public Opinion. 
Throughout his three books, Bernays’s work comes across as an interesting mix of 
intellectual self-justification and crass self-promotion, the marriage of which was 
to be one of his singular, if dubious, achievements.45 While PR consultants might 
have worked in the interests of their institutional clients, they nonetheless thought 
of themselves very differently from advertising agencies. As Bernays is quoted in 
the introduction to his landmark text, Crystalizing Public Opinion, public-relations 
men don’t work in images (like their advertising counterparts) but instead “deal 
in reality.”46 This connection between image and reality, the attempt to interweave 
and mold both, is essential to understanding the connections between news, visual 
culture, and truth that fake news entails.
A comparable work written nearly a century later by the provocateur and 
inheritor of Bernays’s mantle, Ryan Holiday, demonstrates the extent to which 
the manipulation of journalism and public perception has and has not changed 
in the intervening century. Holiday was a self-taught marketing consultant who 
worked with several high-profile if controversial clients including American Ap-
parel and the author Tucker Max, eventually building a list of blue-chip corpo-
rate clients. In 2010, Holiday published Trust Me, I’m Lying, a tell-all about his 
methodology for manipulating the structure of the news industry. The book set 
off a minor controversy in media circles—an achievement he claims was intend-
ed to make the book self-exemplifying or meta-evidence of the methodology 
he utilized on behalf of his clients.47 The book is thus one part media critique, 
one part how-to on media manipulation. Holiday’s method is rather simple. He 
claims that the news industry is a deeply hierarchical structure where lower-tier 
blogs and social-media figures provide the content and fodder for publishers 
higher up the food chain in exchange for traffic and attention. The arrangement 
is informal and unwritten but, in Holiday’s formulation, entirely predictable. 
Items that get attention at one or two lower-tier venues can be used to push 
higher-tier venues into coverage. For example, in the campaign for the Tucker 
Max movie I Hope They Serve Beer in Hell (Bob Gosse, 2009), Holiday purchased 
intentionally provocative billboard space around Los Angeles. He then defaced 
these ads, took photos of the vandalism, and e-mailed them to a local culture 
website as evidence of the controversy the movie was generating. Once the blog 
picked up this story and ran it, this coverage, along with the original photos, 
was then sent to higher-tier publishers, with a demand to know why they were 
ignoring what was becoming a movement to ban the film. And so on. Holiday 
in essence had pioneered, or at least claimed to pioneer, the sort of manipulative 
tactics that right-wing provocateurs like Milo Yiannopoulos and others would 
master. Put differently, Holiday had figured out how to use the type of trolling 
tactics that Whitney Phillips meticulously documents in This Is Why We Can’t 
Have Nice Things in the service of promoting his commercial  clients.48
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While Holiday demonstrates an essential historical continuity with Bernays in 
his attempts to influence the media, he is also evidence of a radical difference in 
the media landscape of our current moment. Both Bernays and Holiday share a 
certain methodology: package the interests of a specific constituency (often a cor-
poration or industry) in a way that makes it legible to the public—and more spe-
cifically, to journalists—as legitimate news within the public interest. But Bernays 
is clearly a man of institutions and the elite. He represented an industry, founded 
a council, and consulted with the institutional leaders at the highest levels of gov-
ernment, academia, and industry. Holiday, on the other hand, is far more of an 
individual, neoliberal player. His intended readership is not the intellectual elite, 
or even the individual of public opinion, but instead the individual who might be 
able to perform a type of armchair public-relations campaign for whatever pet 
project or product he or she might have to hand. Rather than laying out or at-
tempting to establish an intellectual framework that might justify the role that 
public relations plays in American life as his predecessor had, Holiday instead 
offers us a confessional tell-all on the manner in which the blogosphere might be 
manipulated in order to achieve viral traffic and public notoriety.49
While it is tempting to dismiss Holiday’s work for what it is (a straightforward 
attempt at self-promotion), we should also account for the acute critique that he 
offers of the economic structure of the blog-driven media landscape. In ruthless 
detail, Holiday delineates the metrics that drive blogs like Huffington Post, Tech 
Crunch, Weblogs Inc., Gawker, and countless others to underpay their writers on a 
per-story basis predicated on the traffic that those stories generate. These working 
conditions force writers to search for prepackaged, sensational content in order 
to churn out stories that achieve viral traffic levels. Since these same realities exist 
up and down the hierarchy of the media structure, even the largest, most reliable 
news sites depend in some way on the groundwork carried out by lower-tier, less 
reputable players in the food chain. These are the economic realities that drove 
Macedonian teenagers to create absurd news stories, Facebook to ignore the viral 
contagion across its network as people “liked” and shared the stories, BuzzFeed 
to cover the emergence and influence of completely fabricated news, and an end-
less stream of high-profile media outlets to pontificate on the ongoing presence 
of truth in our current moment. At each stage of the process, traffic and attention 
were the key metrics that drove the proliferation of content, until eventually traffic 
and attention became the content.
This may seem far afield from the discussion of documentary and digital media 
that has dominated the discussion thus far, but we should recall that the same forc-
es in play here (greater access to the tools of content creation, suspicion of official 
accounts, political polarization) are what have driven both the alterations in the 
news landscape that are being described here and the widespread experimentation 
in documentary form that was described in preceding chapters. The economic 
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realities of journalism are nothing new, but in the past these forces colluded to 
produce the norms and standards that the specter of fake news seems to threaten. 
In the United States the history of the news is driven by changing relationships 
between advertisers, journalists, and readers. As Marchand demonstrates, many of 
the early newspapers and magazines self-consciously crafted their content in order 
to assemble the audience that they thought would appeal to different advertising 
demographics.50 Qualities like “truth” and “objectivity” became self-conscious ide-
als that were seen to appeal to a specific, well-heeled demographic that was desired 
by advertisers. The idealized model of journalism that emerged through the efforts 
of early newspaper titans like Joseph Pulitzer sought to maintain a strict boundary 
between the editorial positions of its publishers, the news it produced, and the ad-
vertisements it ran in support of the enterprise more generally.51 For Pulitzer these 
distinctions were aimed at increasing circulation: creating a product that people 
would trust was a means of assembling an audience that could in turn be sold to 
advertisers. Along with the rise of the Associated Press style as the default tone for 
news coverage, an amorphous notion of truth and objectivity became the default 
ideal in American print journalism, even if there were many critics who pointed 
out how distant or impossible this ideal was. As broadcast media (first radio, then 
television) emerged, this same basic equation between content, funding, and audi-
ence was further elaborated through the mandate that this content should be in 
the public interest and regulated through broadcast licensing.52
This is not to say, of course, that news (in any of these forms) had achieved 
objectivity or truth. The equation on which it rested, paid for by advertising but 
produced in the public interest, was always an uneasy if not contradictory com-
promise. This inherent conflict has provided a nucleus for a great deal of media 
and communications research in the post–World War II period, beginning with 
early Frankfurt School work on the culture industry, and resurfacing in various 
arguments and key texts over the past fifty years. Consider, for example, Dan-
iel Boorstin’s much celebrated The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, 
which analyzes the impact of visual culture on journalism as simultaneously ce-
menting a notion of visual objectivity while playing to the basest, most sensational 
appetites of the audience in order to command their attention.53 Or Edward Jay 
Epstein’s equally central News from Nowhere, which vividly chronicled the pro-
duction of network news coverage and the competing demands that it satisfied 
(advertisers, ratings, regulators, and, of course, the audience).54 Other work, like 
Manufacturing Consent, by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, demonstrates 
that the illusion of objectivity invests the media with a powerful ideological capac-
ity that overwhelmingly benefits the financial and political interests that shape it.55 
Further, the long-running concern over increased ownership concentration (the 
number of different media corporations that produce the news) also positions the 
business of media production against the quality of the information it provides.56
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But even the most trenchant critiques of the news and its failure to achieve 
objectivity subtly reinforce the notion that this is the standard to which it as-
pires. Truth and the public interest are held throughout as the norm from which 
the media and journalists deviate. And, more importantly for my purposes here, 
it is the perceived failure to meet these ideals that became the basis of the charge 
of “fake news.” We can see the contours of these competing forces if we consider 
the role of the news in covering the 2016 election. The phenomenon of Donald 
Trump as a candidate posed a conflict for news organizations: on one hand, his 
critics were predicting that his presidency would be a disaster. On the other 
hand, covering the disaster in progress produced record-breaking ratings for 
news organizations that had been under threat of consolidation and retrench-
ment for much of the period between 2000 and 2015. This conflict of interest was 
clearly expressed in a speech by the former CEO of CBS, Leslie Moonves, when 
he stated of the network’s coverage of Trump’s campaign, “It may not be good 
for America, but it’s damn good for CBS.”57 This was also the same set of forces 
that had apparently driven the creation of the Macedonian news stories: outra-
geous information generated traffic, if not truth. Once again, the public interest 
appeared to be at odds with the business of journalism.
But the 2016 election cycle also demonstrated the increased influence of mid-
stream media outlets. Sites such as Vox, FiveThirtyEight, Breitbart, The Intercept, 
Quartz, Slate, and Axios had positioned themselves midway between mainstream 
news and more-marginal independent bloggers and fringe news sources. While 
these were the most prominent, many more also appeared in specific vertical-con-
tent categories.58 Many of them, in an effort to generate trust in readers and attract 
top-tier talent, are connected with or headlined by veteran journalists who once 
worked with older mainstream media outlets. Many employ techniques that are 
dependent upon or critical toward the practices of traditional mainstream jour-
nalists. And several of them are independently funded by wealthy individuals as 
ideological or political projects. Rather than producing consensus, these various 
outlets instead seem to respond to the polarization and dissensus that so charac-
terizes the environment in which they emerged.
As an illustration of this, we can briefly compare two midstream outlets: Bre-
itbart and The Intercept. On the surface, each resembles the other, and both fit 
the midstream model described above. The Intercept is largely backed by Pierre 
Omidyar, the billionaire founder of eBay, through an umbrella media project 
he started called First Look Media.59 The founders of the site—Glen Greenwald, 
Laura Poitras, and Jeremy Scahill—all came from existing careers in media and 
journalism, listing among their credits Salon, The Guardian, Democracy Now, and 
the New York Times, although Poitras was best known as an independent docu-
mentary filmmaker. Similarly, Breitbart was founded by veteran blogger and Fox 
News commentator Andrew Breitbart and heavily funded by the Mercer  Family 
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 Foundation.60 After Breitbart’s death in 2012, Steve Bannon became executive 
chairman and worked on revamping and expanding both the website and the or-
ganization itself. Ideologically, the two sites could not be further apart. Under Ban-
non’s leadership, Breitbart positioned itself as a platform for the far right and “alt-
right,” openly supporting extreme conservative political issues and candidates, 
including Donald Trump. The Intercept, on the other hand, is largely considered 
liberal or left-leaning, although it would balk at any political affiliation. Both sites 
position themselves as correctives to the failings of the mainstream news. For The 
Intercept, this takes the form of what it calls “adversarial journalism,” pointed at 
the traditional sources of power, including older, established media like the New 
York Times.61 For Breitbart, it means countering what it perceives to be the liberal 
bias in most mainstream media. What is striking about both is the extent to which 
their shared qualities (independent funding, a critical stance toward mainstream 
media and other sources of power, argument-driven information) are qualities 
that might equally describe a particular iteration of documentary film itself. In-
deed, it is not a coincidence that figures like Scahill, Poitras, and even Bannon had, 
in other contexts, turned to documentary in order to accomplish what they now 
turned to journalism to achieve.
The evolution of these midstream players and their “adversarial” relationship 
with their competitors is the latest development in a longer chapter in the history 
of the news. Beginning in the 1990s, the rather stable landscape of mainstream 
journalism, consisting for decades of print media and the major broadcasts net-
works, was invaded by newcomers from cable, radio, and eventually the Internet. 
But rather than unifying mainstream media’s homogeneity, each new voice posi-
tioned itself as an essential antidote to some key deficit in the existing sources of 
information. Thus, CNN was the answer to the limited amount of time allotted to 
news by broadcast networks, Fox was the answer to the liberal bias of CNN and 
others, MSNBC was a response to Fox’s overt right-wing bias, bloggers were the 
answer to the class of professional journalists, and so on.62 Each new entrant to 
the increasingly competitive news marketplace—itself newly marketized as a re-
sult of media consolidation and shifting revenue sources within older, established 
forms like newspapers and broadcast networks—thus joined the mainstream by 
critiquing its existing framework and positioning itself as a better instrument of 
truth and objectivity. This market-driven sense of distrust also came amid cogent 
critiques of mainstream media practices from figures like Jon Stewart, Steven Col-
bert, and even The Onion, attracting large audiences while delivering well-justified 
outlines of mainstream media’s shortcomings.
This reaches something of a crescendo in the emergence of midstream media. 
All of them position themselves in some way as the antidote to what’s wrong or 
what’s lacking in mainstream media. FiveThirtyEight prides itself on its data-driven 
journalism, and the manner in which objective data might counter the affective, 
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subjective impressions of reporters that plague traditional journalism. Vox is the 
explainer news source, giving the story behind the stories that other news outlets 
take for granted. Breitbart and The Intercept are both independently funded, hence 
not reliant on traditional advertising revenue. Each of these outlets vies for our 
attention by offering us not just an additional source of information, but a “better” 
source of information. There is not necessarily anything wrong with a broader 
variety of voices. Media consolidation (i.e., fewer unique voices) has long been a 
primary concern among scholars and media watchdog groups.63 But this greater 
heterogeneity does provide an outlet, or perhaps an alibi, for those seeking to dis-
miss information that conflicts with their own opinions—a move implicitly or ex-
plicitly encouraged in an adversarial environment haunted by the specter of “fake 
news.” The marketplace logic that governs the circulation of ideas and information 
within a democracy dictates that more ideas, more voices, are ultimately better for 
the individuals who make political choices based on this data. But the market logic 
that drives news outlets to compete for viewers through product differentiation 
based on the critique and dismissal of one’s competitors seems to produce the op-
posite effect. As Yochai Benkler and his collaborators demonstrated, followers on 
both sides of the political spectrum in the 2016 US election were consuming a diet 
of media that came from across the political spectrum, but were consuming that 
information differently. Framed, reframed, and shared to one’s network on Twitter 
and Facebook, these stories simply amplified or reinforced the opinions and input 
that one already possessed.64 A broader diversity of media sources like the one 
provided by the midstream outlets, built on the premise that something is lacking 
in the news more generally, seems to produce dissensus and suspicion rather than 
consensus and trust in the media.
This broader diversity of media outlets also makes any level of brand recogni-
tion more difficult. Consider, for example, beyond the relatively larger midstream 
choices discussed so far, the broad array of choices and sources that confront users 
of digital news aggregators like Instapaper, Flipboard, Google News, and Apple 
News. These apps enable users to choose from and curate a broad diversity of 
sources, potentially enabling them to explore a variety of voices from across the in-
creasingly politicized news spectrum.65 Several studies have further demonstrated 
that these apps are also beneficial for news providers, bringing in additional read-
ers who might not have been part of the existing audience.66 While the experi-
ence of browsing such aggregators seems intended to remediate the experience of 
browsing titles at a newsstand in the analog era, the digital form dissolves any of 
the material indicators that might be used to judge the quality of a source’s content. 
When getting something into print or even into a professionally produced website 
required vast resources, the mere presence of a news source spoke to some level 
of investment and commitment. This is no longer the case, and rather than a few 
trusted sources that one has tested over and over through years of consideration, 
178    Post-Truth Politics
we instead have an endless sea of choices and newcomers, all of which appear to 
be equal, at least on the surface. This makes for a deeper level of confusion about 
what’s real or fake, trustworthy or unreliable. The diversity of sources provides the 
perfect camouflage for one site to slip in among the others, imitating the trappings 
and aesthetics of more-established sources in the way that The Onion or the Mace-
donian news sites did.
This sort of camouflage through imitation in the context of information den-
sity is what enabled the alleged disinformation campaigns that appeared on social 
media sites including Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. In the midst of investigat-
ing potential Russian interference in the US election, the social media platforms 
provided a congressional committee with examples of the various propaganda.67 
Of what were purported to be thousands of advertisements purchased by these 
groups and paid for in rubles, fourteen examples were provided as a representative 
sample. As a whole, the aesthetics of these ads are fairly consistent, working to seed 
and spread the sort of viral, meme-driven media that already readily circulate in 
political channels across the web. Most seem to provide an alibi for their informal, 
unpolished look by pretending to be the work of amateurs and small grassroots 
organizations. To borrow Paul Arthur’s term, this sloppy aesthetic is part of the 
rhetoric of authenticity, much in the way that shaky handheld camerawork con-
notes a type of amateur, documentary production.68 Ideologically, they are all over 
the map, espousing contradictory and in some cases incomprehensible political 
positions, but all benefitting from the sort of oppositional, adversarial environ-
ment that predominates in this same mediascape. As their metadata indicate, none 
of them were seen by that many people, but most were shared forward multiple 
times beyond their original placement, making any assessment of their audience, 
and hence their impact, a near impossibility.
These advertisements thus offer a sort of stand-in or emblem of the larger en-
vironment of misinformation and disinformation, paranoia and suspicion that 
pervades any understanding of the US election in 2016. Their material plasticity, 
somewhere between advertisement, propaganda, and journalism, circulates in a 
space of unknowability: seen by an unidentifiable audience and produced and paid 
for by the same. Hidden within a much larger environment of media heterogeneity 
that feeds on critique and suspicion, they offer a marked contrast with the efforts at 
mass persuasion and propaganda at work in prior historical moments, represent-
ing instead the diffusion of media within a networked space. Purchased for small 
amounts of money, they seem to have slipped in unnoticed among everyone else 
on the back of a platform whose only logic is the exchange and monetization of 
content created by others. But like the forms of propaganda considered earlier, this 
is a feature of social networks like Facebook, not a bug.
Ironically, the emergence of all of these imitators, both real and fake,  satirical 
and earnest, seems to have produced a positive outcome for the mainstream, 
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 traditional targets of their attack. Since the 2016 election and Donald Trump’s 
 one-man war on the media, many of these older news outlets have been asking for, 
and in many cases receiving, direct support from their readers in the form of sub-
scriptions, donations, and other revenue streams that might  replace the  declining 
advertising revenue from their print and broadcast properties.69 Almost in the way 
that the media critic Jean Baudrillard once claimed that  Disneyland, with its simu-
lations of Main Street USA and other fantastical,  nostalgic spaces, provided an 
alibi or sense of reassurance that the real world outside the park still existed, these 
fake news websites and the paranoia and suspicion that they have engendered 
seem to have given traditional media a new aura of  authenticity and importance.70
C ONCLUSION
While the 2016 election and the surprise victory of Donald Trump may have been 
a shocking event that “shook the foundations of American politics,” two of its 
most notable features—the cloud of suspicion and conspiratorial theorizing under 
which it unfolded and the reemergence of “fake news”—were the products of long-
standing trends in American culture and its media.71 The political backdrop—and, 
I would argue, accelerating cause—of these larger shifts was of course the war on 
terror. As the US government’s response to 9/11 began to accentuate the political 
polarization and partisan infighting of the late 1990s, it also generated policies and 
practices seemingly designed to bear out, or perhaps simply validate, the darkest 
fears of the conspiracy community. These included things like CIA black sites, 
extraordinary rendition, John Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness program, 
and at least rumors of the widespread surveillance practices that were eventually 
revealed by Edward Snowden. Snowden of course provided only one in a long line 
of explosive leaks that included those of WikiLeaks, of the Abu Ghraib images, and 
several other such leaks that quickly took on a role as fodder for conspiracy media 
in an ever-widening landscape of attempts to contain and explain the causal logic 
of these events. This culture of suspicion, and the perceived failure of traditional 
news outlets to adequately account for and address these events, in turn fueled the 
rise of the midstream news outlets discussed here.
In the early phases of the war on terror, political activists and independent doc-
umentary filmmakers responded by utilizing newly available and rapidly evolving 
digital tools and channels of distribution as they sought to expose and condemn 
what many deemed to be an ill-conceived, unjust response to the terrorist at-
tacks on September 11, 2001. The election of a progressive president on a netroots 
wave of enthusiasm touting a platform of “hope and change” brought with it the 
mainstream institutionalization of some of these technologies. These promises 
were further challenged by political activists and journalists seeking total trans-
parency. The election of Donald Trump on a surge of nationalist populism not 
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only redefined the political right in the United States but also demonstrated the 
extent to which the politics of opposition and the ethos of technological disrup-
tion had become part of the mainstream political discourse. By 2016, many of the 
tools utilized in these early official and oppositional responses to the war on ter-
ror (social networking, user-generated content, virtual simulation, data visualiza-
tion) had become mainstream platforms in themselves. Just as sound technology 
or observational footage had evolved from cutting-edge, novel approaches into 
standard elements in the documentary lexicon, these new technologies became 
established frameworks for representing the world and distributing information. 
Where 2016 might have betrayed the seemingly democratizing, progressive po-
tential that (some believed) was endemic to distributed digital technology, it also 
demonstrated that these newly evolved representational technologies were media 
like any other—media capable of both transparency and obfuscation,  individual 
expression and mass manipulation, documentary alongside fiction. They had 
 become a space, in short, where truth lies.
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